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In the late 2000s, the renewed interest of the Arctic States over the Arctic has been seen with interna-
tional concern as a revival of hard-core geopolitics towards an area that became an example of coopera-
tion among states and minorities. This apprehension is based on a simplistic conception of territory as 
the natural material manifestation of the State over the Earth, typical of classical geopolitics and the 
realist school of International Relations (IR). The scope of this thesis is thus twofold. Firstly it aims at 
problematizing the often academically neglected concept of territory. It is only adopting Wendt’s social 
constructivist approach and the notion of the state “as-a-person”, which rationalizes its personhood and 
agency on the international scene, that I assume it is possible to understand the contemporary situation 
of the Arctic, where the Arctic States are intentionally acting as the legitimate actors, within the socio-
cultural framework of the current International Legal System. Moreover, with the analysis of the 
sources of international law and how they manage and resolve territorial disputes, it will be argued Carl 
Schmitt’s previous conceptions of territorial sovereignty and geographical Order, described in the 
Nomos of the Earth, which is also at the roots of IR realism. My point is that, following Stuart Elden’s 
insight, territory is indeed a political technological tool, whose technological aspects are represented by 
cartography which influences subtly the way we relates to the World and eventually even the patterns 
of the modern nation-state through what Franco Farinelli calls the cartographic reasoning. Such logic 
is best expressed by the three characteristics of continuity, homogeneity and isotropy, that ‘stemming 
from the map’ are the attribute themselves of the modern state. The categorization of these three 
features through the methodological means of Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis will 
provide an initial analytical framework for the Arctic Strategy documents of Norway, Russia and 
Finland. Considering them as the performative territorial representation of the state, it will be possible 
to prove whether the Arctic States are actually turning back to hard national interest-based policies, or 
some post-modern spatial aspect is predominating. The findings are promising on the analytical side, 
showing the appropriate flexibility for texts and maps, and illustrate that the Arctic States are ‘still on 
the Map’, managing to adapt global phenomena in the terms of cartographic reasoning, reaffirming thus 
their leading role in the determination of political space. 
 
ii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER 1 – CONSTRUCTIVISM IN IR AND STATE PERSONHOOD 5 
1.1 CONSTRUCTIVISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 6 
1.2 THE PROBLEM OF STATE PERSONHOOD: WENDT’S HOLISTIC APPROACH 9 
1.2.1 Characteristics of a person 10 
1.2.2 Wendt’s justification of the State as unitary actor: the “essential state” 12 
1.2.3 Wendt’s justification of the State as unitary actor: the “corporate agent” 14 
1.3 CRITIQUES TO THE CONCEPT OF STATE-PERSON: PLURALIST AND PRAGMATIC APPROACHES,  
AND A POSSIBLE SYNTHESIS 17 
1.3.1 Pluralist approach’s critiques 17 
1.3.2 Pragmatic approach’s critiques and insight 18 
1.3.3 Beyond Reductionism and Holism: Complexity and the approach of Synergetics 20 
1.4 THE STATES’ INTERNATIONAL CULTURE 22 
CHAPTER 2 – THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS GEOGRAPHICAL 
EXPRESSION 25 
2.1 THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM AS THE INTERNATIONAL CULTURE 25 
2.1.1 The ordering principle of Sovereignty 26 
2.1.2 Corollary: the underlying principle of Effectivity 28 
2.1.3 The corporeality of the state: territory as necessary attribute 29 
2.2 AT THE GEOGRAPHICAL ROOTS OF IR REALISM: SCHMITT AND THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH 29 
2.2.1 Terrestrial origins of legal systems, the Nomos 30 
2.2.2 The first global Nomos, the Jus Publicum Europeaum 33 
2.2.3 Freedom of the Sea: justification and development 34 
2.2.4 The post-Versailles (dis-)Order and conclusions 35 
2.3 COMMENTARY AND CRITICISM OF THE WORLDVIEW OF THE NOMOS 37 
2.3.1 Major critiques on the Nomos and Schmitt’s ‘international theory’ 39 
2.3.2 Effective sovereignty as the primary title in contemporary international law 40 
2.4 “TERRITORY” AS A POLITICAL TOOL 43 
2.4.1 Land / Terrain / Territory 44 
2.4.2 Territory: a political technology 46 
CHAPTER 3 – THE ‘CARTOGRAPHICAL REASONING’ OF MODERNITY 47 
3.1 THE AMBIGUITIES OF ‘TERRITORY’ 47 
3.1.1 Caressing the geometrical Texture 48 
3.1.2 Triangular Thinking: a Cartographic Epistemology 49 
iii 
 
3.2 EXITING THE MYTH THROUGH PROJECTION: THE BIRTH OF SPACE 50 
3.2.1 Myth and the Map: the forgotten Moral of the Story 50 
3.2.2 Place versus Space 51 
3.2.3 The Revolution of the Cartographic Reasoning 53 
3.2.4 Ideology and the ‘Graphical Bias’ 56 
3.3 CONTINUITY, HOMOGENEITY AND ISOTROPY: THE THREE CHARACTERISTICS  
OF THE MODERN STATE 56 
3.3.1 Continuity 57 
3.3.2 Homogeneity 57 
3.3.3 Isotropy 58 
3.3.4 Alternative cartographies: the example of Imperial China 58 
3.4 THE POSSIBLE POST-MODERN TERRITORIAL DISCONTINUITY IN IR: THE MULTI-PERSPECTIVAL  
POLITY 60 
CHAPTER 4 – CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND THE  
CONTEMPORARY ARCTIC 63 
4.1 THE ‘ARCTIC STRATEGIES’ AS PERFORMATIVE AND TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATIONS 63 
4.2 DISCOURSE AND CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 65 
4.2.1 CDA Framework and Vocabulary 67 
4.2.2 The Cartographic Reasoning in textual form 71 
4.3 THE EXTENSION OF TERRITORIALITY OVER SPACE: THE EXAMPLE OF THE CONTEMPORARY  
ARCTIC 72 
4.3.1 The territorial order’s latest developments: Sovereignty over the sea 73 
4.3.2 The notion of Common Heritage of Humanity 74 
CHAPTER 5 – THE ARCTIC STATES’ ARCTIC STRATEGIES:  
THE CASES OF NORWAY, RUSSIA AND FINLAND 77 
5.1 NORWAY – THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT’S HIGH NORTH STRATEGIES, 2006-2009 78 
5.1.1 The High North Strategies – Between the globe and the map 83 
5.2 RUSSIA – THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION POLICY IN THE ARCTIC  
UNTIL 2020 AND BEYOND 85 
5.2.1 The ‘Foundations’ as the exemplar ‘textual map’ 88 
5.3 FINLAND – FINLAND’S STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION 89 
5.3.1 Finland’s Strategy – Variable styles and perspectives 91 
5.4. FINDINGS AND REFLECTIONS: THE STATE STILL ON THE MAP. 93 
CONCLUSIONS 98 
APPENDIX 100 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 102 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Arctic has been in the last years a rather significant topic in international politics, where national 
interests and global concerns seem to be clashing with a diffuse worry for the military and ecological 
stability of the region and the globe. Despite the increased scientific and environmental cooperation of 
the 1990s (a process of international integration that spilled over many political and social aspects and 
brought to the establishment of the Arctic Council, a high level intergovernmental forum to provide a 
means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States), the conspicu-
ous untapped natural resources, hydrocarbons in particular, and the opening of new ice-free routes cau-
sed by the warming global climate are fostering a new commotion regarding the militarization of the 
area and the determination of territorial boundaries. Mesmeric expressions such as “Arctic Rush or 
Frenzy” recall frontier’s sceneries and epic races, and are frequently appearing in media broadcasts and 
academic publications, advocating a revival of the most realpolitik geopolitics.  
Being mostly an ice pack covered sea, on whose shores and ice nomadic people had been living for 
thousands of years, and settled by nation-states only in the two centuries, the Arctic1 is indeed one of 
the last extensions of the World to be explored and settled, and still maintains the exotic aura of a le-
gendary place. This conception drastically changed in the last decades. In particular the publishing in 
2004 of the ‘Arctic Climate Impact Assessment’ (ACIA), followed the next year by its scientific report, 
increased even more the ecological awareness of the frailty of the area. These documents were a decisi-
ve turning point in the general perception of the Arctic and global warming in general: the ice-pack and 
permafrost layers are sensibly reducing and hazarding traditional ways of living, damaging infrastruc-
tures, reducing food stocks both on land and in the sea. The Arctic is not a symbol of unconquerable 
natural wilderness, but the human activities are irreducibly destroying it. This fostered a new wave of 
‘protective’ environmental discourse, yet, at the same time, there has been increasing political and eco-
nomic interests in the area,  whose causes are various and contingent: the melting of the ice opens ship-
ping routes that shorten drastically circumnavigation times, and easier conditions for oversea drilling. 
Moreover, unresolved territorial disputes among the coastal Arctic brought to spectacular symbolic 
acts, such as the posting of the Russian flag on the North Pole on bottom of the Arctic Ocean in August 
2007. Yet, these phenomena are all on the surface; the real change happens unnoticed.  
                                                            
1 Etymologically, the word Arctic comes straight from the Greek ‘arctòs’, ‘of the bear’, implying the region where the 
constellation of Ursa Minor, the Little Bear, is zenithal. Consequently, Antarctica, is its antipode. 
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Research questions and outline. 
Despite this apparent reassertion of national interests towards the North pole, I had a hunch that the al-
ready established experience of international cooperation enhanced by the Arctic Council on one hand, 
and the example of European integration on the other could have influenced some of the Arctic States 
and international organizations toward a less competitive and hard-security driven policies, enhancing 
networking at all levels, from intergovernmental to local. Thus, the first hypothesis was to analyze the 
recently published Arctic Strategies of Norway, Russia and the European Union, to investigate their 
main themes and discourses. Yet, similar researches had been already undertaken, so I decided to chan-
ge completely perspective, as I noticed that in the discipline of International Relations (IR) the notion 
of ‘territory’ was never truly problematized, but always taken for granted. Being influenced by the cri-
tical thought that the ‘unsaid covers the dominant ideologies’, I strongly felt this was the new topic of 
my  thesis,  helped  furthermore  by  the  insights  of  political  and  critical  geography  and  especially  the  
works of the Italian geographer Franco Farinelli, who theorized the logic underlying all the modern 
thought and the formation of the nation-state: the cartographic reasoning. The Arctic Strategy policy 
papers became thus the perfect research material in order to discover whether the approach the Arctic 
States had towards their territory and the Arctic followed this modern reasoning or some hints of post-
modern governance were to be found, with the help of Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis in-
sights, especially in the investigation of written texts.  
The main questions of this work are thus two, and the second cannot be answered without the back-
ground set up by the first, which is “what state territory actually is and how to analyze it within the dis-
cipline of international relations?”. This is the thread that connects the first three chapters, which un-
cover and build up the analytical model through which the territorial representations of the Arctic Stra-
tegies will be then investigated. In light of this model construction, the adoption of Wendt’s construc-
tivist approach, and his justification of the “State-as-person” theory was essential in order to validate 
state’s intentions and therefore also the policy papers as states’ projections and projects over territory. 
Moreover, the state as “legal person” is one of the basilar concept of the International Legal System), 
that, taken in a broader sense than Wendt’s, could represent the constructivist concept of ‘international 
Culture’, both in constitutive and behavioral terms. 
In fact, territory had usually been carefully defined only in legal terms, stemming from specific princi-
ples, mainly the concept of absolute sovereignty. It is no surprise that the first political theorist to pro-
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blematize territory, Carl Schmitt in its Nomos of the Earth2, was a legal scholar and his dissertation is 
based on the development of jurisprudence in the last four centuries. The Nomos is an important work 
also because it draws its conclusions from the development of the legal system in modern Europe (and 
consequently of the contemporary international Culture too) and also because it will later influence also 
the realist school of IR. The confutation of Schmitt’s theories, especially in regard to the contemporary 
development of international law concerning territorial sovereignty through the continuous reference to 
its sources and jurisprudence (e.g. international conventions, treaties, arbitral reports and judgments) 
will bring to a new and analytically more feasible point of view: Elden’s approach of territory as a 
legal-technical political tool, thus unifying the contemporary legal notion of effective sovereignty and 
the technical means of territory, the geographical and cartographic techniques used to represent it and 
their underlying logic. 
The geographical description of territory in cartographic terms is indeed a powerful tool both for des-
criptive and cognitive relevance. Only considering it as a political ‘symbol’ it is possible its mediation 
between individual places and the totality of the World though uniform space. This space is the result 
of a real “cartographic revolution” that occurred in the same centuries that saw also the development of 
the modern nation-state (16th-19th century). The increasing accuracy in the graphic representation of 
maps as the factual copy of the World, induces the “graphic bias”, a cognitive misconception that assu-
ming the perfect identity between the object (here the World) and the representation (the Map) conceals 
the original selective mechanisms and perspectives that transforms the relation with reality from a sim-
ple reflection into a constitutive correlation: we tend to shape the World according to the maps and 
their patterns. Such obfuscation is mirrored by the pervasivity of what Fainelli calls the cartographic 
reasoning that extends into the formation of the modern nation-state through the three Euclidean cha-
racteristics of space: continuity, homogeneity and isotropy.  
Therefore, it is only unifying Elden’s and Farinelli’s insights, namely considering state territory as the 
political tool of the modern nation-state described in legal and cartographic terms (expressed in particu-
lar by the presence of the Euclidean characteristics), that it is then possible to pose the second question, 
already introduced by John Ruggie in the early 1990s: are globalizing tendencies of any form, leading 
to post-modern patterns of territorial space, namely in signs of a discontinuity in the territorial repre-
sentations of the states? If so, this divergence should be reflected also in the states’ policy documents 
which have state territory as object of their course of action. The Arctic Strategies released in the last 
                                                            
2 Schmitt, 2003. 
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decade by the 8 Arctic States3, are thus an unique opportunity to uncover, through the means of Critical 
Discourse Analysis, the presence and possible discursive variations of the Euclidean characteristics of 
the modern nation-state expressed in textual form, in a region of the world that lately has been 
changing rapidly, affected by environmental, economic and cultural global effects.   
Despite the fact that the analytical framework developed in chapter 4 could be extended to all the Arc-
tic Strategy policy documents released by the Arctic States (possibly in a future research), I decided to 
reduce the current analysis to the strategies of three Arctic States: Norway’s, Russia’s and Finland’s. 
The justification for this choice is that all these three documents have been forerunners of some kind. 
Nor-way was the first country to release an Arctic Strategy policy already in December 2006, followed 
by Russia in August 2008 (though it was made publicly available only in late March 2009), and Finland 
is the first European Union member state to have published its Arctic Strategy in a definitive form, in 
July 2010. Though the initial rationalization was for a mere temporal categorization, the results of the 
textual analysis of the three Strategies actually showed three very different territorial approaches, and 
moreover uncovered an interesting evolution that occurred even in such a short period: a real shift in 
perspectives that confirms the presence of some signs of new, post-modern configurations of the terri-
torial space (in the case of the Norwegian Strategies reflected even in cartographic form, as well as in 
form of text), which however may not be as remarkably present as to substantiate a factual spatial revo-
lution in the predominant modern cartographic reasoning. 
                                                            
3 Traditionally these are the member states of the Arctic Council. See Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Coun-
cil. Ottawa 19 September 1996. Article 2: “Members of the Arctic Council are: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America (the Arctic States)”. 
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CHAPTER 1 – Constructivism in IR and State Personhood 
Every scientific research, and social science research in particular, relies on principles which describe 
and order the way we relate with reality, how we perceive it: our ontology. The specific approach of 
any analysis is in essence that the experience one has of reality, may it be material or ideal, is never di-
rect, but always mediated by mental processes, which are respectively influenced by the socio-cultural 
conventions one lives by. These conventions can be compared to colored lenses, which accordingly co-
lor or limit perceptions to determined categories or procedures the social context constructed. This be-
comes problematic, whenever one forgets that these lenses are on most of time. The general risk is that, 
without realizing this continuous socio-cultural mediation of experience, those conventions can be con-
sidered as natural and permanent, becoming an ideology. Territory, the geographical expression of the 
state, is often taken for granted as an incontrovertible evidence, mostly for its materiality and the confu-
sion caused by naturalistic and organicist point of view. 
The purpose of the first three chapters is, therefore, to recognize the existence of these “lenses” through 
the presentation and discussion of the different theoretical layers of our study. Firstly, it is necessary to 
set the foundations of this scientific approach, which among the social sciences it is called social con-
structivism, and its influence over the field of international relations. In this case, I will mainly follow 
the scheme delineated by Alexander Wendt in his book “Social Theory of International Politics”1 (from 
now on referred to simply as the Social Theory), assessing the strengths and weaknesses of his model 
for this specific analysis. At this phase, it will be particularly relevant his elaboration of the State as 
‘as-a-person’ and as corporate actor within the international system and their mutual inter-action. De-
fending these constructivist assumptions is particular important for only the conception of the state as a 
complex system, with the appearance of emergent phenomena as, for example, some sort of self-
consciousness (i.e. Wendt’s corporate agency) can explain both the states’ perceptions of territory and 
their intentional aspects expressed in the Arctic Strategy policy documents. Thus, following the pre-
vious metaphor, it will be discussed how the “lenses”, or culture within which the social constructs are 
generally formed, affects the actors while interacting with reality, and Wendt’s perspective will help to 
narrow the range of analysis to a state-centered model.  
                                                            
1 Wendt, 1999. 
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Secondly, coming to analysis of the “lenses” themselves, the focus will move from the ontological pre-
mises, to a very specific concept of international culture: the ‘International Legal Culture’, which in the 
last centuries shaped and justified the existence of modern nation-states and their behavior, through cu-
stoms, conventions, treaties and academic debates. The principal thread of this part will be how the 
nation-states developed the concept of sovereignty and territory in legal terms. In fact, most of the con-
temporary tensions expressed about the Arctic and the supposed ‘rush for resources’ are mostly legal 
issues, on the determination and legitimacy of the coastal states to project their sovereignty over the 
oceans. The first scholar to tackle extensively the concept of ‘territory’ through the development of the 
international law, the consequent dynamics connected to it and the consequent division of the World in 
geographically distinct units was Carl Schmitt in his work “The Nomos of the Earth”2. Thus an over-
view of Schmitt’s worldview is unavoidable for it spilled over the discipline of International Relations, 
through Morgenthau’s thoughts. The next step will be the examination of the validity of Schmitt’s pre-
mises and categories and whether this ‘international spatial order’ had actually collapsed with the end 
of the European era, as he assumed, or transformed into a global and more pervasive system.  
Finally, the last layer or theoretical perspective is analyzing territory from the point of view of political 
and critical geography. The heuristic point of departure here is that Schmitt pointed out that state terri-
tory and sovereignty are all concepts that developed in the centuries which roughly characterized the 
birth of modernity (i.e. 15th-19th centuries) and that they are unequivocally linked with the modern no-
tion of nation-state. Stuart Elden’s will develop this insight further defining territory as a political tool 
expressed in legal-technical means. The legal means are delineated through the international jurispru-
dence. The technical relates to geography and cartography, and a deeper exploration of this conceptual 
connection, what Franco Farinelli defined as “cartographic reasoning”3, will uncover the characteristic 
patterns that identify a modern perception and projection of territory. These patterns will form the ana-
lytical categories for the investigation of the contemporary Arctic policy papers of Norway, Russia and 
Finland. 
1.1 Constructivism in International Relations 
During the period of the opposition of the Communist and Western bloc during the Cold War, the inter-
national system seemed more than ever before, distinctly structured and balanced on ideologies and the 
                                                            
2 Schmitt, 2003. 
3 Farinelli, 2003, 2009. 
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possession of specific weapons (namely nuclear weapons), on military power and its projection, on na-
tional interest(s) and rational decision-making. These assumptions were at least the fundaments of the 
dominant International Relations theories of the time, such as structural Realism, neo-Liberalism and 
Marxism, which observed the contemporary World and for many reasons, may that be strictly theoreti-
cal, methodological or ideological, considered the structure, in which conditions the states acted or re-
acted in relation with each other, to be the determinant factor, the variable to be examined. Individuals 
or governments could only follow, within certain limits, the established patterns of behavior, being 
constrained by the objective and material power and logics.4 
Constructivism is a social re-interpretation of the dynamics of the international relations, a scientific 
current, which rose within the academic debate on international relations already in the 1980s, but be-
came more and more pervasive in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of inter-
national bipolarity5. As its name suggests, constructivism’s main postulate is that any social actor, whe-
ther individual or a group, actually ‘constructs’ his own interpretation of reality through the interaction 
with other actors and the material world itself. Thus, ideas and intentions, essential aspects of agents, 
regain relevance to some extent. They are not solely influenced by the material forces of the internatio-
nal structure (as spatial, historical or social contexts), but, on the other hand, the agents can decide, mo-
re or less intentionally, whether to support or modify these patterns. The ontological view of constructi-
vist reality is, therefore, the one where Agency and Structure are mutually constituted in a continuous 
interactive relation between ‘what people do’ and ‘what society shapes’.6  
Meanings and ideas, through the formation of rules and their institutionalization in specific spatial his-
torical and social contexts, can provide the foundations of a social order, yet, at the same time, some of 
them can challenge the existing one. It is these coexisting meanings what permits social structures to 
evolve in time more or less rapidly, and Power emerges not as the possession of material capabilities 
(how many strategic weapons as a structural realist would consider it), but rather through the relation-
                                                            
4 Concerning structural realism the main factors are power balance and rational competition among states, see Mearshei-
mer, 2007, pp. 71-86; for neo-Liberalism the distribution of interests among international organization and the solutions 
of collective action problems, see Martin, 2007, pp. 109-124; and for Marxism the historical determination of societies and 
states through the development of capitalism, see Rupert, 2007, pp. 148-164. 
5 Fierke, 2007, p. 167. 
6 Klotz and Lynch, 2007; p. 2 and p. 6. 
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ships among the social actors and the hegemonic discourse(s) or logics they are sustaining (or challeng-
ing) within the international system.7 
Therefore, constructivist ontology is based on these three factors: intersubjectivity, contexts and power. 
The first factor, intersubjectivity, permits interaction among social actors and the understanding of their 
dynamics, customs and habits, which consecutively tend to regularize into norms and institutions, influ-
enced by the socio-cultural context they develop in. Finally, the study of power relations among co-
existing values permits to assess the relative stability or fluidity of the social structure. 
Considering the scope and extent the research, the ontological framework will follow one of the most 
influential academic works within the constructivist wave in International Relations: that is Alexander 
Wendt’s  “Social Theory of International Politics”8. The rationale for this choice is mainly methodo-
logical, because Wendt recognizes the excessive breadth of the constructivist approach in itself, em-
bracing societies and individuals altogether, and decided to narrow it to a state-centered perspective, in 
order to assess a ‘structural idealist’ approach of international relations able, to recognize as well the 
value of the ideational aspects, which mostly affect states’ identity and behavior in the international 
system9.  
Thus, the relevant three points which will be developed in the following paragraphs are that Wendt’s 
constructivism 
- still presupposes States as the main (even if not only) actors in the International system; 
- their behavior is mostly affected by interests and ideas, which, however, are not absolutely 
decisive,10  
- since the Culture, the social context they operate in, influences as well their actions. 
His state-centered approach is not to be considered as a normative preference, i.e. states should be re-
garded as the only existing and legitimate actors in the international system. It acknowledges them a 
primacy for authority and capability of action. Nonetheless, this assumption raises a delicate theoretical 
                                                            
7 Ibid, pp. 10-11. 
8 Wendt, 1999. 
9 Ibid, see Chap. 1 “Four sociologies of International Politics”. 
10 Faithful to the ‘scientific realist’ approach (see ibid, chap. 2 “Scientific realism and social kinds”) material aspects such as 
geography and resources maintain their importance, though it is the relation with the contemporary context and the func-
tion we give them what actually makes them relevant in the international system. 
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question: how to justify the state as a unitary actor? What nowadays we experience of the state is a con-
stellation of different institutions and bureaucracies, and the simple decision-making of a political lea-
der is not exhaustive in describing the complexity of the State’s action. Wendt tries to resolve this chal-
lenge by an approximation: as a social system like a society is composed by people, also the internatio-
nal system can be considered as composed by states as “international persons”. This could be partly re-
duced to mere anthropomorphism, but it would not entail the actual existence of the state.11 It is actual-
ly a deeper question which is entwined with Wendt’s scientific realist point of view12, and examines the 
idea of the State in its essential attributes. 
1.2 The problem of State Personhood: Wendt’s holistic approach 
The question of the state as main object of analysis is an issue sprung from the development of the 
theory of International Relations and the widening of its research range to international organizations 
and institutions (e.g. neo-liberalism). Nevertheless, the doctrinal approach of the discipline of Interna-
tional Relations has been since the beginning limited to the state and states systems as the only actors 
able to regulate organized violence (i.e. war): original and main concern of international politics13.  
The principal argument against the concept of the state as a decisive unitary actor in international poli-
tics, common to neo-liberal and postmodernist hardliners, comes principally from the fact that it is a 
mere organization of individuals and therefore a ‘theoretical construct’, which once deconstructed will 
prove its ontological inconsistency, its reduction to metaphors.14 This line of reasoning is very powerful 
indeed, it challenges the attribute of personhood of the state, essential aspect in international law, and, 
as described shortly below, it goes together with the language we use.  
Yet, exactly when talking about social agents, it seems quite evident a common confusion about the 
meaning of two most used referring terms: individual and person, often considered as synonymous. 
The word individual (lat. in-dividuus) has the original meaning of “indivisible”, referring to an element 
which further decomposed loses its characteristics, meanwhile person, very close to the English ‘perso-
                                                            
11 Ibid, pp. 194-195. This is an apprehension common to diplomacy and the development of international law in general, 
and for this reason will also suits to our further investigation for the current international anxiety for the changing condi-
tions of the Arctic. 
12 An approach which, reasserting the existence of material reality, it concedes also the existence of unobservable entities, 
whenever they have real effects; such can be the so-called social kinds. See Ibid, pp.60-64 and 67-77. 
13 Wendt, 1999, p. 193. 
14 Ibid, p.196. See also Wendt, 2004; pp. 289-90. 
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na’, comes from the Latin word persǀna meaning ‘mask/actor’, therefore an individual performing a 
role, emphasizing its ‘social’ aspect within a certain scenario or situation15.  
1.2.1 Characteristics of a person 
In these different connotations, is in my opinion to be read Wendt’s analysis of state personhood, when 
he describes the internal and external determinants of personhood: its internal aspect is the ‘individuali-
ty’, the bodily/material composition which endows the object with certain qualities, meanwhile the ex-
ternal one is personhood commonly understood, its ideal/societal aspect, and for this reason always de-
fined by social convention.16 His reasoning continues by pointing the three qualities of a person which 
are taken from Andrew Vincent’s essay “Are group persons”17: psychological, possessing certain men-
tal or cognitive attribute, legal, having rights and obligations in a community of law, and moral, ac-
countable for actions under a moral code. The latter two are indeed intrinsically social, meanwhile the 
former, analyzing the more individual, contingently fluid and mixed features of persons, borders the 
realm of ‘personality’, which we will consider here fundamentally different from personhood18.  
Affirming these distinctions, it is easier to justify the choice of later narrowing the dissertation to the 
legal/moral aspects of the state-as-person, namely because they are the features which followed the de-
bate on the rationalization of the concept of state and its centralization, through its emergence during 
the 17th and  18th centuries of the modern era (though also the psychological aspects will be quickly 
treated in paragraphs 1.2.2 and 1.2.3). Moreover, analyzing historically the evolution of the modern 
state, we may noticed that all Vincent’s three aspects of a “person” phenomenologically appeared in 
treaties and discussions of the time, though in the opposite order than presented originally in his essay, 
from the legal to the psychological one.  
                                                            
15 See Online Etymological Dictionary, entries “person” and “individual”. 
16 Wendt 2004, p. 293. Following the same reasoning it is questionable the assumption of the existence of persons “by na-
ture”: to be a ‘person’ there must be another subject watching at you as a ‘person’, with determined traits and expecta-
tions, otherwise it is an individual. 
17 The same essay is often mentioned also as counter-argument to Wendt’s Personhood of the State. I was not able to re-
trieve a copy of the volume of the journal Review of Metaphysics, where it is originally published, so at this point when ci-
ting his work, I refer to both its quotations in Wendt 2004, pp. 294-95; and Wight, 2006, pp. 193-4. 
18 Mixed for the concurrence of internal and external factors which intrinsically determine each personality; ibid, p. 294. 
As Personality I understand the more psychological “various aspects of a person, that combine to make them different 
from other people”, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. 
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In fact, the legal aspect of a person, the “power and capacity of legal action and being a subject of du-
ties and rights”19 is perhaps the first modern social manifestation of the state as such, aspect codified in 
the Peace Treaties of Westphalia and reiterated in all the future international treaties; This attribution 
permitted the states to become basically the only referent for territorial and warfare issues. 
The moral/ethical aspect, “the capacity for rationality and responsibilities, or the ability to determine 
one’s own action by moral category”20 derived from the almost simultaneous philosophical debate of 
the decades encircling the Westphalia treaties on absolutism and the centralization of the political po-
wer in the hands of the European sovereigns’ power, relocating the concept of authority from universal 
institutions into the forming national states (to sovereigns first and later to governments and bureaucra-
cy). Influential political philosophers and legal scholars (such as Hobbes, Grotius, Pufendorf to name 
some) indeed developed from each conception on the nature of humans and law different justifications 
on the existence of the state as social and political overarching organization and its drives or motiva-
tions in relation with other equals. 
The psychological aspect, instead, is defined as (1) the power and capability of self-consciousness, (2) 
the ability to form and perform intention, (3) the ability to determine a behavior on one’s own interests, 
(4) the capacity of unified and continuous reasoning and volition.21.  It is the most recent and less ex-
plored field of state’s personhood; it borders with identity and revealed to be a complex matter as every 
human being’s psychology. Our argument here is that the points 2, 3 and 4 can be found by deduction 
from the previous legal and moral aspects of the state, and are explained extensively by Wendt discuss-
ing the state corporate identity (see 2.2.3). The first point, however, remains the most mysterious in any 
discipline and still evades a clear definition. Yet, without entering that what could be an endless debate 
on the nature of consciousness, some interesting insight can be pondered reading Wendt’s later contri-
bution “Social Science as Cartesian Science: an auto-critique from a quantum perspective”, with 
quantum and systems theories’ concept of emergence22, or exploring the thought of the externalist cur-
rent in the field of the philosophy of mind, where consciousness itself is considered as a relational phe-
nomenon23, where consciousness could be regarded as the result of an “in-process” of relations bet-
                                                            
19 See note 17. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Wendt, 2006, in Guzzini and Leander, Constructivism and international relations. See also Wendt, 2004, pp. 302-5; and 
paragraph 1.3.3 ‘Beyond Reductionism and Holism’. 
23 see also Alva Noë 2006, p. 412. “Consciousness could be considered as a dance: is not to be found only in the muscle of 
the dancer, but also in the mind, in the music, in the partner …”. 
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ween specific conditions/formations/representations/schemas which make possible an identification 
with some of the process’ material and ideational aspects. 
Moreover, there is another relational aspect of personhood, implied especially on the international le-
gal level, which is usually reduced to the mere concept of recognition: all the narratives created in the 
name of the state and constitute its historical self and memory are as internally determined, so also ex-
ternally influenced. The reductionists’ argument usually is limited to the internal aspect: the state is 
formed by rational individual human beings, exclusively entitled for intentional action, and therefore 
only they can be ontologically real subject; the state is only a metaphor. As it will debate later below, 
personhood is also defined by external factors and actors, fact that confers it more features than just the 
sum of its components, even though only by reflection. 
Thus, leaving the legal aspect of the state personhood for later inquiring, we will examine in more 
depth its moral and psychological aspect with Wendt’s concept of corporate identity, after a short 
definition of what Wendt considers the material “body” of modern state, the “essential state”. 
1.2.2 Wendt’s justification of the State as unitary actor: the “essential state” 
Wendt dealt with the question of state in the Chapter 5 of the Social Theory where it could be easier to 
understand his conceptualization of the ‘essential’ state as the individual, minimal and indivisible unit 
of analysis; the ‘body’ spoiled by all its contingent forms. 
The definition of such essential state springs from three different sociological traditions: Weberian, 
Marxist and Liberal one, which respectively cover the state from its being independent from society, to 
an intermediate structure, to its complete identity with society. These are regrouped in Wendt’s 
definition into five properties: 
An institutional legal order; attribute of Marxist origin. This is the intermediate structure composed by 
institutions, law and regulations, that create the State-society complex. 
The monopoly of legitimate use or organized violence; from the Weberian conception of the state, 
where for various reasons, usually moral, the state only possesses the legitimacy for the use of organi-
zed violence (i.e. Police and Army) in order to compel its society or other states toward specific goals. 
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Sovereignty; also a characteristic of Weberian origin, where the state is held as the supreme social au-
thority, unfolding both internally and externally. Important point here is the localization of the supreme 
authority within an organizational structure “invested with the internally non-rival unified authority“. 
Wendt’s calls it the ‘empirical sovereignty’ especially in regards to the external sovereignty.  
Society; pluralist attribute, commonly described as the people who both form and conform to the state. 
To define it is quite an arduous task for the fluidity of its various aspects (shared knowledge and boun-
daries; causal, bottom-up and top-down factors). 
Territory; this is the feature on which most of our inquiry will concentrate upon. Firstly it is noteworthy 
that, reiterated also by Wendt24, this characteristic is equally shared by all the previous three approa-
ches. Indeed modern states first distinctive trait is that they are territorial: their authority is unlimitedly 
exercised over a delimited area. This distinguishes them from other past and present international sub-
jects, as empires, churches or firms. However, he states that ‘territoriality stands for the state as spatial 
extension does for people’25, as an external and natural quality, that questioned and scrutinized too 
deeply it would make loose the scope of analysis: the state essential properties. Beside the fact that at 
this point, he is clearly confusing territoriality (that is the relational aspect of the state towards the terri-
tory itself) with territory, nevertheless, he later affirms that there are important constitutive and causal 
aspects to be kept in mind while analyzing this aspect, such as how territories are ‘located’ and how 
they gain their meaning; issues that will be extensively treated in the next chapters26. 
Therefore, after this quick analytical listing of the characteristics of the essential state we reach a defi-
nition that is: 
“… an organizational actor embedded in an institutional-legal order that constitutes it with 
sovereignty and a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence over a society in a 
territory.”27 
One of the main argument in the following chapters of this thesis, however, will exactly be that, by 
examining the evolution of territory and territoriality within the international system, the essential state 
                                                            
24 Wendt, 1999, p. 202. 
25 Ibid, p. 211. 
26 Ibid, see also paragraph 2.2.1 for the ‘grounding’ of territory, its terrestrial origins. 3.1. for the etymology and meanings 
of the term. 
27 Wendt 2004, p. 213. 
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cannot be an exhaustive transhistorical model ‘of behavior’ as Wendt affirms28, for their changing con-
stitutional and causal aspect: only an historically and contextually grounded analysis could attempt 
some explanation, especially in regards of the contemporary scenario of the Arctic.  
1.2.3 Wendt’s justification of the State as unitary actor: the “corporate agent” 
It is in the second part of chapter 5 of the Social Theory that Wendt undertakes the explanation of the 
State as a coherent ‘corporate agent’, a “structure of shared knowledge, or discourse which enables in-
dividuals to engage in institutionalized collective action”29. His stance here is particularly strong: by 
stating “States are people too” he assumes the states possess of the capacity of intentionality and re-
sponsibility30. These capabilities, essential factors for agency are three. Firstly, the idea of person, or in 
this instance, a group-self, which articulates as a narrative, discursive and intellectual history; it is a so-
cial belief to which individual human beings accept or recognize the obligation to act jointly on its be-
half31. The peculiar feature is that even those who do not submit to such obligation, eventually have to 
recognize that others do, thus implicitly recognizing the belief’s existence and effects. It is a relational 
characteristic. Secondly, there is a defined internal decisional structure, the process through which a 
common shared decision is reached and as affecting the whole group. Thirdly, clear rules of authori-
zed actions permit the attribution of those acts to the group-self, essential for responsibility.32 These 
aspects clearly coincide with Vincent’s qualities of ‘psychological person’ described briefly above: the 
group-self as expression of group-consciousness (1.) and the internal decisional structure with rules of 
authorized action creates the conditions for unified and continuous reasoning and volition and to some 
extent the ability for determined behavior (4. and 3.). Only one point remains so far unclear: how the 
group-self is able to form and perform intentions (2.). It is a point of extreme importance for our re-
search, because stating the state is not able to have intentions like in later critiques, is to deny its agen-
cy and possibility to even theoretically produce any strategy paper. Wendt deals with this issue in his 
first chapters when he discusses scientific realism as his main approach.  
                                                            
28 Ibid, p. 214. The essential state is the sociological description of the modern state ‘body’, and it works as far as such ‘or-
ganizational actor’ is existing. See for example paragraph 3.4 ‘Alternative Geographies’ and the comparison with Imperial 
China. 
29 Ibid, p. 215. 
30 Wendt, 1999, p. 197. 
31 Ibid, p. 218.  
32 Ibid, pp. 219-20. 
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Where then does intention come into play? Intentions are defined as the “agent’s specific purpose in 
performing an action or series of acts” or, according to G. E. M. Anscombe, “acting under a represen-
tation”33, therefore an appropriate explanatory relation between a belief and an action. This brings us to 
the concept of intentionality which is “the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for 
things properties and state of affairs”34. It will be discussed later in the last paragraphs whether is it 
right to assume the state having ‘a mind of its own’; nevertheless the ideational aspect of intentions (or 
desires, or interests), comes clearly to the fore. They are a specific kind of conception: the view for 
something; while beliefs are views about the world. 
Traditionally, in the discipline of International Relations there is no doubt that states have interests, yet 
approaches on their nature and causation differ. As summed up by Wendt in chapter 2 of the Social 
Theory, the mainstream approach, Rational Choice Theory defines intentionality in a simple equation: 
Desire  +  Belief  = Action 
It is, therefore, the particular supposed need for something that, mediated by a general view of the 
World, which consequently sets the conditions for the action: Desire is not a separated entity from the 
other Beliefs, as the simplistic equation would seem to imply, but all evidences in social sciences point 
to the fact that is mostly the former that constitutes the latter. The insight comes from social anthropo-
logy which puts  the basis  for  a  Cognitive Theory of  Desire,  where “motivations, desires or interests 
should be seen as “schemas” (or “scripts”, “frames”, or “representations”) which are knowledge 
structures that “make possible the identification of object or events”35.  
The belief of belonging to a specific group-self of the state then forms its identity, embodied in the 
state complex and institutions that are endorsed with the authority of action. The interests, the drives 
which such identity implies, refer then either to the reproduction requirements of this identity (objecti-
ve interests) that collapses if not achieved, or more closely related to the founding belief of identity, 
which reinforce its secondary aspects. Wendt recognizes therefore 4 main identities: corporate identity 
(overlapping with the above-mentioned group-self), type, role and collective identities. At this point, 
                                                            
33 Both the quotations come from Setiya, Kieran, "Intention", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) 
34 Jacob, Pierre, "Intentionality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition). 
35 De Andrade in Wendt 1999, p. 122. Though, this relation Desire/Belief is observed in human individuals, nevertheless 
the cultural aspect influences not the individuals alone, but also their associations in what Wendt calls the ‘group-selves’. 
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we will not further expand the conception of these last three identities, which are mostly relational36. 
An important aspect here is however to be remembered: these identities are used as analytical catego-
ries, but they remain first and foremost beliefs. The relevant argument here is that, while the last three 
identities are basically multiple and inter-relational, that vary from state to state, the personal identity is 
an essentially internal belief, intrinsic to the concept of the modern state and it is constituted by the sha-
red ideas, the Culture of the International system.37 
It follows logically that the interests linked to this specific identity are universal and common to all sta-
tes and to some extent coincide with what are traditionally called “national” or objective interests, the 
requirements for the reproduction of the corporate identity. Wendt indentifies four of them: physical 
survival, autonomy, economic wellbeing and collective self-esteem38. The first three, already listed by 
Weber, can be related to the five properties of the essential state (see above 1.2.2): physical survival 
with territory and institutional legal order; autonomy with sovereignty and the monopoly of organized 
force; economic wellbeing with society39. The fourth, collective self-esteem, is introduced by Wendt 
and comprises personal identity with all the other three relational identities, role in particular, and thus 
related to more subjective interests.  
One of the main arguments of this research will be that these principles are indeed common among all 
the states; however, they are not absolutely universal or unrelated to the international system, or even 
preceding it, as Wendt maintains. Before the creation of the international system with the treaty of 
Westphalia (1648), there was no entity clearly presenting all the characteristics listed in the essential 
state. As we will explain shortly in the next chapters, they are the result of modernity and the aspect of 
international relations happening on a different level than domestic policy, as we understand it today, 
formed simultaneously together with the assertion of the modern states as territorial delimited entities.  
                                                            
36 Type identity is related to the regime of a state; role to the social position of the state in the international environment 
vis à vis the other states; collective identity is the grade of ‘solidarity’ with the latter.  
37 Ibid, p. 125. Wendt later categorizes such Cultures into three labels, Hobbesian, Lockian or Kantian, according to the de-
gree of internalization of the Other within the system. However, we will later consider this concept of ‘International Cul-
ture’ in a very broad sense, in order to grasp perhaps the more subtle structure of the international system expressed 
through the international legal system. 
38 Ibid, pp. 235-38. 
39 Here society could be understood as the group considered as participating in the political process: with democracy the 
overlapping is usually coherent, though in autocratic regimes, in spite of the fact that their rhetoric stresses the wellbeing 
of all the people, it is most of the times restricted to the leading elites.  
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1.3 Critiques to the concept of State-person: pluralist and pragmatic approaches, and a 
possible synthesis 
The question of state agency as a coherent entity is a powerful and contested theoretical issue. It im-
plies a series of logical backfires, such as reductionism and structuralism. This paragraph will deal in 
particular with two critiques exposed in the Journal Review of International Studies in 2004,40 which 
reported an extensive academic discussion on Wendt’s assumption of State-personhood. These critical 
assessments hit two of the basic postulations of state’s corporate agency: Wight’s pluralist approach, 
which challenges the coherence itself of the corporate agency, and Franke and Roos’ pragmatic ontolo-
gical model, which disputes its capability of intentionality.  
1.3.1 Pluralist approach’s critiques 
The liberal/pluralist approach in international relation developed as a reaction to the neo-realist structu-
ral realism with Waltz as its most famous exponent, and diverted the focus of analysis from the con-
straints of the international system to the important capacities individual human beings and institutions. 
Colin Wight, belonging clearly to this school of thought, cannot theoretically allow that the state, as a 
collective of individual human beings, could be thinking or reasoning in such a self-aware manner41. 
Colin argues that states, though being agents, they are mainly institutional structures, constructed by 
human beings, who ultimately have the responsibility of social action. In his opinion Wendt’s move of 
coagulating the state over the “idea of corporate being” is once again a reductionist view which forgets 
those individuals who do not identify with such idea. Moreover, Wendt’s attempts of showing of group 
intentionality springs from the structured interaction of individual human beings, do not leave any con-
ceptual room for a conscious human agency, being thus completely constrained by the structure, the 
idea of state, and therefore missing an important part of causal power expressed in state policies. The 
state can cross the ‘ontological wall’ only on the back of individuals42.  
Wight’s critique of the reductionism of the state as a single group and thus the relinquishment of those 
who do not accept it is a critical and important assumption which, however, does not refute the existen-
ce of the very same idea of state. Anarchists oppose to the state as structure of power, yet, nevertheless, 
have to confront with it and with the people adhering to it. Moreover, as we discussed above, state per-
sonhood is not only internally composed, but also relational and externally perceived on the internatio-
                                                            
40 Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No 2; 2004. 
41 “[E]ven if it is the individuals acting within the agreed idea of state, how can be the state thinking?” Wight 2006, p. 183. 
42 Wight 2004, p. 279. 
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nal level by other people and states, as real. It might be that the legal fiction of state personhood trigge-
red the widespread personification of the idea of state. Nevertheless, by habits and customs, this idea 
has become a belief far more complex and enduring than scholars would assume: it is easy to realize its 
existence and look behind the mask, but the others will still see ‘us’, either people or individuals (e.g. 
the Italian people or the Italian Prime Minister), belonging to it in each situation may occur. Thus, con-
sidering state personhood as the mask of the interactional play, it should not be of much of a bother the 
material by which is made of, it is real as far as it is recognized as having real effects in the play. The 
objective difficulty in such approach is that there is no external viewer: in different degrees everyone is 
actor and audience at the same time. The discrepancy between international and national level is indeed 
apparent exactly because, since their very establishment, only states have been assigned this specific 
role and no individual human beings, who in the end could represent or symbolize the state43.  
1.3.2 Pragmatic approach’s critiques and insight 
As it is one of the main assumptions of this research, the state is much more of a mere social structure: 
it is an aggregate of specific conditions, social, geographical, functional and ideal ones; it is the process 
itself of the interaction of all these factors. The insight of the state as a process, a ‘third way’ between 
the strict reality of state’s personhood and Wight’s reductionism is the pragmatist44 ontological ap-
proach of Franke and Roos as presented in their essay “Actor, Structure, Process: Transcending the 
state personhood debate”45. It is a good working model which extends substantial coherence not only 
to states but also other social phenomena such as non-governmental, international or supranational or-
ganizations. Even though we will claim shortly below that the only weak point such model are the ini-
tial assumed preconditions, their exposition have inspirational aspects. Therefore, their reasoning will 
be firstly reported and then argued. 
Starting from the state personhood debate of Wendt and Wight’s, a solution is given by Franke and 
Roos defining such social organizations ‘structures of corporate practices’, where people, in order to 
overcome problems otherwise impossible for individuals, created rules of actions for that purpose; 
“[they are] the totality of the rules made to work on a specific problem is the structure of corporate 
                                                            
43 Though, also this historical cleavage seems to be slowly overcome by the recognition of universal human rights and cri-
mes against humanity.  
44 With pragmatism, we define here the so-called Classic Pragmatism philosophical current, developed mainly in late 19th 
century United States, whose most influential exponents are Charles S. Pierce, William James and John Dewey.  
45 Franke and Roos, 2004.  
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practices”, where human actors are located in structured positions.46 Later in their demonstration of the 
characteristics of such structures, conceived as spaces of (im-)possibilities, ‘rules for action’ are the 
constitutive properties that define: the problem to be solved and others structures; the configuration of 
the position of the human actors in the structure and respective relations; and the potential for action. 
Beliefs are reduced to solely the “rules of action that guide an actor’s concrete action”47. Moreover, 
agency is also restricted to human beings only, as the only sentient nodes of the structure. This because, 
according to the classical pragmatic concept of agency, corporeality (or the reactive physicality of the 
agent, its corporal strivings and basic beliefs), reflexivity (or the competence to reflect on one-self) and 
the aptitude for abduction (or the ability to reach new beliefs by revising the rules of action), are exclu-
sive properties of the human beings48.  
Finally in the last part of their essay, Franke and Roos present processes as the interrelation between 
actors and structures that changes their respective characteristics in time.49 Analyzing then the driving 
forces influencing such processes, comes the synthesis of the pragmatic agency’s characteristics into a 
concrete model of causality (the Aristotle-Kurki synthesis as they put it, though it is not matter of dis-
cussion here)50. However, immediately later there is one feature that, if changed, let all Franke and 
Roos’ argument turn on our reasoning’s advantage: the question of agency. Franke and Roos’ accepted 
since the beginning that agency is only human, and therefore it is “[g]iven that states – understood as 
structures – do not exhibit these qualities”51. Then, the further reasoning explained with the quotation 
of George H. Mead, that the self is divided into two separated stages the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ (read also 
‘person’) and that the self “is essentially a social process going on with these two distinguished pha-
ses”52. Yet, what if the state is capable of a group-self and of intentionality, precursor quality of agen-
cy, as Wendt described in the previous paragraphs? 
The two major arguments against Franke and Roos’ preconditions of their essay are thus two. Firstly 
the concept of actor/agency, which they asserted as their initial precondition, that pertains exclusively 
to the human beings. Considering instead the fact that the state is identified as group-self, suddenly also 
the pragmatic characteristics of agency suit also the group-self: ‘reflexivity’ and ‘aptitude for abduc-
                                                            
46 Ibid, p. 1066. 
47 Ibid, p. 1068. 
48 Ibid, pp. 1069-70. 
49 Ibid, p. 1071. 
50 Ibid, p. 1072. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Mead, MindSelf and Society quoted in Franke and Roos 2004, p.1072. 
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tion’ has happened and one example is brought by Wendt in the Social Theory, when he analyzed the 
case of USSR and the change of policy of the new “New Thinking”53; corporeality is then again a com-
plex arguable aspect on the degree of internalization individual beings feels it which, however, recalls 
rather closely Wendt’s essential state and consequently the “national interests” (indeed he defined it as 
the ‘body’ of the state).  
Secondly, the fact that the state is considered as the mere sum and structure of people and rules of ac-
tion, a definition that would work for a social organization in its initial stages, yet cannot grasp the 
complexity of the ideational range it reaches when the social organization becomes a dynamic self-
organizing system, dependent yet autonomous from the initial conditions of its establishment. This 
complexity connects the identity of the state and many more aspects than just people or rules of con-
duct: it invests also material aspect such as buildings, means of transports, arms and land (how then 
could not still be nowadays a supreme offence for a nation to have an official building damage or a ship 
sunk. So far reaches the symbolism of the ‘flag’, so to speak). It is time, belief and habit which trans-
form these otherwise unrelated objects in properties of the state, which is then usually reified, yet none 
of these properties alone, ideational or material, people or belief, can be defined as essential, because 
what make the state real is indeed the process of interaction of all these conditions and the internalized 
belief in its existence.  
1.3.3 Beyond Reductionism and Holism: Complexity and the approach of Synergetics54 
A possible synthesis can be ventured at this point of our reasoning introducing some concept that has 
usually been utilized for mathematical modeling in diverse discipline from statistics to economics: 
complexity and complex systems. Although its empirico-positivistic origins, the concept of complexity 
has also relevant philosophical value especially, when dealing with philosophy of science, and this will 
be the approach of the next paragraphs: to outline the characteristics of complex systems and their fre-
quency in social phenomena such as society and other associative grouping. So far, the state has been 
defined with some of the characteristics that are typical of complex systems, like self-organizing who-
les, often not responding to linear causality. Yet, what is complexity? Roughly, “systems with nume-
                                                            
53 Wendt 1999, p. 76. When the Soviet apparatus realized that an aggressive attitude towards the West fed a constant 
hostility and military expenses. The more conciliatory course of the late 1980s brought to the end of the suspect and 
mistrust of the Cold War. However, though these moments of ‘reflexivity’ are possible, cannot occur too often otherwise 
mostly theory would influence reality (ibid, p. 77).  
54 The title of this paragraph is partly taken from the book of the proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the International 
Academy of Science 2001, Agazzi and Montecucco, 2002, and B. Kanitscheider’s essay on synergetics, Ibid., pp. 39-44. 
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rous components capable of structured interactions that generate emergent phenomena [i.e. not redu-
cible to any single components, but exactly emerging from their mutual interaction] may be called 
complex” 55.  
To explain better this social reality of social process as a ‘whole’, and therefore a complex system, we 
could present an analogy which has even ancient precursors56. Imagine a car. What is that makes it a 
car? If one dismantles it into pieces one will have the engine, the wheels, the steer, breaks, seats (even 
the driver) and so forth; yet even if we could define them as the car’s parts no-one of them actually re-
presents the ‘car as such’. However, this is not to deny the existence of ‘car’ (especially when it actual-
ly brings you somewhere, or could hit you in a crossroad), but that the identity of the car is a not an in-
dependent entity, completely quantifiable or definable without considering all the internal relations and 
interactions that belong to the whole ‘car’ (one of the most decisive being indeed human beings, with 
their uses, modes of construction and meaning of cars).  
Similarly at the social level, the state possesses an identity, a whole, as an emergent phenomenon that is 
not reducible to any of its material and ideational parts, a fact that does not however weaken its reality. 
One of the approaches lately used in order to complement social processes with complexity is the 
theory model of synergetics. Initially developed by the physicist Hermann Haken from the observation 
of the behavior of gas particles emitting laser light, with its three concepts of parameter of order, 
enslaving principle and circular causality, has more a new perspective about self-organizing social sy-
stems, especially in language and communication.57 Circular causality is here the most important cha-
                                                            
55 “Complexity” entry in Scholarpedia. Or following the more semantic definition of Evandro Agazzi, which does not stress 
emergence:  
“complex is a compound in which the relations among its constituents are significant, since they make this com-
pound a whole endowed with identity and evincing analytical complexity” [Emphases in the text.] 
Compound is to be considered here as a plurality of components, yet with no sensible structure. Analytical complexity 
means here exactly that is the multitude and structure of the internal relations that characterize the whole. Its relative 
synthetic simplicity instead (i.e. considering the compound as a whole limits its external relations) can be expressed in pri-
mitive predicates, composing it in a unity, which is however different from uniqueness. See Agazzi in Agazzi and Monte-
cucco 2002, pp. 7-11.  
56 The first recorded is the speech of monk Nagasena to King Menander of the Bactrian Kingdom, where he argues with 
the king the existence of a self by presenting the very similar analogy of a chariot. Yet, without going as far as into psycho-
logical self’s definition, the point is once again there is no thing as an independent self, but the self is a relational quality of 
social complex systems. This analogy well explains the usual identification reification we apply with mental representa-
tions. See Rupert Gethin, 1998, p. 139. 
57 See Kanitscheider in Agassi and Montecucco, 2002, p. 39-43; Parameter of order is the amplitudes of unstable modes 
determining the macroscopic pattern; the enslaving principle is then connected with the circular causality in the way that 
the components of the system influence and are equally influenced by the macroscopic variable: in our case either the 
state and its society, or on a higher level the predominant international culture toward the states. 
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racteristic, since it is the quality of social phenomena that has been ascertained in various way, in our 
field often under the name of interdependence where, in more deterministic wording “[t]he elements of 
the system generate their own organizers, and these variables react on the parts determining their be-
havior by forcing them into specific modes”58. This applies both to the states as unitary social organiza-
tions and to their international interaction into a shared culture, which, as discussed below, we will ar-
gue to be slightly wider and at the same time stricter than Wendt’s specific description. 
1.4 The States’ International Culture 
The definition of ‘culture’ itself has been problematic since the first times it was utilized in the 18 th and 
19th century. However, for analytical simplicity we will start with the broader definition of the anthro-
pologist Edward Brunette Tylor:  
“Culture or civilization, taken in its wide anthropological sense, it is that complex whole which includes know-
ledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of a 
society”.59 
What is relevant here is not much who or what actually acquires the complex whole of capabilities 
(nowadays, there is no major argument against the fact that also animals have their own cultures which 
are transmitted through learning and repetition; in the case of the undergoing dissertation, it would be 
enough to switch ‘man’ with ‘person’), but the fact that the component is part of a society, which 
presupposes an integrated and interactive group of individuals, and no IR scholar would deny the simi-
larities between the behavioral patterns of states and some of the ones of people in society (even with-
out going as far as the English School that theorizes such society). Restricting even more the range of 
the previous definition of ‘Culture’, Ruth Benedict described it as “the sociological term for learned 
behaviour [sic]”60, which points straight to the causal aspects. Such patterns adapt well to D’Andrade’s 
cultural schemas described also as representations of prototypical events.61 Yet, it is important, espe-
cially considering a relatively short time lapse that culture has also constitutive aspects: such shared 
ideas or rules cannot be just consider cumulatively as “culture” because a simple summation would not 
explain its continuity over time, change in content or turnover in people sustaining those ideas. Such 
continuity and resilience to sudden changes supervene with the occurring of the socialization and inter-
                                                            
58 Kantischeider in Agassi 2002, p. 41. 
59 E.B. Tylor 1871, Primitive Culture, I 1; quoted in the Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology, 1996, p. 137. 
Entry ‘Culture’. 
60 Ruth Benedict, 1943, Race and Racism, pp. 9-10; quoted in the Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology, 1996, 
p. 139. Entry ‘Culture’. 
61 Ibid. p. 145. Entry ‘Culture and personality’. 
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nalization of social norms,62 in a pattern of circular causality where individuals are shaped by culture 
through learning and simultaneously interpret culture by performing actions and rituals.  
At this point returning to Wendt’s definition of culture, stated in several places in the Social Theory, he 
describes it in its widest sense as ‘shared knowledge’, extrapolating common and collective shared 
knowledge in their respectively causal and constitutive aspects.63 Yet a couple of sentences strikes for 
their appropriateness in describing such interconnection between social agents and structure “There are 
no structure without agents, and no agents (except in the biological sense) without structures. Social 
processes are always structured, and social structures in process”64. Later on, when dealing with the 
“three cultures of anarchy” (Chapter 6 of the Social Theory) he states rather strongly that the structure 
of the International System is its “culture”, conceding that, however, it does not cover the whole reality 
of its social structure. It is a statement, which is the basis of the following chapter of the dissertation. 
However, it is slightly puzzling at the same time that he then shrinks this characterization into culture 
as ‘the knowledge or understandings shared by the states on the use of violence’ (i.e. war); which is ac-
tually a description that echoes many of the first approaches of international studies of the international 
system, such as international law, diplomacy or the early theories of the discipline of international rela-
tions as well.65 Yet, by describing the roles and different approaches states enact in their interactions, 
each pulled by different conceptions of the Other, seems more to be related to the behavioral, and the-
refore casual, aspects of culture which does not tell much on how the structure works as a whole, but as 
in the different modes of behavior or schemas. Our point here is that, conceded that Wendt explained 
very well some of the dynamics that structurally influence states behavior and positioning, there is a 
deeper and unitary level of culture, the states ‘Culture’, that defines their basic form and accepted mo-
des of interaction.  
My point is that in a centuries long process of socialization among the forming modern states, the Cul-
ture that emerged, and is consistent with the initial and most general concept of Tylor’s, is a uniform 
International Legal System (see 2.1 for definition). It was not immediate, nor uncontested, yet it is pos-
sible to speak today of a homogenized system that has spread all over the planet, and equalized and in-
                                                            
62 “[… T. Parson] views social actors as acting according to roles that define—through internalization and socialization—
their self-identities and behaviors.” Bicchieri, Cristina and Muldoon, Ryan, "Social Norms", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition). Socialization is broadly speaking the adaptation also through learning of an individual to 
other’s social expectations; internalization concerns the individual’s worldview, role and possibly self-identity.  
63 Wendt 1999, pp. 159-61 for common shared knowledge; pp.161-164 for collective shared knowledge. 
64 Ibid. p. 186. 
65 See for example Cassese and Lowe for international law; Berridge for diplomacy. 
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tegrated all previous kind of human organizations that presented some of sovereignty’s characteristics, 
into the legitimate agent’s status of ‘states’. Without going too far into any legalistic or normative as-
sumption, neither ‘linguistic turn’: we are talking here about the general “rules of the social game”, 
states come to agree to and play accordingly, where all the social aspects, masks and roles are imple-
mented, each one then following their own strategies influenced by previous conditionings.66 
Such rules started as practices, custom and habits, often in form of rituals, that regulated the first con-
tacts, the steadiness and reliability of communication between governing entities (e.g. inviolability of 
envoys), and example of written treaties goes back to Mesopotamic kingdoms. However, the novelty 
that brought the 16th century and the Westphalian treaties as an historical watershed is the crystalliza-
tion into formally independent and territorially defined units67. This system was indeed originally limi-
ted to Europe, yet, as we will see in the following chapter, it expanded over the centuries becoming the 
only one internationally accepted, with all its contradictions and paradoxes. 
                                                            
66 As Wendt tries to explain the international structure through logics of anarchy (his famous essay ‘Anarchy is what the 
States make of it’) my scope here is to explain it as stemming more subtly from a legal-cartographic reasoning, the topic of 
the next two chapters. 
67 See paragraph 2.1 as an example the definition of state. 
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CHAPTER 2 – The International Legal System and its geographical expression 
In this chapter, will be analyzed what is here considered the subtler Culture of the international system: 
the International Legal System that nowadays has covered all-over the planet. Initially, it will be descri-
bed in an asynchronic ‘snapshot’, i.e. the current situation with its constitutional and behavioral effects 
on the states (in particular following the ‘legal realist’ approach of the jurist Antonio Cassese) and later 
its parallel historical development and, more importantly, its geographical dimension described in Carl 
Schmitt’s work The Nomos of the Earth. The importance of Schmitt’s analysis, despite any ideological 
or cosmological divergence, is that it was the first linking, so openly the geographic dimension and 
ordering of human societies and the link with the customs and habits that later codified into the current 
International Legal System.  
Moreover, Schmitt’s influence extended into the discipline of international relations in two significant 
ways, firstly influencing more or less openly one of the traditional exponents of the dominant realist 
school of thought, Hans Morgenthau, and secondly for a rediscovery of his works with their translation 
into English in the end of the 1990s. This revived interest, combined with an international scenario in 
the beginning of the 2000s that seemed posing again the “state of exception” as the fundamental politi-
cal characteristic (terrorist attacks of September 2011, US invasion of Iraq). Nonetheless, keeping in 
mind all the relevant criticism on Schmitt’s work, we will accept his insight of the spatial dimension 
and ordering of the states, with some comment that we believe useful updates on the contemporary cir-
cumstances of the international system.  
Lastly, through the insights of Staurt Elden’s essay “Land, Terrain, Territory”, it will be disclosed the 
fact that a fruitful analytical approach of territory could be to eventually consider it as a political tech-
nology, developed historically in the last centuries as a result of technical and legal practices that en-
hanced a more pervasive control and management of the earth. Namely the legal aspects are the main 
topic of this chapter, while the technical ones will be developed in the next. 
2.1 The International Legal System as the international Culture 
With International Legal System I refer here to the framework of the international norms, written and 
unwritten (including therefore also custom and protocol) that defines who/what acts on the internatio-
nal scene (i.e. primarily the states) and, as Kegley points out, for the norms’ “deontological content”, 
also what they are permitted and expected to do, thanks to the collective, and thus social, consensus on 
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proper conduct and consequent sanctions on deviations1. Moreover, he continues underlining, that such 
norms are not only modal regularities reinforced by diplomatic rituals, but they are “intersubjectively 
shared understandings which, when formed, communicate this consensus about the obligations of in-
ternational actors to behave in a specific way”2. Defined in these terms, it is thus the Culture where the 
international agents act. 
However, besides these behavioral aspects, there is hidden also the constitutive factor: such norms defi-
ne as well what is to be considered an ‘international person’. After centuries of conventional under-
standing, the definition of state found expression in the 1933 Convention of Montevideo on Rights and 
Duties of the States, the first attempt to codify the customary law regarding the nature of states. Despite 
the controversy on the effects of the ‘recognition’ (see below), it is nowadays general jurisprudence to 
identify these main characteristics: 1) a residing population; 2) defined territory; 3) an effective structu-
re of authority.3 Interestingly enough these three elements resume four4 of the five qualities of the more 
sociological “Essential State” of Wendt, and a defined territory is always present. Sovereignty is not 
stated here because it is generally considered as a founding principle of the international community 
which generates each state’s equality in right, not from their power, “but upon the simple fact of its exi-
stence as a person under international law”.5 Yet, it is exactly this principle of absolute sovereignty 
within one state’s jurisdiction and territory that work as a “ordering principle” sharply delimiting each 
one from the others and at the same time poses them on a horizontal and equal level among each other. 
Moreover, this very principle is nevertheless depending on another underlying condition that became 
decisive in international jurisprudence, the “effectiveness of authority”, that has more constitutive ef-
fects than other social practices as recognition.  
2.1.1 The ordering principle of Sovereignty 
The notion of sovereignty is a legal-political concept that only in the 20th century was attempted to be 
separated, but exactly in this double-nature it is the ‘organizational principle by which modern political 
systems are founded’, not only domestically, but also internationally; quoting Loughlin synthetic defi-
                                                            
1 Kegley 2002, p. 188. 
2 Ibid. 
3 All these characteristic are common and present in textbooks, then one may emphasize as more relevant the internal 
political, economic, cultural ties, as Cassese, or more the effective capability of undertaking relations as in Lowe. 
See Cassese 2001 p. 3; Lowe 2007, p. 136 and following pages. 
4 It is assumed here that an authority presupposes the monopoly of legitimate violence. 
5 Montevideo Convention, Article 5. Good overview on Sovereignty as a principle of International Law in Cassese, 2001, pp. 
88-91. 
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nition, sovereignty “comes about when a group of people within a defined territory are moulded into 
an orderly by the establishment of a governing authority which is able to exercise absolute political 
power within that community”6. Traditionally it is the connection with absolute power the characteristic 
that has been almost predominantly investigated both in political and legal sphere.7 Nevertheless, in my 
opinion, much more relevant in his definition are the patterns of ‘orderly cohesion moulded within a 
defined territory’.  
Even though some scholar of international law argues the fact that the renowned treaties of Westphalia 
(1648) actually created abruptly the current international system out of the previous void (and they did 
not since they were in accordance with previous treaties and protocols), they did however pose for the 
first time clearly the concept of sovereignty of the state (and the corollary of “effectivity”) and at the 
same time stressed the universal equality of the all the state.8 These values had been progressively re-
iterated in following treaties and finally came to a codification with the UN 1970 Declaration on Frien-
dly Relations (No. 2625-XV), where the respect of the personality of other states and the inviolability 
of territorial integrity and political independence are declared.9 Despite the current good intentions, it is 
necessary to state that, nevertheless, such a horizontal footing between the states (or anarchical in more 
socio-political phrasing) did and does not prevent military conflicts when previous principles for the 
imposition of justice prevail. Since in principle no there is no authority superior to the state, it could 
any time recall upon itself the right to decide what was its paramount interest and to use any possible 
                                                            
6 Loughlin, 2000, p. 125. 
7 Also a philosophical inquiry that brought to what is considered to be the “hard-core” realpolitik thinking of the realist 
school, as the Morgenthau’s quotation explains “[...] the preservation of sovereignty is seen as the foremost concern in 
international affairs”, Ibid.  
8 See Lowe, 2007, p. 9, for the suspicion on the Westphalian relevance. It is true that single concepts of territory, soverei-
gnty were to some extent theorized already before their codification into the Westphalian system and are present in other 
legal cultures; yet, they were scattered and never so tightly interrelated as in modernity. 
See Kegley for the key components of the Westphalian normative order. Kegley, 2002, pp. 188-189.  
9 UN Resolution 2625-XXV; p.124 “The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States”:  
All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international 
community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature. In particular, sovereign 
equality includes the following elements: 
(a) States are juridically equal; 
(b) Each State enjoys the right inherent in full sovereignty; 
(c) Each state has the duty to respect the personality of other States; 
(d) The territorial integrity and the political independence of the State are inviolable; 
(e) Each State has the right to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural system; 
(f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international obligations and to live in peace 
with other States. 
Adopted by consensus by the General Assembly, though not legally binding, it sets, together with all treaties, state repre-
sentatives’ declarations, diplomatic practice,  the standards which may be considered overriding and permitting the inter-
national community; see Cassese 2001, pp. 88-89. 
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means in order to achieve it, war included (this is the traditional anarchic principle on which both the 
realist schools of international law and relations are founded). Such conditions were however slowly 
codified by international treaties and conventions, which gradually curbed the most violent and arbitra-
ry expressions of this absolute sovereignty, until the UN Charter entered into force and became the 
foundation of a new regime (see paragraph 2.3.2). 
2.1.2 Corollary: the underlying principle of Effectivity 
Effectivity is the general rule that ‘permeates the whole body of international rules’ claims and situa-
tions are relevant on the international level only when they are implanted in real life and capable of im-
plementing the acts of a sovereign authority, i.e. a durable and firm display of authority mostly over a 
territory or a population.10 However, this does not necessarily mean that ‘force was the principal source 
of legitimation’, as Cassese mentioned considering the case of the state again insurgents or invaders, 
but the only method to ascertain the actual exercise, or often even just the capability, of sovereignty 
over an area. This principle does not apply simply regarding occupied territory, but it is one of the very 
reasoning which guides the expansion of international law in most of the areas that were not covered 
before. This capability is nowadays closely linked with technology and is the guiding principle when 
considering sovereignty over open spaces (see paragraph 4.3). 
Effectivity is also the reason why another supposed constitutive element, international recognition, that 
initially may be considered as constitutive, from a legal realist point of view has no actual relevance, as 
it does not affect the existence of the state in itself, but its relations with the other states. Recognition is 
traditionally an act, which can be instantiated by declaration or simply by initiating official diplomatic 
relations (i.e. sending of representatives), and this highlights the political nature of the act. It has the 
meaning that the recognizing state believes the other to fulfill all the requirements of a full-fledged sta-
te, and once stated such acts cannot be retracted, however, the principle itself goes against both the pre-
vious principle of equal sovereignty.11 Some sort of ‘communitarian recognition’ has gradually taken 
place with the status of member to the United Nations, but it has not resolved the consequent and ever 
present contradiction between states de jure and de facto (respectively states only recognized as such or 
lost their territory, and those which present all the elements but lack recognition. Some well-known 
contemporary examples are the Tibetan Administration in Exile or The Republic of China in Taiwan).  
                                                            
10 Ibid.; pp. 12-13. 
11 How could indeed a single state decide if another fulfills all the requirements? Ibid. pp. 48-49.  
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2.1.3 The corporeality of the state: territory as necessary attribute 
All interpretations of the state, from legal to sociological ones, require a territory, a delimited area of 
land where the authority and sovereignty of the state indeed takes place. It is an essential attribute 
which links the state with the materiality of the world. The necessity of this link is reflected in the fact 
that jurisprudence cannot conceive a state without territory, but describes portions of territory without 
population or in some cases even without a definite structure of authority.12  
Moreover, most of the treaties and norms traditionally dealt with territorial delimitations or the settle-
ment of territorial disputes. The instances of commencement, termination, secession or union of states 
themselves (each one affecting substantially their existence) are expressed in territorial terms. Lastly, 
the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity stated in the UN resolution 2625 on Friendly Rela-
tions13 (and earlier in the UN Charter itself, Chapter 1) shows the effort to protect these characteristics 
and stabilize the system. Territory has then been clearly charged with specific significance for the es-
sence of the state, in such a way that it has become naturalized and unperceived no more as one of the 
factors composing the state, but reified as the state itself. Obviously, such state’s corporeality is not 
completely exhausted by territory alone, but extends to many other aspects and items through the social 
process of representations. Yet, this specificity of territory, its very notion as a “space of possibility” 
for the state’s action, is an important aspect that has been an underlying theme both in legal and inter-
national relations development in the last century.  
2.2 At the geographical roots of IR realism: Schmitt and the Nomos of the Earth 
Bearing well in mind his controversial definition of the political and the historical context he developed 
his theories in, Schmitt is relevant also in the contemporary analysis of territory mainly for two rea-
sons: first of all, he is the first political theorist who patterned the terrestrial/geographical origins and 
outlines of the contemporary International Law and of the international system as a whole, and second-
ly he was the major source of influence for Hans Morgenthau (though such direct connection was never 
clearly declared by him14) and consequently also for the following realist school of international rela-
                                                            
12 The example is the approach of the international community regarding contemporary Somalia: even if it is considered to 
be a ‘failed state’ collapsed under a civil war and de facto divided into different and more or less extended chiefdoms, it is 
still considered as a ‘state’, nor the neighboring states try to fill the void as a mechanical realist would assume.  
13 See par. 2.1.1, note 9. 
14 He declared a case of plagiarism in the opposite direction. Hans J. Morgenthau, before emigrating to the United States 
and becoming their leading international relations scholar, was originally a German national, born in Coburg in 1904, 
studied Law in Münich and wrote his doctoral thesis discussing ‘The Concept of the Political’ of Carl Schmitt. He received a 
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tions. However, the fundamental pessimistic idea of human nature, the ideal of the Political as an auto-
nomous sphere of action (independent of utopian legal, moral or economic values) and based on power 
and interest are the typical characteristics of political realism. By surveying and deconstructing his 
thought expressed in the book “The Nomos of the Earth”15, we aim at revealing the inspirational find-
ings of Schmitt over the often uncovered connection between the State and its territory and finally at 
criticizing some of his anachronistic conclusions. 
The book “The Nomos of the Earth” (hereafter referred to as simply the Nomos), work that collected a 
series of essays written in the early 1940s but published in its final version in German in 1950, was first 
and foremost an historical overview of the development of International Law until the 1st World War, 
exclusively from a juridical perspective. Schmitt’s academic background was on constitutional law in 
the tormented years of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), and his sympathies and support with the 
German National-socialist party produced rather conservative and authoritative concepts of Law and its 
expression in a system of sovereign states16. His major intellectual concern had been to reconcile the 
problem of the modern state’s sovereignty in an international environment which was starting to limit 
this absolute sovereignty in the name of cosmopolitanism and the creation of the League of Nations. In 
the Nomos, Schmitt portrays the organization of the European modern states between the 17th and 19th 
centuries, as the first defined global Order, which, founded on the conceptual grounds of states agency 
and mutual equality, brought to a global equilibrium, and the ‘bracketing’ of war among equals. For the 
scope of the research, I will mostly overlook the more legal-moral aspects of Schmitt’s Earth division, 
which considers as first purpose of international law the one of limiting the destructive potential of war 
(typical assumption of jurisprudence as a discipline), and will concentrate instead on the geographical 
ones, which reflect the thinking and technology of his time, but, however, disclose some insight on the 
contemporary tendencies on the territorial expansion on the last undefined surfaces of the world.  
2.2.1 Terrestrial origins of legal systems, the Nomos 
According to Schmitt territory is basically is the social result of land-appropriation by any community, 
which constitutes the founding legal act taking control and distributing the essential resources based 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
praising letter and managed to meet him in person, an encounter that apparently disappointed him, as written in his auto-
biography. Afterward Schmitt actually revised his theory incorporating Morgenthau’s concept of ‘intensity of conflict’. Yet, 
the connection between the two, and especially on Morgenthau’s worldview, was much deeper. See William E. 
Scheuerman, 2007. 
15 The version of the work we refer to is the English translation published in 2003. 
16 Vinx, Lars, "Carl Schmitt", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition). 
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and originated by the Earth, and consequently it is expressed in three activity: appropriation, division 
and production; resumed in a word, divided in a nomos.  
As described in the Appendixes of the book, nomos is an ancient Greek word, deriving from the verb 
nemein, which resumes the three functions mentioned above: its first meaning is to pasture, leading the 
herd and occupying portions of land; second meaning is to reap fruit (and thus indirectly to inhabit a 
place) points out to the productive side; the third and more used was then to distribute equally these 
fruits of human production. Another interesting aspect is that the substantive came to describe also the 
result of these practices, namely their institutionalization into custom and habits that eventually became 
a people’s customary law (i.e. oi nomoi; to be remembered how the first Greek legislators were called 
literally ‘nomos’-givers, i.e. nomothetes17), usually in opposition to an ideal law of nature, i.e. logos.  
Nevertheless, the nomos remained linguistically confined in the household’s domain, becoming later 
source of the economic activity (e.g. oiko-nomia, household’s management), and expresses a form of 
power which does not comply with its traditional denominations: imperium, the supreme power, pote-
stas, functional power, what one can do, or auctoritas, the social power, status18. Schmitt tries to con-
nect it with the latter: in the same way the herder (nomeus in Greek) leads the flock, such is the good 
statesman. Moreover, extending the patriarchal link of the household to the state, whenever the state 
administrates totally the social welfare, then power is becoming again a nomos of distribution and 
production.  
Yet, despite the interesting connection with ‘redistributive’ power (and eventual links to absolute sove-
reignty and totalitarianism) Schmitt’s emphasis all over the book is nevertheless on land-appropriation 
as the primeval act and source of legal authority, which is followed by the immediate functional divi-
sion of the land, that becomes consequently the measure of the order and the form of political activity. 
‘… power formations of every sort [are] founded on new spatial divisions, new enclosures and new 
spatial division and ordering of the Earth’19. Nomos describes the whole process and the final effect: 
the politico-spatial order of the planet and the dynamics that bring it forth. 
                                                            
17 Greek  – English Lexicon, Lindell and Scott, Oxford ed., 9th Edition, 1940. Entry ୍ʆ୐ʅʉʎ, nomos p. 1180; 
18 Auctoritas, Latin for authority, could be the most suitable candidate as the power form of the nomos, since they share 
the same semantic origin (Auctoritas comes from the verb augere: to augment, to raise); yet in Latin the material produc-
tive aspect was relinquished becoming a source of power in itself. 
19 Schmitt 2003, p. 79. 
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As often myths describe the unconscious in a way that becomes evident, it is no wonder that Greek 
mythical narratives directly connect Law and Earth, as Justice (Themis) daughter of the Earth (Gè), re-
affirming a materially geographical20 origin which is often overseen. The event that produces the order 
and unity between land and law is land-appropriation that is grounded basically in two ways: internal, 
by the same appropriating community among its members, and external, by the relation between the 
different appropriating groups. Land-appropriation therefore precedes any distinction between domestic 
and international and basically constitutes it21. Moreover, since international law (i.e. völkenrecht in 
German or jus gentium in Latin, i.e. the law of people) developed as a way to permit a safe and cohe-
rent communication and exchange between these groups, Schmitt could claim with some degree of cer-
tainty that the traditional history of the international law is mainly the history of land appropriation, its 
division and consequent relations between these separated entities22.  
One of main Schmitt’s argument is thus that every human community creates its own spatial order and 
divisions, which are clearly terrestrial, because over the sea nothing could be fixed or marked. These 
distinctive orders are characterized by a center (or axis) and a direction (or usually by irradiation from 
the center). Nevertheless, even if each order believed to be the center of the cosmos, to some extent, al-
ready in ancient times a common concept of universality was also developed, which in European terms 
is expressed by the word ecumene (from the Greek oikomene [gé], the inhabited [earth]). These distinc-
tions though pertained more to the religious and cosmological thought, where the relation between divi-
nity, humans and the world is direct and the unity of law becomes either divine or natural. In the me-
dieval European context this notion was embodied by the Respublica Christiana where secular and spi-
ritual were intermingled and in the forms of the Empire and the Church, each divided in territorially 
overlapping subdivisions. Such mythological and universal order are typical of what Schmitt defines as 
the first epoch of spatial nomos, that characterizes all pre-modern human communities until the 15th 
century, when a specific shift in spatial awareness happened during the Age of Discovery, from 1492 
onwards, and differentiated Europe from the rest of the World. Earth appeared not to be a finite totality 
anymore, but an infinite space open to discovery and exploitation, which brought to a more precise 
                                                            
20 We use geographical here on purpose: see below geography according to Farinelli, Chap 3.  
21 Schmitt, 2003, pp. 80-81. 
22 Though also some aspect that we consider as belonging to the private sphere of Law were present, like the condition 
and status of aliens, the historical legal acts we can rely on are treaties and vows asserting peace and the control or influ-
ence over some territories.  
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consciousness of one’s own territory in order to justify the land-appropriation of new land23. This co-
incided with a weakening of the previous extra-territorial and more spiritual medieval authorities: reli-
gious disputes in 16th centuries led to bloody wars which undermined the unity of the previous social 
orders confuting also the unitary cosmological worldview that dominated until that time. The common 
solution developed to end the slaughter was the creation of a territorially determined and religiously 
neutral authority, the modern state, as the only entity able to wage war against an equally recognized 
state24. However, in dealing with new concepts and dimensions, aliens to previous legal knowledge, 
scholars referred to previous legal systems, mainly Roman law, with its emphasis on categories of 
persons as agents and territorially based jurisdiction and authority, in order to explain the new reality of 
absolute monarchies25. 
2.2.2 The first global Nomos, the Jus Publicum Europeaum 
The European modern legal order which followed the end of the cosmological worldview was conse-
quently based on absolute sovereign states behaving as rational individuals, defined in their power in a 
defined territorial area, whose only constraints on their sphere of action was the traditional motto pacta 
sunt servanda (i.e. agreements are to be observed). Though not disregarding it completely, Schmitt af-
firms that the only voluntary binding of the state to the agreement it undertook was too weak to descri-
be the whole system, because economic, cultural and religious ties, created a more solid structure of 
patterns26, being aware of the thicker social environment all social groups develop in and drawing clo-
ser to a constructivist structural approach. The states common identity and shared recognition as legiti-
mate equals brought to the bracketing of war in a manner resembling a duel.  
This regulated legal order was located exclusively among the sovereign Christian domains, whereas 
over non-Christian countries or empty territories the right of appropriation remained always possible. 
An Amity Line, was time to time individuated, within which the civilized rules of the European states 
permitted the bracketing of war, normed within the limits European landmass, while over the sea and 
                                                            
23 This particularly important shift in perspective will be one of the main focus of next chapter, the ‘beyond the map’ par. 
3.2.3. 
24 Ibid. pp. 141-42.  
25 ‘The analogy between states and human persons became predominant in all international law considerations’ and also 
commonly since the identity between kings and princes and the state apparatus was total. See Schmitt, 2003, pp. 143-44. 
Though Loughlin argues instead an “impersonalization of rulership” (Loughlin, 2000, pp. 128-129) which is actually not 
that contradictory, sovereignty is an ‘earthly depersonalized authority (Ibid., p. 130) and it was not Luis 14th per se being 
the state, but he as the King. The pervasiveness of this new belief hit also the philosophical sphere bringing to the 
‘Emergence of the idea of the individualized state’ as Simons’ essay wittily is entitled. Simons, 2004. 
26 Schmitt, 2003, pp. 147-151. 
34 
 
beyond, speed and force of military interventions ruled in extra-European warfare (a typical example is 
privateering). Therefore Schmitt’s Nomos, typical of the modern era, was an expanding multi-layered 
territorial  system with at  its  core the European Public  Law system of  sovereign states,  delineated by 
Amity lines, where courtesy and probity regulated the states’ interaction, and a increasing degree of 
freedom extending to the undiscovered territories and the open sea, which to some extent, balanced and 
stabilized this European core, letting completion, aggressive and expansive elements storming outside. 
2.2.3 Freedom of the Sea: justification and development 
Land in the modern Nomos was thus either belonging to European States or to those human communi-
ties of equal standing, otherwise it was to be occupied. The sea was completely outside of this order, 
clearly influenced by the contemporary geopolitical thinking of the time, as he states in the introduction 
thanking personally the insights of Mackinder, famous American geopolitical author, for its division 
between maritime and continental powers27. What is relevant in this additional land/sea distinction, 
which he considered as essential in the system, was again a different conception of enemy, looting and 
war. The open sea, as the unoccupied land, becomes a safe space for the states aggressiveness to take 
place, and justified England’s role as balancer of the continental Europe, as overwhelming maritime 
power. However, he himself discloses the historical development of such conception, analyzing the 
legal nature of the open sea. 
As seen shortly above, the main legal concerns in the structuring of the European Public Law system in 
the 16th century sprung from concepts of Roman Law. The seas were no exception, but they presented 
an ‘elemental’ condition which prevented the stable exercise of power. Once the Europeans managed to 
tame the oceanic waves, the conundrum was whether the sea was to be considered legally as res nullius 
or res omnium: no one’s or everyone’s possessions. In the first case, the sea was free for occupation as 
the unoccupied land. In the latter, the sea becomes likewise a common, an area everyone is allowed to 
go to and exploit. Surveying Schmitt’s contemporary legal scholars, the verdict was that in order to 
become a commonality, the sea had to be constituted as a condominium, a common property of all the 
                                                            
27 Though this division goes much beyond the 19th century and had already an influence in ancient times with Thucydides. 
Yet, Mackinder’s formal geopolitical model could claim a “grounding in the natural features of the Earth”. See Agnew, 
2003, pp. 28-29.  
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states: every state would have to ensure the rules repressing criminals such pirates. All conditions 
which were deemed not sustainable at the time28.  
Indeed the main problem in dealing with the concept of freedom of the seas is the clash between the 
states’ freedom of sea-warfare and their freedom of trade/fishing. During the Age of Discovery, the 
quarrel was essential in order to break the maritime monopoly of the first discoverers, the Iberian king-
doms, or of the rising maritime powers, such as England. Grotius’ Mare Liberum (1609), supporting 
the right for free trade of nations over the seas, and Selden’s Mare Clausum (1617), advocating instead 
the sovereignty of England over the adjacent waters and narrow seas, represent the two opposite view-
points on the issue29. 
A compromise was to be later achieved with the conception of ‘territorial sea’, a narrow strip, defined 
initially by the reach of the coast artillery (ubi finitur armorum vis, i.e. where finishes the strength of 
armies) and later to a 3 nautical miles range. Moreover, exactly the fact that this measure had not yet 
been reviewed at the time of the publishing of the Nomos, proved that, although terrestrial in origin, 
this was a convention which lost its original perspective (i.e. coastal defense) and served the wider con-
cept of freedom of sea. Therefore, the sea was still considered as a ‘a realm free for test of strength’, 
and in particular this space of freedom balanced and permitted the stability of the European Core to last 
over 200 years30. However, exactly the extension of territorial rights also over the seas will be one of 
the codifications and signs of the generalization of the overriding principle of effectivity (see paragraph 
4.3.1). 
2.2.4 The post-Versailles (dis-)Order and conclusions 
The European geographical order as described by Schmitt was already crumbling in the end of 19th 
century: a considerable number of treaties were signed with non-state entities in extra-European lands 
in order to justify a legal title of ‘effective occupation’, i.e. sovereignty acquired by effective admini-
stration of a specific territory, especially regarding aspects of public order and external defense, render-
ing thus the practice more and more customary. According to Schmitt, this very principle undermined 
the solidarity and communitarian spirit that previously united the European states, because it rejected 
the social principle of recognition. Moreover, such the effective occupation basically equalized the 
                                                            
28 Ibid. pp. 175-76.The situation has drastically changed nowadays, but this will be dealt below, see paragraph 4.3.1. 
29 Ibid, pp. 178-181. 
30 Ibid, p. 183. 
36 
 
status of colonial territory with the one of the motherland, displacing Europe from its central, or hier-
archically superior, global position. Indeed he considered “superficial [the] notion of a universalizing 
process that is naïvely seen as a victory of the European International Law. It mistook the removal of 
Europe from the center of Earth in international law for Europe’s rise to the center.”31 
Such critique springs apparently from his concrete order-thinking (statement that will be shortly argued 
in the next paragraph), as the concrete order of international order consists in his opinion in the uniting 
and blending of different several diverse orders (setting as examples the dichotomies spiritual/feudal 
law for the pre-modern period, dynastic/interstate law for the early Westphalian order, liberal-economic 
norms/interstate law for the 19th century). With the late 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, he 
sees no spatial structure left, no boundaries when the first symptoms of globalized economy appeared: 
the amity lines seemed to be drawn in human activities rather than on territories. 
This process reached its climax with the end of the 1st World War and the Paris Peace Conference 
(1919-20) which created a provisional international system with the League of Nations. Schmitt’s criti-
ques on the criminalization of Germany and the puny normative attempts for criminalizing internatio-
nally any kind of war, dissolving thus the distinction of just enemy in their total annihilation, are impor-
tant claims on the resulting concept of total war which was to break out in the 2nd World Conflict, an-
other symptom of the ‘dis-Order’ of the inter-war period. Yet, not entering this intriguing arguments on 
the bracketing of war which display the tragic metaphysical perspective of Schmitt,32 his most definiti-
ve assessment is that “the League of Nations was unable to develop an internally consistent and unify-
ing principle of the territorial status quo”, since every nomos ( here as unity of order and orientations) 
presumes property guarantees33. There was no legal principle that govern the existing territorial state of 
affairs, and therefore condemned to the following breakdown and holocaust.  
After having considered the conditions that brought to visible confusion of the interwar period and the 
critiques of the excessively utopian idealist strive of that time, Schmitt concludes his book with a last 
appendix, reflecting on the possibility of a new nomos given the contemporary circumstances (as for 
the year 1954). He comes to three possibilities: the victory of one of the contender of the Cold War, 
able then to appropriate, divide and share the World (‘according to his ideas’, a dreadful case in 
Schmitt’s opinion); the restoration of the previous nomos adjusted to the contemporary technological 
                                                            
31 Ibid, p. 233. 
32 Ojankangas, 2004, pp. 11-12. 
33 Schmitt, 2003, p. 245. 
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means and dimension (US becoming the sea-air power able to balance the land-based USSR); the com-
bination of several independent großräume (i.e., roughly translated, ‘areas of influence’) internally 
homogeneous, which could then balance themselves and precipitate in a new order.34 Of particular in-
terest here is Schmitt’s anxiety on the possibility of the World’s unification under a single domination: 
it seems the simplest solution to the problem of lack of order, a possibility enhanced by modern techno-
logical means; yet he already foresees also the possibility of self-destruction and the leveling of human 
plurality. He clearly leans to one of the latter two prospects, yet we leave the assessment on the accura-
cy of his conclusions and analysis after almost 60 years to the readers themselves.  
2.3 Commentary and criticism of the worldview of the Nomos 
Schmitt’s historical reconstruction of the development of a legal-geographical order of the Earth in the 
last centuries holds great authority and fascination, which after his late translation into English in the 
late 1990s, has brought a revival of his ideas in the wave of neo-conservatism of the beginning of the 
2000s.35 Yet, some critical assessment is due for a more a objective understanding of his thought. 
The first more consistent comment is the significance of the socio-historical conditions when Schmitt 
composed his major works: he developed most of his political theories in the interwar period, characte-
rized by continuous domestic and international instability (communist revolution and unrests, crimina-
lization of Germany after the Paris treaties). He wrote his most influential works on politics and sove-
reignty in response of what at that time seemed the crisis of the liberal parliamentarian state, threatened 
by extremist political tendencies (communism on one side, and national-socialism on the other). His 
early works, such as Political Theology (1922) and The Concept of the Political (1932) defined a clear 
critique of the liberal ideals of the first half of the 20th century, setting the roots of a stable domestic po-
litical community reasserting two fundamental principles of political activity: firstly the primary role of 
decision-making and the deepest meaning of sovereignty, (i.e. “Sovereign is that who decides in the 
state of exception”) and secondly the identification of the political group that essentially can be reduced 
to the distinction enemy/friend. Both Schmitt’s Decisionism and the distinction Enemy/Friend springs 
from a rather pessimistic anthropological view of human nature, violent and unrestrained, that can be 
brought under control only through the fear of self-destruction.  
                                                            
34 Ibid., pp. 352-55. Part V, chapter 3. ”The new Nomos of the Earth”. 
35 An extensive critique of Schmitt’s “Fatal Attraction” on contemporary international political and legal theory can be 
read on his essay, Teschke, 2011. Specifically in our case, it is clear that this research is clearly influenced not merely by 
the fact of the existence of an international order, but by the fact that this order is possible and actually it conflates with 
the idea of an international legal system/ international culture expressed geographically. 
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With this view he strenuously opposed the late modernity’s liberal ideology that ‘dissolves the political 
struggle and conflict into a neutral sphere of the technical, transforming society and the state in an ‘ad-
ministrative mechanism’ imposing an immanence that sterilizes any plurality and possibility of change. 
Also at the international level he believes that the imposition of a unanimous and a-political universal 
society is the justification of the most violent imperialism. In order to counter-balance such fearful ab-
solutist tendencies he promotes a return to the concreteness of life. And when the concrete of reality 
strikes in the social world where all standardized procedures risk to narcotize social and political life in 
a mindless mechanism of technocratic bureaucracy? Schmitt’s answer is in the extremes: in all the ca-
ses when normality is contradicted by the exception, which is a rupture, ‘a contingent and conflictual 
foundation and a foundational contingence’ of collective human existence; therefore, his main objects 
of analysis during his career become all borderlines, exceptions that starts a new order: the state of ex-
ception, revolution, the enemy as existential threat, and importantly in our case, land-appropriation.36 
There is everywhere a fundamental act of distinction, act of discernment that is at the basis of the au-
tonomous sphere of politics and also solidifies into the line separating physically two communities. As 
Ojakangas has ingeniously pointed out, what is axiomatic in all Schmitt’s thought, in the meaning of 
revolving around an axis, is the juxtaposition inside/outside,37 and taking this process under a pure co-
gnitive approach, it is indeed inevitable: in order to define/determine something (lat. de-finis, de-termi-
nus “from the limits/borders”) one has to divide, to limit the extent of knowledge into a coherent unit.  
Yet, these extreme events listed by Schmitt can be, and often are, sudden and violent, but not necessa-
rily: on his behalf and there is never any appraisal of violence. War is indeed a horror that need to be 
bracketed and the conflict regulated in order to let the essence of the Political be fully expressed (the 
elimination of the enemy is the elimination of politics too). Schmitt has a negative, tragic view of 
human nature and the world, deeply influenced by the same religious bias he tries to separate politics 
from, but eventually falls back into, recognizing the dogmatic approach in accepting the truth of the 
distinction of the extremes as a ‘leap of faith’.38 Even though such a drastic approach could seem a de-
finitive closure towards transcendence, seeing the danger of liberalism becoming in his opinion an ab-
solutized immanence, Schmitt’s systems are never permanent: although the founding act of each order 
                                                            
36 Ojakangas, 2004, pp. 23-29; “Philosophy of the Extreme” and especially pp. 26-8 for Schmitt’s counter-balancing of im-
manence. 
37 Ibid, p. 12. 
38 Schmitt’s negative theological view of mankind can be resumed in a sentence ‘Man is a sinner’. Vinx, Lars, "Carl 
Schmitt", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall  2010  Edition).  And  Ojakangas,  2004,  pp.  19-23,  for  the  ‘psycho-
logical’ analysis of the pessimist Carl Schmitt. 
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remains the same, the configurations of the units continuously change, so in an apparent paradoxical 
manner they are a characteristic of openness towards changing historical context.39 
2.3.1 Major critiques on the Nomos and Schmitt’s ‘international theory’ 
Criticism on Schmitt’s philosophical anti-liberal thought are numerous and the very first is his support 
to Nazi-fascism, dictated either by personal conviction or calculated opportunism, and therefore also its 
theoretical justification, when, even declaring impartiality on the political ideologies proposed, one 
cannot deny that eventually he promoted the same total warfare he was criticizing liberalism for. Se-
condly, his undisguised Eurocentric and hierarchical worldview, based primarily on the supposed pri-
macy of the European civilization could be an argument brought forth by a post-colonialist school of 
thought, paired by arguments of a ‘Westphalian nostalgia’ on Schmitt’s behalf, point out to a not so 
well-hidden normative standpoint when “things really worked out, back in the days”, even when he 
himself states that the conditions that made that specific order appear were not present anymore.40 
Notwithstanding Benno Gerard Teschke’s criticism on Schmitt’s consideration of the Westphalian trea-
ties as an historical turning point (an opinion that according to Teschke was lacking at the same time 
any critical analysis of the treaties themselves)41 does not hinder the fact that, though scattered and not 
clearly stated, Schmitt has presented all the major characteristics and innovations introduced by the so-
called Westphalian legal systems, that Kegley lists in his historical, political and philosophical analysis 
of the treaties and their negotiation procedure. Setting sovereignty as the recognized fundamental prin-
ciple, states were entitled with rights and duties: rights of self-preservation, political independence and 
of equality; the duty of non-intervention in others’ internal issues and the obligation of good faith.42  
However, the most pugnacious arguments usually involve the normative aspects of Schmitt’s analysis, 
of the dangers and the violence of a universal and moralistic liberalism taken up again by neo-conser-
vatives and opponents alike in the nowadays uncertainty on the concept of humanitarian intervention 
and  “just  war”,  defined  by  Teschke  as  a  “fatal attraction”. He strongly argue that Schmitt’s is no 
                                                            
39 See ibid, p. 26; Ojakangas reports here Carlo Galli’s analysis where, even if Schmitt’s thought of this openness towards 
transcendence, it is eventually the possibility itself toward continuous contingent adaptation of the system. The only pos-
sible critique at this point, as we will also present soon afterwards, is the clear subjective nostalgia of the primacy of the 
pre-war Jus Publicum Europaeum. 
40 Scheuerman 2007, pp. 7-8; Vinx, Lars, "Carl Schmitt", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), see 1. 
Biographical Sketch, 2nd paragraph.  
41 Teschke, 2011, pp. 202-03. 
42 Kegley, 2002, pp. 190-191.  
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international historical theory or sociology, for it lacks any real dynamic of the spatial orders, ruling out 
any social aspect, thus reifying geopolitics, privileging the political over the social: there is no descript-
tion of what process actually drives these fundamental acts (land-appropriation, enemy-declarations, 
world-ordering), ‘a curiously non-geopolitical stance’43, when he clearly admit the debt with Sir Hal-
ford J. Mackinder, considered to be one of the founding fathers of geopolitics44. The critique that 
Schmitt presents a “semantic geo-mythological legal history” is though not completely off the mark. 
Schmitt admitted already in the introduction of the book that myths are a possible rationalization of 
otherwise inexplicable phenomena, such as in our case the complex socio-historical events that connect 
law and land, and are expressed in the principles of Roman Law, a territorial legal system mostly of 
private property, that later expanded its notions providing the bases and the vocabulary of the interna-
tional interaction itself. The frequent mistake here is the misunderstanding of power identical to its geo-
graphical extension over the earth (Agnew’s ‘territorial trap’, see par. 2.4). Territory is more and less of 
that: less because power has many more dimensions than the geographical one, and more because it is 
the result of different social practices and technologies in which power may have a limited role. 
2.3.2 Effective sovereignty as the primary title in contemporary international law 
However, pointing only to the act of land-appropriation as the original, ‘radical’ legal title of territorial 
sovereignty looks nowadays anachronistic, or rather in clear contrast with another legal principle, 
which at the time was abhorred by Schmitt: what he called ‘effective occupation’, but it is in the end 
the effective sovereignty, i.e. ‘the actual, continuous and peaceful display of state functions’ over a 
defined area of the world. 
Schmitt’s anachronism comes from the fact that he focused primarily on the first function of the three-
folded meaning of nomos, i.e. land-appropriation (evidently for historical contingencies and opportuni-
ties), dismissing the ones of division and administration. In his opinion, only land-appropriations could 
happen within and, most importantly, outside the international legal order, and exclusively in the latter 
case they “uproot the existing spatial order and establish a new nomos”45. It is evident here that at the 
time he had in mind the exceptionality of the case of a sudden unilateral land-appropriation done with 
                                                            
43 Teschke 2011, pp. 214-215. 
44 Schmitt, 2002 , p. 37; Mackinder is famous for its heartland theory, which presents the fundamental geographical dis-
tinction of the World into land and sea, a contrast that is present in Schmitt as well, though the first geographer displaying 
this “terrestrial order of our planet” was the German Carl Ritter, in Farinelli 2003, p. 96. 
45 Schmitt, 2002, pp. 81-82. 
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the clear purpose to override an iniquitous status quo (as  for  Germany  in  the  2nd World War), yet it 
does not become an ‘order and orientation’ as far as such extra-legal action is accepted and incurpo-
rated at least as customary, and therefore fundamentally and continuously changes the state of things, 
justifying anarchy instead of a new Order.  
The normalization of the exceptional act as such, as an arbitrary and sovereign decision, unconditioned 
by any constraint would be indeed an unpredictable social environment, yet the very nature of the sove-
reign decision is never completely absolute or unconditioned: it is taken under conditions by which the 
agent has to choose between alternative not described in previous norms. The Sovereign has no formal 
freedom; it is forced to choose by circumstances. In order to become ‘order and orientation’ it has to 
become recognized as a new norm and requires some concept of property guarantees and of status 
quo46. Such conditions for stability realized within the legal system enhanced by the United Nations 
with the declaration of territorial integrity of the states and the mechanisms of the principle of the uti 
possidetis (lat. “as you possess”) that regulated the de-colonization process especially in the African 
continent. Territorial integrity has been confirmed and reaffirmed throughout a series of regional and 
international treaties, starting from the Covenant of the League of Nations (1920, Art. 10), or the al-
ready mentioned Montevideo Convention on rights and duties of the States (1934, Art.11), to the Uni-
ted Nation Charter (1945, Art.2(4)), to most of regional organizations47. Yet, what is considered inter-
nationally and politically most relevant was the Helsinki Final Act (1975, Point III and IV) which hel-
ped thus stabilizing the territorial disputes in the Cold War Europe. The uti possidetis was originally a 
legal principle of the Law of War, by which a territory and all the property within remains with its pos-
sessor at the end of a conflict if a treaty does not provide otherwise, that later evolved, through the in-
dependence of the Spanish American colonies in the 19th century, in the ‘doctrine that old administrati-
ve boundaries would become international boundaries when a political subdivision achieves indepen-
dence’48, giving thus precedence to the right of precedent legal title (uti possidetis juris). This principle 
                                                            
46 Ibid, p. 245. 
47 These are explicitly the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), just to cite some. For a comprehensive list with the distin-
ction on the intensity of the territorial integrity provision see Appendix I in Hensel, Allison and Khanani, 2006, pp. 33-36. 
48 Quotation from the Black’s Law dictionary cited in Hensel, Allison and Khanani, 2006, p. 8. 
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has unquestionably become globally recognized when it was accepted as the leading criterion in resol-
ving territorial disputes also in Africa and Europe49.  
What about when there were no legal title to be produced? Different legal theories had defined this ori-
ginal legal title of territorial sovereignty, such as discovery or symbolic annexation. Schmitt believed 
all of them were reducible to land-appropriation, a term that could coincide with the current legal terms 
of apprehension that includes both the significations of occupation and conquest.50 Yet, as stated in the 
Island of Palmas Case (Netherland/U.S.A.), even if the single act of occupation was accomplished, ef-
fective and declared it was not sufficient. As the International arbitrator Max Hubert stated in the Island 
of Palmas case (1928): 
“[The fact that t]he occupation shall be effective would be unconceivable, if effectiveness is required only for the 
act of acquisition and not equally for the maintenance of the right. If the effectiveness has above all been insisted 
on in regard to occupation, this is because the question rarely arises in connection with territories in which there 
is already an established order of things. Just as before the rise of international law, boundaries of land were ne-
cessarily determined by the fact that the Power of the State was exercised within them, so too, under the reign of 
international law, the fact of peaceful and continuous display is still one of the most important considerations in 
establishing boundaries between states”.51 
This is because independence, and therefore sovereignty, has indeed been expressed geographically as 
the ‘exclusive right to display the activity of the State’, as a situation recognized and delimited in spa-
ce. The interesting aspect in nowadays jurisprudence on territorial disputes, that demonstrates at the sa-
me time the very conservative nature of international law and its tendency towards a status quo, is that, 
even though it is recognized the importance of the display of territorial sovereignty, and Hubert himself 
advocated for the primacy of the principle of effective sovereignty over the single legal title of acquisi-
                                                            
49 See the Case concerning the frontier dispute (Burkina Faso / Republic of Mali) 22. December 1986 III.2. “[...] Although 
this principle was invoked for the first time in Spanish America, it is not a rule pertaining solely to one specific system of 
international law, it is a principle of general scope [...]”.  
The Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (1991-1993) recognized the international relevance of the In-
ternational Court of Justice and directly refers to the Burkina Faso / Mali case when reporting in Opinion No. 3 on Borders 
the application of the uti possidetis iuris (being the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia undergoing a process of dissolution, not 
secession, see Opinion No. 1). 
50 The terms are used depending on the fact whether the land was inhabited or not, and whether the population had signi-
ficantly resisted. They both are included in the wider umbrella of acquisition which however comprehends also the peace-
ful transfer of territorial sovereignty from a state to another through cession, or by the geological extension of a territory, 
i.e. accretion. See Island of Palmas Case (Netherland/U.S.A.), 9 April 1928, Reports of International Arbitral Awards; p. 839; 
and Malcolm Shaw’s Lecture, “The International Legal Principles Relating to Territorial Disputes: The Acquisition of Title to 
Territory”. 
51 Ibid. My emphases.  
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tion52, nevertheless previous legal titles of acquisition still retain predominance. As explained by 
Malcolm Shaw, effectivity is confirmative, it completes and confirms, but not contradict previously va-
lid legal titles53.  
Therefore, in absence of any legal title, what decides the territorial sovereignty could be relevant geo-
graphical factors (eventually contiguity), but in the end, if present, it is the ‘display of actual, peaceful 
and continuous activities of the state’, i.e. effectivity. Whenever, a prior legal title exists and recogni-
zed then this title has predominance, since the need of stability of the international system lets the prin-
ciple of territorial integrity prevail and protect any form of legal possession. Otherwise indeed land-
appropriation and any invasion or occupation would be immediately effective and destabilizing any 
order. According to these principles, the contemporary International Legal System fulfills even 
Schmitt’s requirements of property guarantees and status quo for necessary for ‘order and orientation’. 
2.4 “Territory” as a Political Tool 
It is comforting and frustrating at the same time to find an article which discloses most of the same rea-
soning one had spinning in the head for a long time. Such sensations came reading Stuart Elden’s arti-
cle “Land, Terrain, Territory” (2010), that skillfully presents and summarizes the arguments by which 
the concept of territory is best approached as a ‘political technology’, as an open question to be addres-
sed on every occasion more than an absolute definition, that helps understanding its different historical 
and geographical aspects.  
Elden’s first argument is basically the same as my heuristic point of departure: territory as such has 
been constantly ignored and never critically analyzed because it is just so ‘obviously universal’. He 
points to several reasons, one being the recent post-structuralist mistrust of the last decades for any-
thing that is limited into clear-cut limits, temporal or spatial boundaries (though epistemologically a 
certain degree of coherent knowledge requires some kind of boundaries). Another motive is the tradi-
tional approach of geography towards politics and state power, that Agnew calls the “territorial trap”, 
                                                            
52 Ibid. “If a dispute arises as to the sovereignty over a portion of territory, it is customary to examine which of the States 
claiming sovereignty possesses a title – cession, conquest, occupation, etc. – superior to that which the other State might 
possibly bring forward. However, if the contestation is based on the fact that the other part has actually displayed soverei-
gnty, it cannot be sufficient to establish the title by which sovereignty was validly acquired at a certain moment; it must al-
so be shown that the territorial sovereignty has continued to exist and did exist at the moment which for the decision of the 
dispute must be considered critical. This demonstration consists in the display of State activities, such as belong to the terri-
torial sovereign.”, Island of Palmas Case (Netherland/U.S.A.), pp. 838-39. 
53 Malcolm Shaw’s Lecture,  “The International Legal Principles Relating to Territorial Disputes: The Acquisition of Title to 
Territory”. 
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i.e. a three-fold assumption of the “conventional understanding of the geography of state power”, ac-
cording to which: sovereignty requires delimited territories; that there has to be a distinction domestic 
versus international; and that the territorial state is the natural ‘container’ for modern societies. 
Agnew’s arguments are critical ones, which had never been tackled, but often avoided altogether. 54  
The probably most relevant cause for this misconception, Elden continues, is that people and scholar in 
particular use and confuse the word ‘territoriality’, conferring to it a more active flavor than its original 
meaning: as for ‘spatiality’, territoriality is a property of territory, its status, rather than a mode of ac-
tion toward the territory. Such confusion stems from the fact that territory is a concept which has been 
treated in different disciplines and acquired two main aspects: a biological and a social one. In Elden’s 
opinion, neither of these offers a solid ontology of territory, since, although they grasp the volitional, 
biological driven and behavioral aspect, and its consequent social construction for human beings, they 
still deal with territory too narrowly, missing completely the historicity and geographical unevenness of 
the concept.  
Elden’s method is thus to consider territory as a concept of its own, separated from any consequent be-
havioral or social approach, for the reason that territory is logically prior to territoriality, thought it of-
ten materially created in a second moment, by the different qualities one thinks of it. A working defini-
tion to start with is then the one of the geographer Edward W. Soja of territory as “the political organi-
zation of space” whose main purpose is to enhance societal solidarity through the processes of competi-
tion, conflict and cooperation which are eventually expressed territorially; and as politics presupposes 
power these processes can be analyzed in three different perspectives: 1) as control over the distribu-
tion, allocation and ownership of scarce resources; 2) as the maintenance of order and the enforcement 
of authority; 3) as legitimacy of authority through societal integration.55 These standpoints of analysis 
of territorial expression of political power cluster in fact around three words: land, terrain and territory. 
2.4.1 Land / Terrain / Territory 
The term “land”, as the Latin terra, refers specifically to the ground, the soil, the dry land, as the basis 
that nurtures and sustains human existence. It displays its material aspect as a scarce resource, and the-
refore its economic-politic quality, immediately expressed through property. All elements already re-
cognized and discussed above by Schmitt (see also par. 2.2.1), although in a way somehow excessively 
                                                            
54 Elden 2010, p. 801. and Agnew, 2003, pp. 53-54. 
55 Quoted in Elden, 2010, p. 803-4.  
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tragic and definite, nevertheless ‘land possession has always been a determinant of power, and conflict 
over land has been a key indicator for power struggle’56, yet all the potential of social space in relation 
with the earth does not end there. 
Even considering only the conflictual dimension of such relation, there is an immediate peculiarity of 
the earth/land from all the other objects of struggle: it is at the same time site and stake of the conflict. 
‘Terrain’ is the term that draws together the material strategic aspects of the land that can be related 
both to the military and productive aspects. It is indeed a word mostly used by physical geographers, 
geologists and agronomists that explains the ‘form’ and composition of the earth, but also the immedia-
te rapport between the physical aspect and human interaction, and the combination of the these physical 
features and the human labor creates the landscape (another extremely interesting concept in human 
geography that however goes beyond the scope of the research). The terrain thus expresses the politico-
strategic understanding of the earth, where its physical conditions enhance or hinder human action.  
Both the concepts of land and terrain predate the state and territory collects the characteristics, adding 
however a new dimension and perspective that is distinctive of modernity. Elden’s point is that the ap-
propriate approach able to grasp the historic-geographical development of the concept is indeed to re-
cognize how it is dependent on certain techniques, mathematic and cartographic ones in the first place, 
and the law. The legal correlation between territory and sovereignty has been already revealed and exa-
mined in the previous paragraphs, yet they were made conceptually possible also thanks to geometrical 
and cartographic advances that brought to a major change of perspective, and made mapping and con-
trol over large portions of the earth possible. Elden relates these developments to a ‘calculative grasp of 
the material world’ where the modern concept of space expressed through cartography ‘not only repre-
sents the territory, but it is actively complicit in its production’.57 Territory is therefore the politico-
technological feature of the earth, enhanced by calculative techniques and politico-juridical develop-
ments, that “it is more than merely land, and goes beyond terrain, but is a rendering of the emergent 
concept of ‘space’ as a political category: owned, distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered and 
controlled”58. 
                                                            
56 Ibid, p. 806. 
57 Ibid, p. 809. This modern shift of worldview perspective through the introduction of abstract space is what the Italian 
Geographer Farinelli calls the “cartographic reasoning”, which will be the major topic of the next chapter.  
58 Ibid, p. 810. 
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2.4.2 Territory: a political technology 
Territory is thus a complex mode of social-spatial organization that cannot be understood only in one of 
the three elements presented above, and moreover as a historically and geographically conditioned and 
dependent concept, constantly and almost unconsciously used as a political instrument for measuring 
and controlling parts of the earth.  
Territory is a technology, a tool, because it includes all the techniques for measuring the land, and con-
trolling the terrain: measure and control. It is conditioned because as an historical conception it is pro-
duced by specific events and ideas that inevitably and fluidly modify it in time. It is simultaneously a 
geographical notion because it orders the world, yet at the same time it is not the only one and it is 
dependent on the conditions it emerged which have been unevenly distributed over the globe. It is 
exactly considering these elements that Elden poses two necessary caveats of this approach: firstly it is 
the analysis of a ‘conceptual lineage’ derived from and directed toward a Western philosophical 
thought; secondly, though this approach endeavors a more comprehensive insight over territory, it is 
nonetheless partial, for territory is ‘at the same time juridical, political, economic, social, cultural and 
affective’ and most of these important features are intentionally set aside by Elden in order to focus on 
the political one.59 After having analyzed the politico-legal aspect in this chapter (with a short follow-
up for the contemporary situation in Chap. 4) my further step is to take into consideration the technical, 
cartographic aspects of territory, which had a major role in shaping territory and the modern state, fol-
lowing a specific logic that pervades the relation with the World. Such cartographic reasoning is at the 
roots of modern thinking and understanding its inner logic will help grasping also the subtler ways state 
asserts and project itself through territory.  
                                                            
59 Ibid, p. 811. As it is also the scope of this thesis, though in the next chapters some connection to the cultural and affecti-
ve aspect could be the topic of further research. 
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CHAPTER 3 – The ‘Cartographical Reasoning’ of Modernity 
Certainly one of Schmitt’s most remarkable contribution, despite criticism or objective inaccuracies, 
was to spot a general historical pattern that developed all over modernity and categorized the Earth into 
a orderly defined state and non-state territorial configurations, with the terra nullius, ‘nobody’s land’ 
free for appropriation. The concept of territory itself remains however unquestioned, quickly dismissed; 
even in legal terms it is just the geographical expression of the peaceful activities of the state. Yet, this 
very reluctance in questioning this specific characteristic of the modern state reveals a hidden and es-
sential feature of modernity: the underlying logic that shaped the territory and the state simultaneously, 
that the Italian geographer Franco Farinelli calls the ‘cartographic reasoning’: a subtle intrusion of the 
geometric-mathematical notions habitually used to produce accurate maps, that eventually modified our 
relation with the Earth.  
As Elden ingeniously discussed in the previous chapter, a useful approach to analyze the concept of 
‘territory’ is to consider it as a political technology. The argument of this chapter will be to explore its 
technical/cartographic techniques and their effects, as the legal devices have been already exposed abo-
ve (i.e. the definition of a state, and to some extent its recognition; the principles of territorial integrity 
and non-interference, all deriving from the principle of sovereignty). The cartographic ones, such as 
perspective and projection, have instead geometrical and mathematical origins and the presumption of 
absolute accuracy and scientificity of these techniques brings to the ‘graphic bias’ through which geo-
metrical characteristics typical of the Euclidean space are eventually transferred by analogy to the so-
cial world and influenced the very structure of the modern nation-state and its notion of territory. 
3.1 The Ambiguities of ‘Territory’ 
Most of the confusion about the nature itself of territory comes however primarily from its etymology. 
Territorium is originally a Latin composite word, where the ending –tor(ium) implies an agency, and 
the ambiguity stems from the very first particle terri-. One line of thought is to connect it directly with 
the land, lat. terra.1 Another origin stems from the verb terƟre, to plow up, and therefore the word terri-
torium would mean the piece of cultivated land, a field, meaning that later extended to all the fields be-
longing to a town or a city.2 Lastly, links the word with the verb terrƝre, to frighten, and it is the defini-
                                                            
1 Etymological dictionaries Italian and English entry ‘territorio’ and ‘territory’. Territor is then the land owner.  
2 Farinelli, 2009, p. 14. And Grotius’ quotation in Painter, 2010, p. 1102. 
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tion given in one of the fundamental text of Roman and subsequent legal system, the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis ordered by the Emperor Justinian in the 6th century CE: 
“The word “territory” means all the land included within the limits of any city. Some authorities hold that it is so 
called, because the magistrates have the right to inspire fear within its boundaries, that is to say, the right to remo-
ve the people”3 
The two main meanings that the word conveys refer then mostly to either the productive or even force-
ful control of land. Yet, it is the latter definition take will prevail in the Corpus Juris Civili and defini-
tly influence later jurisprudence and political thought and the new concept of sovereignty4. 
3.1.1 Caressing the geometrical Texture 
It is nevertheless noticeable that one the possible etymologies of ‘territory’ points to the management 
of a delimited area, as does Jacques Lévy in his encyclopedic entry for the Dictionnaire de la Géogra-
phie5,  where,  out  of  the  eight  possible  ‘usages’  of  the  term,  he  ticks  two  as  particularly  relevant  for  
scientific research: territory as ‘regulated and bounded space’ and ‘ethological metaphor’. What unifies 
all these definitions is, according to Lévy, the fact that they refer to a space that is metric and conti-
nuous, territory as a “metrical topographic space”6, an extremely interesting intuition that will be deve-
loped shortly below.  
Yet, first of all it is important to clarify my position regarding the term: Painter draws attention to the 
fact that the discourses on the concept change from language and literature of reference, when for 
example in Anglo-Saxon cultures has a more defined political edge than the ones of Romance origin.7 
Similarly, as Elden warned above, territory is clearly a notion developed in a European setting, and 
therefore one could argue it would be irrelevant to extend such concept globally. My standpoint is 
instead to assume the fact that the political administrative attribute is predominant in international 
relations, spread globally and was adopted by all the members of the international community (i.e. 
modern states), in legal terms of the place of ‘peaceful and legitimate state action’. This postulation, 
                                                            
3 Quotation from the Digestum 50, 16, 239 of the Corpus Iuris Civilis in Painter, 2010, p. 1102.  
See also Farinelli, 2009, p. 14. 
4 First as a subjective concept (the magistrate’s authority shapes territory) and then as an objective one (authority, or 
sovereignty, stems directly from the territory). 
5 Quoted in Painter, 2010, pp. 1098-1099. 
6 Ibid, p. 1110. 
7 Though the argument that in romance languages ‘territory’ is often replaced by terms as ‘region’, ‘province’ or ‘district’, 
is not sufficient because they all imply either the exercise of administrative or political power ‘Region’ comes from the 
Latin verb regĥre, i.e. to govern; ‘province’ is the conquered land, lat. pro- vincĥre, i.e. to win in behalf of somebody; 
‘district’, lat. de-strictus, i.e. enclosed, contained.  
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however, does not mean in any way that territory and state power are equivalent or that territory is the 
complete geographical expression of power, even if the double etymology could hint in this direction. 
According to Farinelli territory is more precisely the cartographic symbol of power.8 
3.1.2 Triangular Thinking: a Cartographic Epistemology 
Farinelli uses the word ‘symbol’ on purpose: the term etymologically means ’put together’ and it was 
originally in Ancient Greek culture the two halves of a previously broken object, given to two persons, 
that later proved the existence of a relation, a bound, between them; and had meaning only in the reuni-
fication of the two halves.9 In this sense Farinelli, following Charles Pierce’s levels of the logico-
semiotic relations among objects, defines it a cartographic symbol: the first level is the iconic relation 
that is given thanks to mutual similarity among objects; the index is then the relation between iconic 
relations, and finally the symbolic relation is given when two indexes are related together by an iconic 
relation of similarity. Place is iconic for the repetitive relation of similarity with the everyday life earth, 
‘the circumstance one lives and works in habitually’; putting a name or a sign on the map there is a cry-
stallization into a relation with two systems of reference, the 
world we live and the world on the map, through a common 
index relation where space is created and becomes the comm-
on denominator.10 
Eventually, however, he does not explain plainly what is the 
other index system space is related with in order to compose 
the symbol of territory. Interpreting his further thinking, we 
could assume quite safely that the second index system is the 
World itself, assumed here as the Wittgensteinian ‘totality of 
the states of affairs’ or, in a more etymological point of view, 
the “Age of Man”, everything related to the human, the social 
life.11 In this way should be understood the logico-semantic 
                                                             
8 Farinelli, 2003, p. 27.  
9 Ibid, p. 28. 
10 Ibid, pp. 35-38. 
11 For Wittgenstein see Tractatus logico-philosophicus 1966 p. 7, proposition no. 1 “The World is all that is the case”, 1.1 
“The world is the totality of facts, not of things” and 2. “what is the case – the fact – is the existence of states of affairs”. 
O.E. woruld, worold "human existence, the affairs of life," also "the human race, mankind," a word peculiar to Germanic 
languages (cf. O.S. werold, O.Fris. warld, Du. wereld, O.N. verold, O.H.G. weralt, Ger. Welt), with a literal sense of "age of 
Figure 1. The logico-semantic triangle. 
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triangle in figure 1, though the graphic representation there is a personal translation of the instructions 
that Farinelli suggested, according to which the triangle should be drawn by the reader himself.12 
However, what we could infer from Farinelli’s first analysis is that the cartographic logic is actually 
more pervasive than we could imagine and follows the technique of triangulation: diving the Earth (or 
the World in a cognitive sense) into smaller triangle/units and given a single denomination as points on 
a geometric plane. This process requires specific practices that likewise entail consequences, as the se-
lection or loss of information by which it is not possible to have the map as a comprehensive copy of 
reality, and yet it pretends to represent it accurately. This correlation reality-representation is crucial in 
understanding the modern illusion of the perfect equivalence between the two. A theme already tackled 
indirectly in ancient myths. 
3.2 Exiting the Myth through Projection: the birth of Space 
Indeed, all over his two books, Farinelli’s analysis of geography is a complex one and it starts from the 
assumption that geography, the description, the writing of the earth (geo-graphy), is simultaneously a 
way of understanding the world; an epistemology, as more powerful as it is hidden or unperceived by 
those utilizing it, and it permeates all aspects of human culture, from myths, to politics, arts and litera-
ture. Meanwhile the main focus of the discussion will remain on its technico-political aspects, a short 
digression on the first mythical records already gives some important argument expressed through me-
taphorical language. 
3.2.1 Myth and the Map: the forgotten Moral of the Story 
Myth is present also at the birth of geography as it was for the origins of law, exactly because philoso-
phy and geography developed hand in hand, unfolding the myths and  the cosmologies that had pre-
viously described reality. According to Farinelli, geography is an ‘instantaneous extract, the clip of an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
man," ... later extended to the known world and to the physical world in the broadest sense universe, Etymological dictio-
nary, entry World.  
12 Farinelli, 2003; pp. 34-35. ‘Usage instructions’. “If the equivalence between world and image nowadays fails, if the 
former is not reducible anymore to a map and consequently the cognitive process is not adaptable to the triangulation as 
we know it we are back to the feet of the pyramid. On its peak we draw a ‘W’ for world. Below, corresponding to the lower 
vertices of the triangle facing us, we draw a ‘P’ for place and a ‘S’ for space. Moreover, always below and coinciding with 
the last farther vertex yet to be named, that of the lateral triangle whose side is in common with the first and therefore is 
comprised between ‘W’ and ‘S’, we draw a ‘T’ for territory. It is important that is the reader that sketches the figure with 
one’s own hand because as already Edmund Husserl already warned, every geometric construction implies a causal system 
of causes and effects.” My translation from the Italian original text. 
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unchanging reality, the sectioning of the World and recomposing it through a measure.’13 The first 
myth we come across is the one of the so-called ‘Wedding of the Earth’ by Pherecydes of Syros (6th 
century BC) who described the first sacred wedding between the Earth (Chthon/Ge) and the Sky (Zas). 
The interesting aspect is that the veiled bride (Chthon in her maiden name which represents the soil that 
gives birth and receives burials) receives from the Sky an embroidered cloak depicting rivers, moun-
tains and cities; only when the Earth wears the wedding cloak, the ceremony is concluded and she adds 
to her name, Ge, implying its visible surface.14 Other myths like the Dionysian mysteries, describe the 
process by which this totality is com-prehended and reproduced. The World, represented by Diony-
sus15, is killed and torn in to pieces. It is later his brother Apollo, the shiny solar god, representing here 
reason and measure, that recompose him on a plane table and bringing him back to life16.  
Both these mythical indications point to a couple of very important claims which remain fundamental 
to geography and sometimes are forgotten: firstly the Earth, Ge, is visible only when covered by her 
wedding cloak, the map; secondly this process is undertaken through the subdivision of the World into 
separate logical independent units that in a second moment are brought together on plane surface, the 
paper, or linear space; this operation is eventually possible only through measure, perspective and 
projection17. Yet, a last note of caution is that this very process of reproduction is at the same time 
changing the nature of the Earth itself, from Khthon to Ge, and therefore even if the object of 
knowledge is recomposed in order to be completely understood, the means and logic of this process 
limit it in many ways.  
3.2.2 Place versus Space 
In more secular terms, the same act of comprehension was blamed on one of the first philosopher of the 
Western tradition, the Greek Anaximander (c. 610 - 546 BCE), when he drew the first world map re-
                                                            
13 Farinelli 2003, pp. 8-9.  
14 Farinelli “L’invenzione della Terra” (The invention of the Earth) 4th episode from the RAI radio broadcast program “Alle 8 
della Sera”. 
15 See above chap. 4, note 11, for the wider meaning of World. Dionysus stands here for the “life without interruption and 
limits, life as infinite and indistinguishable process” Károly Kerényi [Dyonisos. Bild des unzerstörbaren Leben 1976] cited in 
Farinelli, 2003, p. 9. 
16 Ibid. Interesting enough are also the similarities with the Egyptian myth of Osiris. Osiris, god of agriculture was killed and 
torn in pieces by his brother Seth. Later recomposed and brought back to life by his wife Isis, who generates Horus, the 
falcon-god, often represented simply as an eye, as the ‘God who sees from above’, like the external eye of projection. 
17 All these elements are represented by represented respectively either by Apollo, Zas (the Sky), or Horus. All the three 
deities have more or less close connection with the firmament and this is a significant hint to the modern projection that 
uses astronomic standards for cartographic representation.  
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presenting the known world of his time on a plate. He was soon accused of blasphemy and hubris by 
his  own citizens for  such an act.  No one could reduce the sacred World in  on a  plate.  Yet  it  is  only 
through projection, and the space it creates, that is ‘possible to exit the myth, transforming something 
that is not possible to define into something whose nature we can control and identify’.18 However, 
with a price to be paid. The cartographic projection is the transformation of a three-dimensional unity 
(in this case the Earth, a spherical, closed and finite area) into a two-dimensional map (plane, open and 
theoretically infinite)19, an element that brought eventually to a revolution in the spatial understanding 
that will be more or less evidently omnipresent in modern thinking (see next paragraph). 
The puzzle here is also between place and space. Place is a part of the Earth surface, that is not equiva-
lent to anyone else for its inherent qualities. Space is a geometrical abstraction, coming straight from 
the Greek word ‘stadion‘, measure, where all included parts are equivalent to each other thanks to the 
uniformity created by the linear scaling of all objects through projection. The mythical geography is a 
collection of places, often overlapping, yet never interchangeable. It was the geography of what you 
directly see, the copy of the World, representing simultaneously the relations between the objects and 
places. Modern geography, instead, starts with the conception of the Earth as ‘space’, described by the 
three principles of Euclidean geometry, where all the objects represented are characterized by continui-
ty, homogeneity and isotropy20. These qualities were applied geography through the techniques of pro-
jection and linear geometric perspective, theorized exhaustively for the first time by the Imperial geo-
grapher and astronomer Claudius Ptolemy (c. 90 – 168 AD) in his work Geography. The volume tran-
scribed and preserved by Arab mathematicians during the Middle Ages, was returned to Europe in the 
15th century, influencing greatly the European Renaissance, transforming the physical representation of 
all images. In Ptolemy’s work, geometrical projection has capital importance: in the drawing of his 
map of the Ecumene the viewer is abstracted to a simple eye that observes the World from above, able 
to see everything in one sight.  
The same techniques of projection and linear perspective will be studied used by Renaissance artists 
and engineers to represent places and areas with an accuracy that permitted an action over the territory 
                                                            
18 Ibid, p. 20. 
19 “[T]he cartographic projection is based on a mathematical rule that permits to determine the correspondence on a plane 
surface of the paper of one and only point for any other point determined on a globe by the intersection of a meridian and 
parallel.” Ibid, p. 12. 
20 These three characteristics will be explained in more detail in paragraph 3.3, but for now they can briefly paraphrased 
thus: continuity means that the space in-between is uniform and never interrupted; homogeneity that all objects are quali-
tatively homogeneous; isotropy that all the objects are directed in the same direction. 
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that was considered at the time unconceivable. There was indeed a general mistrust of such abstract-
tions, as the comment of the Florentine people during the war against the city of Lucca in 1430, when, 
among many learned people Filippo Brunelleschi, Donatello, a plan to flood the city by deviating the 
waters of the river Serchio: 
“who suggested and proved with their geometry liar and false (not in itself but for the others’ ignorance) 
that the City of Lucca could be flooded, and they were drawing it by arts not well understood, so that the 
foolish multitude cried that thus be done, and said “we are indeed touching what these observing theorist 
are drawing us.”21 
Thus since the beginning, cartography and its techniques were powerful means that permitted the trans-
formation of the variegated Italian and fragmented political realities into the ‘first prototypes of modern 
state territoriality’. Yet, it took another century for these cartographic techniques to replace the pre-
vious ones and be continuously utilized in official maps. This is not only the result of the economic re-
vival of the early 15th century that generalized typographic reproduction of a texts and images, but of a 
real spatial revolution, a cognitive shift from a still cosmological perspective to the cartographic vision 
of reality.22 
3.2.3 The Revolution of the Cartographic Reasoning 
The transformation of the cartographic reasoning in the general is briefly described as the reversal of 
the relation between the World and its representation. Until the 16th century there was no doubt that 
maps were a representation of the World, though in its widest sense, portraying not only those geogra-
phical features that later will be considered natural (mountains, rivers), but also that it was inhabited, 
with buildings and ships, humans, animals and fantastic creatures: a collection of places, and therefore 
a unidirectional relation, a reflection of the World describing a totality, both in time and space, which 
transcends what is seen23. In the cartographic representation, this correspondence changes nature: due 
to the translation into a regime of perfect equivalence between the World and its representation (the re-
gime of the Euclidean space), this relation became a one-to-one correspondence, pretending to present 
                                                            
21 From the chronicler Giovanni Cavalcanti (1381-c.1451) quoted in Farinelli, 1997, p. 46. 
22 Ibid, p. 53 and pp. 46-47. With ‘cosmological’ we mean here a specific view of reality, the universe (cosmos), that under-
lines its orderliness and logics (logos) which is reflected in all its aspects, micro and macro, the same laws govern from the 
individual human being to the structure of the universe, though on different levels; this approach is typical of pre-modern 
societies. The cartographical is instead the typical reasoning that characterizes the modern age (see 4.2.3). 
23 Though this process of secularization/objectivation did not happened abruptly, and some hint of spirituality remained in 
the attitude some Renaissance Princes maintained toward the sacredness of the World. It was the later commoditization 
of  the 17th century which brought the popularization and secularization of ‘modern’ cartographic maps. See Kagan and 
Schmidt in Woodward, 2007; p. 678. 
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everything in one sight, therefore enabling a bidirectionality through which the characteristics of space 
started infiltrating the World itself: the map and territory became the main model through which modi-
fy it. The process is not a simple one and caused by several consecutive factors. 
Following Woodward’s categorization in History of Cartography (vol.3), this revolution happened with 
specific changes in relations between: 
 The internal structure of the graphic syntax of the maps; 
 The maps and the observed World; 
 The maps and society.24 
Farinelli addresses in different moments to all these three areas, but the focus of this analysis will be 
mainly in the first area of the internal relationship of map’s structure, its internal logic, for the main ar-
gument is indeed that this very structure influences the way we usually relate to the World, taking for 
granted the map as a natural product, ‘a transparent window on the world’25, and eventually even orga-
nize into political units. 
Woodward argues in his introduction to Renaissance cartography that since the very beginning map-
makers had a certain degree of self-awareness of the constructed-ness of maps they created. Quoting as 
an example the description of the cognitive process express by Nicolaus Cusanus, 15th century philoso-
pher and astronomer, ‘the cosmographer as a man in a five-gates city (the gates represent here the five 
senses) through which come continuously messengers. He gathers all their information and “compiles it 
into a well-ordered and proportionally measured map lest be it lost.” He then shuts the gates, sends 
away the messengers and turns to the map, meditating on God, as the creator who existed prior to the 
entire world, just as the cosmographer existed prior to the appearance of the map.26 Cusanus later even 
underlines the concept: “in so far as he is the cosmographer, he is the creator of the world”.’ Yet, in 
my opinion this initial self-awareness of the contingent construction of the map was lost in the same 
subtle arrogance later expressed by Cusanus: the cosmographer creates the map in the same way God 
rationally created the world, ‘well-orderly and proportionally’, forgetting thus in the comparison some 
                                                            
24 Woodward, 2007; pp. 12-22. 
25 J. B. Harley in Sullivan, 2011; p. 83. 
26 Woodward, 2007; p. 18. Cusanus quotations are from his Compendium, 1464. My emphasis.  
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important aspects of the mapping process and its cartographic logic that, if overlooked, bring to the 
‘graphic prejudice’ and the illusory identity between map and the world.  
The first step of the reasoning is a fundamental problem of cartography, the process of selection of the 
information to be represented, which found its basis in the expression of the “perfect imperfection”. 
Such principle follows the rationale that in any pictures should represent only what is substantial and 
essential, omitting what is secondary and could distract from the message of the pictorial work. (It is 
the equivalent of the rhetoric figure of aposiopesis, the ‘sudden becoming silent’); the deliberate absen-
ce of certain information on behalf of what is considered important and essential. Indeed privileging 
qualities as ‘naturalness, verisimilitude, proportions and the perfection understood as the standing out 
of the essential over the inessential’ set an algorithm able to select the items to be represented.27 This 
selection, or elision as described by Robert Sullivan, can be technical, functional, more subtly ideologi-
cal or evidently political. Whatever the case, it is an arbitrary choice.28  
With the selection occurs thus the creation of the first system of reference of the triangulation (see 
4.1.2), which is then projected over the abstract plane of space, the map or the sheet of paper. What we 
tend to forget here is that the abstract Euclidean space is by itself a system of reference, with its own 
characteristics and rationality: homogeneity of the objects, that means their equivalence in nature once 
referred to in identical signs, so their reduction into ‘standards’; continuity, meaning that the spatial ex-
tension is not interrupted and therefore the simple contiguity can extend the objects’ qualities; lastly 
isotropy, is the property of having the same qualities no matter the direction they extend. All these pro-
perties will eventually influence the structure of the state itself, once it will be given to the state its own 
geographical symbol, the territory, and the relation between the physical territory and its representation 
is rendered bidirectional. Moreover, the projection on a plane permits a couple more relevant cognitive 
shifts: it detaches the viewer from the representations, as were flying over them; and the progressive 
shift from oblique view to orthogonal perspective, combined with the use of coordinates, empowered 
the apparent immediate, full ‘visual’ knowledge of the model from above (yet again, of only what was 
previously selected). Moreover, even if it is reproduced on a delimited material support, the map with 
clear borders of the page, conceptually it implies the virtual extension of the represented space into in-
                                                            
27 The phrase “imperfect perfection” is taken from Cardinal Gabriele Paleotti’s “Discussion on the sacred and profane ima-
ges divided in five books”, 1594, quoted by Farinelli as the exhaustive contemporary description of the underlying logic 
that brought the supremacy cartographic image over any other visual representation in the 16th century, before it became 
subtly absorbed in the general thinking. Farinelli 1997, pp. 47-49. 
28 Sullivan, 2011, pp. 83-86 and p. 96. 
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finity, “beyond the map” so to speak, enabling and to some extent thrusting of a movement of expan-
sion forward.29 
3.2.4 Ideology and the ‘Graphical Bias’ 
The importance of this cognitive shift is often underestimated, and thus unconsciously cartographical 
projection truly becomes an ‘ontological device’: it changes the nature of the object, as the relation bet-
ween the map and world, from unidirectional, from the sensible to the intelligible, becomes bidirectio-
nal, with abstractions influencing the world. This happens also thanks to the illusion that, as J. B. Har-
ley exhaustively put it, cartography is considered as a ‘factual science’ and its basis is that maps are a 
‘transparent window on the world’30. This apparent factuality justified by the scientific rationality and 
positivist approach helps what Lucien Febvre defined as the ‘graphic bias’, i.e. the tendency of consi-
dering everything that presents a formal resemblance as equal in nature31. This process is indeed enhan-
ced by means of the ‘perfect imperfection’ and projection described above and the general characteri-
stics of the Euclidean space that give the illusion of the map as the accurate representation of reality. 
Such illusion is the underlying ideology that conceals the patterns of the cartographic reasoning that 
initially forms the maps and eventually, thanks to this formal equivalence on the cognitive level, modi-
fies also reality (see also par. 3.1.2). 
3.3 Continuity, Homogeneity and Isotropy: the three characteristics of the modern state 
Farinelli, analyzing in several chapters of the Crisis of the Cartographic Reasoning what he calls the 
“mystery of the State”, uses the cartographic terms of the Euclidean characteristics in order to underline 
the analogical inference of the map on the structure of the modern nation-state, for the same features 
have been detected with different name in other social sciences32. These three characteristics indicate 
the presence of the cartographic reasoning and are thus the typical features of the modern territorial ap-
proach of the nation-state. 
                                                            
29 Such limitedness of the space and its simultaneous potential infinity beyond the edges could also have helped con-
ceptually the Age of the Discovery and the European oceanic explorations (see Farinelli, 2003, p. 13) and even though we 
cannot enter the rulers’ heads of the time, there definitely were conceptions of expansionism related to maps: see Kagan 
and Schmidt in Woodward, 2007, p. 665, and the quotation from Christopher Marlowe’s play Tamburlaine the Great: “give 
me a map. Then let me see how much / Is left for me to conquer the world”. 
30 From his quotation in Sullivan, 2011; p. 83. 
31 “Pregiudizio grafico” from the Italian translation quoted in Farinelli, 2003, pp. 129-30. 
32 The Portuguese jurist and historian A. M. Espanha, when dealing with the development of absolutist monarchies in early 
modernity from a History of Law’s point of view, uses the terms “unity, polarization and homogeneity”, which eventually 
refers to the same phenomena. Farinelli 2009, p. 100.  
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3.3.1 Continuity 
The first and more evident is continuity, referring to the assumption that the simple contiguity of simi-
lar objects creates a uniform space where a property is transmitted or a function operates evenly. His-
torically, it is a development that clearly followed the formation of the nation-states, with the regular 
incorporation of different political units with the limits and jurisdiction of one single state and Farinelli 
brings as example the expansion of the Muscovite state from the 15th century, that spread over the con-
tiguous steps eastward, regardless of the geographical conditions or different ethnic tribes.33 In its first 
stages, the common unifying property of the state is here authority, that will turn into sovereignty, 
when political power from its personal attributes will be rendered more and more impersonal and rei-
fied. Continuity and delimited space nevertheless imply also a discontinuity ‘at the edges’ and the con-
cepts of frontier and border. In chapter 2, we have seen already the importance of contiguity in the legal 
determination of the state territory, continuity, as the presumption that ideally no other condition than 
distance (or better the inclusion within a certain distance, i.e. within borders) is important in the exer-
cise of state’s authority/sovereignty. It becomes also one of its cartographic preconditions.  
3.3.2 Homogeneity 
Continuity creates already a physical homogeneity that Farinelli identifies initially with the physical 
removal of ambiguous terrains such as swamps and marshlands. Indeed, in this perspective, extensive 
land amelioration works undertaken by state authorities had been for many countries (Germany and 
Italy as example) the first national common efforts as a unified state as territory-shaping activity, and 
the transformation into manageable dry land of inaccessible and unproductive areas is the material ho-
mogenization of the territory. This conceptual physical homogeneity, however, has theoretical spill-
overs: a double qualitative transformation, that unfolds the analogy with the cartographic image of the 
state on a map: firstly the conceptual shift from territory as the limits within an authority is expressed 
(as in the jus justinianus) to the authority/sovereignty becoming an intrinsic characteristic, part of the 
soil itself, and thus extends its properties over extensions that had been naturally excluded before, the 
seas34. Secondly, homogeneity has then been historically associated in the field of political science as 
                                                            
33 Ibid, pp.78-79. 
34 Sovereignty as an intrinsic characteristic is also described as the ‘objectivistic concept of territory’, Farinelli, 2009, p. 87. 
The shift from authority to impersonal sovereignty is reflected also in titles when kings of people became kings of lands: 
e.g. the king of France in the 12th century from Rex Francorum (of the French) became Rex Franciae (of France). Kagan and 
Schmidt in Woodward, 2007, p. 667. 
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the ‘similarity in habits and customs’ and Farinelli clearly states to refer it to the concept of nationality, 
which certainly helps mobilizing the population as a whole, unifying every one as the nation35. 
3.3.3 Isotropy 
Isotropy is then the final result of the previous features plus the projection of linear perspective. The 
term traditionally used in physics defining the uniformity in all directions or as defined by Farinelli 
“the equality of the parts [of a whole] as regard the direction”36. This could be too general a definition, 
which, one could argue, wrong-foots the reasoning done so far. Quite the opposite, it helps in deepen-
ing the effects of the analogical inference “map-state”. Until now the characteristics of continuity and 
homogeneity are more qualitative relations, dealing with qualities of the parts. Isotropy instead affects 
the structure directly, indeed directing the previous elements in a typical pattern. Cartographically, the 
configuration is the one of linear perspective: all the points and lines are directed towards the vanishing 
point. Similarly, in the case of the state, it is centralization where all the elements are functionally 
oriented towards the capital37, once again in a bidirectional way, either from the parts to the center or 
from the center to the parts38. It is exactly isotropy that transforms the particular homogeneity of each 
state into the institutional uniformity common to all the modern nation-states, once they have assi-
milated the implicit structure of the map-state pattern.  
3.3.4 Alternative cartographies: the example of Imperial China 
However, a clear example of the non-consequentiality of the presence of mathematical cartographic 
techniques alone and the development of the cartographic reasoning and the nation-state is the unfold-
ing of cartography in China throughout its imperial history. It is beyond doubt that already in ancient 
times the Chinese were advanced in mathematical calculation that permitted them accurate astronomi-
cal estimations and developed already from the Han dynasty (206BC-220AD) and especially during the 
Song dynasty (960-1276AD) scaling, an abstract sign system and accurate grid system for topographic 
                                                            
35 The ‘similarity in habits and customs’ that makes the Prince’s administration easier on territory is an expression used 
already by Macchiavelli and Guicciardini, Farinelli, 2009, p. 80. 
36 Farinelli, 2003, p. 12. The etymology of the word is then from the Greek composed word hisos “equal” and tropos 
direction.  
37 Farinelli, 2009, p. 86.  
38 An excellent example is what the 19th century Italian political philosopher Carlo Cattaneo (1801-1869) described as the 
‘Richelieu’s Principle’: where the new centralized state structure made France and her people “understand an only langua-
ge; adore an only standard; [...] keep their eyes fixed on an only city; which wants and thinks for all the others; which for 
all the others rebels or for all the others surrenders”, quoted in Farinelli, 1997, p. 54. My emphasis. 
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maps39, which were utilized for the usual military and administrative purposes. For these mathematic-
cal/cartographic, along with printing techniques, and actual artifacts, the Chinese cartography was con-
sidered advanced and the step to the introduction of European cartographic techniques in during the 
Qing Dynasty (1644-1912AD) was short. Yet, nothing as a cartographic revolution ever took place.  
Reasons for this are certainly a different conception of space, where distance was not considered in an 
exclusive sense in boundaries, but inclusive, where authority irradiated from the center (capital city/ 
Emperor) and integrated the other countries into the Chino-centric cosmologic worldview40. Another 
argument brought forth by Cordell D. K. Yee is that despite the quantitative and mathematical aspects 
of some maps, they were never systemically produced and there is no support for the argument of a 
continued tradition of measured mapping. Moreover, they represented a small portion of the wider 
range of graphic representation of space painted on silk or engraved on wood, which were clearly 
pictorial.41 Therefore, two parallel traditions were equally present, one we could call scientific and one 
descriptive; and yet accuracy, distance and narrative description were held as equally important. There 
has always been a complementary relation between image and text, or even between image and the 
word itself42, that persisted also in more recent times during the last dynasty and permeated all social 
strata, bureaucratic elite included although they had more frequent access to European cartography43. 
It is only with the decline of the imperial system of the late 19th century, that cartography and the geo-
graphical image of China blended with nationalistic ideas creating an ‘emblem’ which everyone could 
identify with44. Nonetheless, if this identification would remain on the nationalistic scheme, it would 
fall on the characteristic of homogeneity, discussed above. The Euclidean characteristics are the signs 
of the presence of wider conception of nation-state that instantiates both the cartographic and legal 
                                                            
39 Cordell D. K. Yee, 1998a, in Harley and Woodward, figure 3.1. and 3.13. p. 36 and p. 48. 
40 Such attitude has been popularized by the sentence “[One] under Heaven”, and the very same name Zhonghua / 
Zhongguo, “Middle Kingdom”, reveals the traditional Sino-centric worldview. 
41 Cordell D. K. Yee, 1998a, in Harley and Woodward, pp. 53-55. 
42 Ibid, pp. 58-63. Ideograms indeed blend the visual and conceptual aspect of wording in a way that remains mysterious 
for alphabetical languages. 
43 “The history of cartography in China was not the imposition of science on a weaker recipient. [...]” Mapmakers, like 
astronomers “were member of the elite imbued with traditional values, who supplemented and strengthened indigenous 
science, not to discard it, and their loyalty remained with their ancestral worldview”. ‘Traditional Chinese Cartography and 
the Myth of Westernization’, Cordell D. K. Yee, 1998b, in Harley and Woodward, p. 200. 
44 Wachman, 2005; pp. 34-37.  
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techniques, which definitely took place also in China together with modernization and the end of the 
Empire45. 
The fact that the nation-state would have prevailed as the political structure was not a certainty at all: in 
the early modernity there were in Europe many competing political structures that contradicted one or 
more of the three Euclidean features: Empires (which traditionally ignores cultural homogeneity) or 
trading cities confederations (which, despite any contiguity, worked on the basis of an open network 
rather of a centralized unity). In Farinelli’s opinion, what helped in the process is definitely the concep-
tual progression from absolute monarchies to nationalism, but first and foremost the “ontological ma-
chine” of the system map-state, because it provides the mental, conceptual support for the abstraction 
of the state. 
3.4 The possible post-modern territorial discontinuity in IR: the multi-perspectival polity 
After having analyzed historically the legal and cartographico-technical aspects of territory as political 
tool, comes easily the conclusion that the cartographic reasoning is indeed a pervasive logic that deve-
loped all over modernity and helped the conceptualization of the modern nation-state. This understand-
ing has been a crescent concern also in the discipline of International Relations since the beginning of 
the 1990s, when globalization and international integration processes showed that the strict pattern of 
territory could not explain unilaterally anymore the socio-economic practices occurring. John Ruggie 
actually criticized already in 1993 the lack in IR of the possibility to study such discontinuity in the in-
ternational system, “that is, [...] addressing the question of whether the modern system of states may be 
yielding in some instances to post-modern forms of configuring political space”46.  This is actually the 
original heuristic point of departure of this research, when the evolving situation in the Arctic is in my 
opinion a topical event where two conceptions of cognitive representations of the World are co-
existing: the modern cartographic and the multi-perspectival post-modern one. The question is to which 
degree are they present and whether one is dominating the other. 
                                                            
45 A shift that is reflected in the sudden emphasis on the integrity of the motherland rather than on the irradiating unques-
tioned prestige of the Empire. 
46 Ruggie,  1993;  pp.  143-44.  As  Ruggie  points  put  it  is  important  also  to  remember  that  ‘modern’  in  its  original  sense  
means ‘pertaining to what now exists’, and only with the 18th century started extending to a specific time frame including 
the Enlightenment, the Renaissance and capitalist relations, i.e. the very period of the transformations that created the 
modern mode of political space organization, the system of territorial states. Ibid, p. 148. 
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Thought I understand that the concept of event entails endless philosophical discussion, I will adhere to 
its most general meaning: event is what is topical and happening (see also par. 4.2.1, note 11).47 I 
consider here “event” as the manifestation of a changed perception, expressed in a divergence from ty-
pical representational characteristics and behavioral patterns. “Yet, what is the universe of discourse 
and practices to which [this divergence] pertains?” asks Ruggie. The argument presented in the next 
chapter is that this particular universe of discourse and practices is the specific order of discourse of the 
cartographic reasoning, expressed mainly in the terms of the three Euclidean characteristics (par. 4.2). 
However, if we want to express the ‘post-modern discontinuity’ there are, in Ruggie’s wording, nume-
rous possible answer, yet not all are of equal interest. An easy theoretical point of departure could be 
the logical inversion of the cartographical features (e.g. the presence of disjointed, heterogeneous and 
decentralized sub-national entities). Another possible approach could be Vollaard’s essay “The Logical 
of Political Territoriality”, where, skimming Robert Sack’s 24 facets of territoriality, he comes to four 
political implications48, that resemble the concept described above: geographical fixity (the symbolic 
aspect of territory49), impersonality (homogeneity as the tabula rasa), geographical exclusivity (conti-
nuity) and centrality (isotropy). Using them as variables, he theorizes a good analytical tool in order to 
avoid Agnew’s territorial trap (see 2.4), yet each aspect can be derived in various ways that often inter-
mingle: e.g. the sense of belonging to an area can be triggered by personal relations (kinship or dynas-
tic territoriality) or functional; pre-existent multiculturality contrasts the territory as an ‘emptiable’ 
space, regardless of people and phenomena’, ideal for planning; the openness/closeness of borders can 
affect centrifugal of centripetal (cross-border or exclusive policies).  
An exhaustive classification of all these possibilities and the theorization of some coherent represent-
tation of these global post-modern dynamics, which would form a comparative model to the cartogram-
phic reasoning, would be useful for a more complete analysis but it lies beyond the scope of this inves-
tigation, and could be the topic of future research. I would thus adhere to Ruggie’s “multi-perspectival 
                                                            
47 Casati, Roberto and Varzi, Achille, "Events", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition). 
48 Vollaard, 2009, pp. 693-98. 
49 Adding more to this aspect, Thongchai Winichakul, in his book “Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation”, 
conceives the state as a geo-body, ‘a territorial entity produced by the new conditions of knowledge-production’ , and this 
geo-body ‘becomes naturalized and its soil endowed with primordial sentiment’; the map becoming a “meta-sign” bears 
and creates meanings of its own’, and increases blending with other powerful nation-building discourses . Yet, the concept 
of ‘geo-body’ is again just the description of the recursive self-generating process of the state as a complex system descri-
bed in Chapter 2 (See 2.2.3 and 2.3.3). Unfortunately I was not able to retrieve the book so I had to rely on featured re-
views of Winichakul’s work. Especially Prasenjit Duara, Featured review of “Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a 
Nation”, 1994, in the American Historical Review, Vol. 100, No 2, p. 478. 
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polity”. He convenes as well that what he calls the ‘differentiation’ (i.e. the separation in individual 
properties of what was common to all humans) in territorial sense as the result of changes in several do-
mains of social life, material, social and cognitive. The latter he calls “social epistemes”, including po-
litical doctrines and metaphysics and spatial constructions and act as specific social carriers and practi-
ces: one in particular to which he attaches special attention is that ‘the specificity of modern territoriali-
ty is closely link to the specificity of single-point perspective (i.e. the cartographic technique of project-
tion, see 3.2). Moreover, the post-modern refusal of positivistic methods of research, it does not impede 
the investigation of ‘change’, when analyzing either structures or preferences (or constructions in this 
case) as ‘forces’, or simply as social facts50 (in the same way described in framework of Wendt’s scien-
tific realism) or likewise as ‘social events’ (see Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis, par. 4.3.1). 
Proposed examples of multi-perspectival polity are then: the European Communities (nowadays Euro-
pean Union) with their patterns of collaboration and integration through neofunctionalism (and more 
importantly in my opinion the concept of subsidiarity, that dealing with specific problems empowers 
the ‘closest’, most appropriate local authorities, and the consequent new regionalism51); the non-
territorial region of action of the economy, i.e. the World (where movement, of money in particular su-
persedes localization, the local production of wealth); and what Ruggie calls the ‘transformative poten-
tial of global ecology’, that could compromise a new set of spatial, metaphysical and doctrinal con-
structs through which a global awareness could be based on.52 All these new global patterns are present 
in the contemporary Arctic, where the global dimension of environmental threats (global warming and 
pollution) triggered forms of cooperation among states (namely the Arctic Council), and world-wide 
economic drives call for the exploitation of untapped natural resources, making of the new territorial 
awakening of the last decade an exceptional opportunity to examine in the states perceptions of territo-
ry (i.e. their Arctic Strategies) whether such divergence in the modern territorial representations is 
actually taking place and to which degree. 
                                                            
50 Ruggie, 1993; pp. 168-70.  
51 See Hörnström, 2010, Chap. 2 “From centralist redistributive policy to new regionalism”, pp. 9-26. 
52 Ibid, pp. 173-74. 
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CHAPTER 4 – Critical Discourse Analysis and the contemporary Arctic 
According to the premises of the previous chapters, states are then complex social processes, that emer-
ge possessing personhood and intentionality, and ‘as persons’ they have organized themselves into a 
common Culture, the International Legal System, that, besides defining their existence, regulates their 
means of communication and action between each other. State territory is also defined as one of its es-
sential part, yet not as a natural attribute caused by the mere appropriation of land by a community, as 
Schmitt theorized, but as the result of legal and technical practices: the principles of sovereignty and 
effectivity on the one hand and the cartographic reasoning on the other. 
It is only considering all the legal, historical and philosophical aspects underlined above, it is possible 
to reframe any geopolitical discourse regarding territorial disputes. One could examine all the political, 
military, economical motivations behind territorial claim, however they would eventually explain why 
it happened in that certain moment: they would be the contingent cause. The overarching idea is that 
the state, acting as an international person within the International Legal System, while disputing new 
portions of territory, is communicating perceptions and intentions over that area. These intentions will 
reflect the state’s approach towards that territory and region, and therefore express whether it adheres 
to the practices of the international Culture, and it should present simultaneously the peculiar patterns 
or perspectives, typical of the modern nation-state. 
4.1 The ‘Arctic Strategies’ as performative and territorial representations 
Within these conceptions, the contemporary political situation of the Arctic is an ideal situation for a 
dynamic analysis of the states’ approach towards territory. Their Arctic Strategies have an international 
relevance as they are issued exactly during that period of time when discourses on the Arctic changed 
drastically, from the Arctic as cooperation ground, to the general apprehension of a renewed rush for 
natural resources that could endanger international peace and stability. Although, as it will be explained 
in the following chapter, it is clear that this commotion is eventually by a misperception of the process 
of normalization of the legal status of the Arctic Ocean after the commitment of the Arctic States to the 
United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Sea, and therefore the territorialization of the seas. 
However, there is more to the mere legal aspect. The Arctic Strategies published by the Arctic States 
are also a concise textual synthesis of what each state considers of its territory and the Arctic region in 
general, and at the same time they perform the role of conveying these intentions to the widest audien-
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ce, domestic and international, as part of the concept of ‘Public diplomacy’ in a strict narrow diploma-
tic framework1, but also in a geographical sense they have a high performative value, both to the do-
mestic and international level. Using Wood-ward and Lewis’ explanation of Non-Western Spatial 
thought and expression’2 (see table 1), although being material, in my opinion the Arctic Strategies 
clearly belong to the category of performance cartography as they are the written form of a process, i.e. 
the state’s policy over the territory, and realize the internal experience of spatial constructs, that is 
‘territory’ as the product of the legal-technical practices described in chapters 2 and 3, in particular it is 
shaped by the three characteristics of the cartographic reasoning (par 3.3). Though their performance is 
not yet complete, they do declare the states’ intentions on a long term and, by hypothesis, describe in 
the most concise and yet articulated way the states’ perception and projection of their own territory.  
INTERNAL 
(Inner Experience) 
EXTERNAL  
(processes and objects that realize or externalize the internal experience) 
COGNITIVE 
CARTOGRAPHY 
(thoughts, images) 
PERFORMANCE 
CARTOGRAPHY 
(performance, processes) 
MATERIAL CARTOGRAPHY 
(records, objects) 
Organized images such  
as spatial constructs 
Non-material and ephemeral  
gesture, ritual, song, poem, dance, 
speech. 
Material and ephemeral  
model and sketch 
In situ 
Rock art, displayed maps 
Mobile comparable maps 
Paintings, Drawings, Sketches, Models Textiles, 
Ceramics. 
Table 1, Categories of Representations of non-Western Spatial Thought and Expression, Woodward and Lewis, 1998. 
The Arctic Strategy Papers are thus relevant research material from both the perspectives that see them 
as the performative territorial expression of the states of a broader internalized cognitive logic (i.e. the 
extension of territory and the ‘cartographic reasoning’ over the sea through space,) and the simulta-
                                                            
1 ‘Public Diplomacy’ in broad term is ‘a political advertising’ conducted by diplomats, and could be conducted by the em-
bassies, but also by the Foreign Ministry itself. Berridge, 2002, pp. 125-26. The same procedure is to be found in the publi-
shing of most of the Arctic Strategies, coordinated by the Foreign Ministries, at least in the cases of Norway and Finland in 
particular. In this light the Strategies belong also to another of the conventional diplomacy’s aims: ‘Clarifying intentions’. 
Ibid, pp. 121. Without doubt these additional international purposes influence the genre of the Arctic Strategies towards 
the promotional aspect of governance genre (par. 4.3.2). 
2 In Woodward and Lewis, 1998, p. 3. Even if the table is referring to so-called non-Western cultures, the anthropological 
frame of the categorization permits the comparison also with the International Culture as “[t]he elements of thought and 
meaning which lie at the base of any logical integrated system of culture may be considered under two aspects: the inter-
nal and the external” Sorokin in Woodward and Lewis, 1998; p. 3 note 6. He continues saying the internal is more impor-
tant to study for the student of Culture, who is nevertheless constrained by material evidences to study also the external.  
Thus the internal, cognitive cartography is state territory defined though the cartographic reasoning, which the Arctic 
Strategies are the procedural expression of.  
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neous product of the agency of the state that expresses in textual form through a specific genre, the 
‘governance genre’ of Policy documents (see par. 4.3.1 ‘Genre’).  
Being these documents the written form of a communicative act, the methodology of analysis of the 
material will be based on a specific kind of Discourse Analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), for 
its analytical effectiveness in determining the presences of discourses, understood here are representa-
tions and perspectives of part of the World (par. 4.3.1 ‘Discourse(s)’), and its decisive critique of ideo-
logies and their unperceived effects on the construction or reproduction of social practices. Some of the 
concepts already expressed in the previous chapters will be repeated here using a linguistic/discursive 
terminology. 
4.2 Discourse and Critical Discourse Analysis 
The interest in language, what and the way people interact between each other and reproduce habits 
and social practices, was the heuristic starting point for what in Social Theory is called the ‘linguistic 
turn’.3 Variously utilized in many different disciplines, Discourse Analysis (DA) is a useful tool for the 
qualitative analysis of any form of communication: from simple conversations, to interviews, ethnogra-
phic reports, newspapers or even short exchanges at the shop. Its importance comes for the realization 
that language does not only depict reality as usually perceived but in any social context determines the 
context and the action of the social actors, according to certain patterns4. The detection of such patterns 
and the consequent relations between social agency and structure are the most relevant findings of this 
approach. In particular, it challenged the individualistic and utilitarian rationality of previous IR theo-
ries, which crystallized categories and human/social behavior on oversimplified rational models, lack-
ing of any insight on the contextual environment where the social actors and the theories themselves 
developed in. For these reasons, DA is widely utilized in different IR theories (from Critical Theory 
and Constructivism to post-colonialism and feminism), with a peculiar trend towards a post-structura-
list approach, which emphasizes the social construction of meanings, the linguistic construction of rea-
lity and the historicity of knowledge5. It can be said in other words, it emphasizes the social creation of 
the various representations of the World (discourses), on their transmission and effects on societies, 
identities and actions (social practices). 
                                                            
3 Entry Discourse in the Encyclopedia of Social Theory,  2005;  pp.  203-4.  Starting already with de Saussure’s  works in the 
first half of the 20th century, the linguistic turn had its momentum especially after the 1970s with Foucault’s theorization 
of Discourse and the Critical Theory in social sciences.  
4 Gee, 1999; p. 11. 
5 Campbell, 2007; p. 209. 
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The innovation of Critical Discourse Analysis is that, following neo-Marxist critiques on the Gram-
scian concept of ‘hegemony’, it is a renewed degree of investigation that does not stop on the level of 
meaning alone, but also on that of assumptions. From this approach there are principally three themes: 
first that ideologies6 are mainly placed in the ‘unsaid’, whenever the so-called ‘background knowledge’ 
(naturalization) can be used as an obfuscation of ideological processes; secondly that also norms of in-
teraction, the ‘context, can be ideological; thirdly, a theorization of Power in discursive terms, that is 
the capability to shape orders of discourse (see par. 4.3.1) and arrange themes in a more or less con-
sciously desired order of importance.7 This degree of analysis is also stressed by Neumann, who state 
the appropriateness of Discourse Analysis (the adjective Critical is omitted here, but it could be easily 
assumed) for the search of the hegemonic patterns and alternative representations. The identification 
and the search of asymmetries of these representations make possible the assessment on the 'openness' 
of the discourse (i.e. whether only one or more discourses are present and which one is dominant) and 
their layering and problematization of the dominant ones enable the investigation on the scope or the 
degree of social construction in the relationship between 'fact' and 'representation'.8  
Here is then evident the assumption of ontological realism, i.e. the supposition of the existence of an 
external reality, which eventually affects the social constructions (coherent with Wendt’s scientific rea-
lism). Through this precondition, CDA sees language and particularly its discursive practices (later de-
fined as social practices) as the mediation of the social events with the material reality and social con-
structions.9 What is happening with the re-nationalization and politicization of the Arctic is not just the 
revival of Geopolitics, but the ideological struggle of different visions/representations on what the 
                                                            
6 Originally theorized as a ‘system of beliefs that naturalized inequality through false consciousness’, nowadays it is agreed 
to have a more dynamic definition where meanings became patterned, stabilized and objectified; and once institutionali-
zed they conversely affect the meaning making of individuals. These processes do not only hide the ways Power realize in-
equality, but also constitute it. In short, reifies and deceives, what is historically and socially constructed. See the entry 
‘Ideology’, by Susan Silbey in The Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology, 2006, pp. 278-79. 
7 Fairclough, 1995, p. 23-24. Or as Torfing describes it, “[d]iscursive practices are said to be ideological in so far they contri-
bute to the naturalization of contingently constructed meanings” and ideological discourses are produced “in order to 
maintain their hegemonic power or establish a counter-hegemony”;  Torfing,  2005,  p.7.  The  importance  of  the  CDA  ap-
proach in this research is indeed to detect and challenge the “normality” of the hegemonic status of themes or discourses 
represented in political and in our case strategy policy documents. 
8 Neumann 2008, p. 70-74. 
9 See Fairclough 2003, pp. 14-15; Wendt, 1999, pp. 51-64.  
There are however relevant critiques to this assumption: as Torfing points out that to rely too heavily on this ‘critical rea-
lism’ is a risk in reducing possibilities on an overwhelmingly independent social structure; Torfing, 2005; p.7. I partially 
agree with his argument, in the sense that symbols and meanings belonging to this structure, do change. Yet, an accurate 
analysis of the dynamics of these changes would require not only an historical investigation on the formation of the role 
and identity of the State as social actor in general, as tentatively was done in the first chapter, but also of each individual 
states taken under investigation, on a broader time-lapse and research material. 
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Arctic in particular and territory in general, actually is or should be. Being one of the leading scholars 
of this critical approach, the analytical framework will be based on two works of the British linguist 
Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis and Textual Analysis for Social Research. 
4.2.1 CDA Framework and Vocabulary 
Framework of textual analysis  
According to Fairclough’s ‘critical realist’ philosophy of science10, social reality is a continuous media-
tion of practices between established social structures and individual agency. Social structures are very 
abstract entities (such as an economic structure or a language) that define what is possible. Social 
events are ‘what is topical/what is happening’11 and texts are parts and often expression of these occur-
rence. The mediation between the potential of structure and the actual of the event are the social 
practices, called also order of discourse, which in discursive terms are the ‘particular combination of 
genres, discourses and styles’, or the social structuring and control of language variation: the pos-
sibilities where choice is socially structured.  
In these terms, the social structure under investigation is the contemporary International Legal System, 
which structured as a society of rational and recognized people (the states), with its own customs and 
practices that defines the existence and space of actions of its members. The social event occurring is 
the modern states’ relatively late territorialization of the Arctic, and the question such event rises is 
whether this occurrence is following the traditional social practice of the cartographic territorial ap-
proach sketched in the previous chapters, or some variation is happening at the level of this order of 
discourse, i.e. the states’ territorial approach. The Arctic strategy papers befall in this event as they are 
the most explicit textual form of the states’ perception of their own territory, in politico-technological 
terms. I realize that I am considering linguistically the sole combination of genre/discourse/style, and a 
more complete analysis would require a similar research for all official document and declarations re-
garding the state’s territorial approach, yet the particular genre of the Arctic Strategies belong to (see 
                                                            
10 Fairclough, 2003, p. 22.  
11 Fairclough never gives a clear definition of what he implies with the term “social event”, expect in the glossary: “Social 
structures define what is possible, social events constitute what is actual, and the relationship between potential and 
actual is mediated by social practices. Language (more broadly, semiosis) is an element of the social at each of these levels 
— languages are a type of social structure, texts are elements of social events, and orders of discourse are elements of 
(networks of) social practices. One consequence is that rather than starting from texts, one starts from social events (and 
chains and networks of events), and analyses texts as elements of social events.” Ibid, p. 223, my emphases. Thus, I remain 
with the interpretation of term as the as the manifestation of a changed perception, expressed in a divergence from typi-
cal representational characteristics and behavioral patterns. 
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below) in my opinion makes them especially apt for the initial analysis of this work, that can be 
broadened in a successive research. 
Of particular importance is also what Fairclough defines as the “Background Knowledge”: the orderli-
ness of social interactions depending on what is seen as non-ideological, normal ‘common sense’.12 
This ‘naturalization’ of discourses can be part of the subject construction (in this case the property 
seems to be part of the institution), or is a notion of the dominant ideological formation (which in this 
case is perceived as a skill or technique necessary for the subject to assume a status).13 The ideology at 
work here, concerning territorial approaches, is the unquestioned, state-centered mono-perspectival 
nature of state territory, discourse that developed simultaneously with the formation of the modern 
states and followed the logic of cartographic reasoning through the three cartographic characteristics of 
continuity, homogeneity, and isotropy. 
Genre 
Genre is defined by Fairclough as ‘a way of acting in its discourse aspects’14. It thus represents agency 
expressed through texts. It may have different degree of abstraction (e.g. Narrative, Report, News Inter-
view), but in the individual genre of a text can be analyzed in terms of: activity, what people are doing; 
social relations, the interaction between the social actor (hierarchical or solidaristic); communication 
technology: mediated or not, two ways or not. This classification is particularly important because poli-
cy documents, category which the Arctic Strategy Papers belong to, are considered a specific kind of 
genre, a governance genre, specialized in regulating and controlling other social practices, and therefo-
re a relevant expression of Power in discursive form15.  
The Arctic Strategies are thus official plans that, concerning the state’s action, declare the intentions 
and project each state is determined to realize. As for the social relations they stand for, the declara-
tions have a quite wide audience: as a self-imposed commitment, it has a political weight both on the 
domestic and international level, yet, bearing in mind the international framework of the thesis, the 
most important aspect here is the assertion to the other social agents of the international scene (i.e. 
mainly other states) of the announcer’s plans and prerogatives. The communication technology is one-
way and mediated as they usually take form of printed booklet or electronic communicate.  
                                                            
12 Fairclough, 1995, p. 28. 
13 Ibid, p. 41-42. 
14 Fairclough, 2003, p. 215. 
15 Ibid, p. 68 and p. 141. 
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Discourse(s) 
At this point is better to distinguish the two main meanings of the term 'Discourse': abstract and speci-
fic discourse. Discourse, considered in its most wide and abstract sense (and written with capital ‘D’), 
is a 'particular view of language in use'. In its specific sense, utilized as countable noun, 'discourses' are 
“different perspectives associated with different relations people have with the World, which in turn 
depend on their position in the world, their social and personal identities, and their social relationships 
in which they stand to other people”16. This comprehends also (geo)political representations. Assuming 
the 'ontological realism' of the existence of a reality external from the subjects or social actors (Fair-
clough’s and Wendt’s common assumptions, see note 9 above), these representations do not only repre-
sents the World as it is perceived, but project a vision, an ideal, representing a 'strategy' to change the 
world in particular directions. “Discourses are part of the resources people deploy to in relating one 
another, keeping separate, competing, collaborating, dominating and in seeking to change the way they 
relate”17. Discourses can be defined as different ways of representing: a) a part of the World, b) from a 
particular perspective. Thus, the identification of the main “themes” of the text and their perspective 
are the essential part of the research and of particular interest is also the spotting of the cartographic 
perspective signaled by the presence of the three Euclidean characteristics. Moreover, Harley’s insights 
on the representation of space and time could be relevant for the territorial order of discourse.18 In 
short, the specific 'discourses' expressed all aspects delineated above will be the main object of research 
of thesis, which will be detected and analyzed in the different strategy papers. 
Style, Modality and Evaluation 
Though divided into different chapters, style, modality and evaluation are features of the text related 
with its author: style is the discoursal aspect of ways of being, the author’s identity; modality and eva-
luation are then the relation between the author and the representation, what one commits to, either on 
level of truth, obligations, necessity or values.19 These aspects ‘texture’ the identity of the author and it 
is possible through their analysis to extrapolate nuances on their attitude on particular issues. It is at this 
level that assumptions are more or less overtly expressed20. Style and modality give thus a deeper in-
sight in the manner the state not only expresses its intentions, as its territorial approach over the Arctic, 
                                                            
16 Fairclough 2003, p. 124. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid, p. 129. 
19 For Style see ibid, p. 159. For Modality and Evaluation, ibid, pp. 162-63 and p. 166. 
20 See ibid, p. 170-71 for the modalization’s markers and p. 173 for assumptions. 
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but also its opinion about itself and the World. Particularly the different styles of the publications show 
whether each Arctic State sees the management of the Arctic mostly as an internal affair or as an act of 
‘clarification of intentions’, or as a promotional possibility.  
Recontextualization, genre mixing and intertextuality 
Elaborating on these three aspects of Discourse, genres are an important feature as they sustain the in-
stitutional structure of society21. Governance genres (typical of policy papers as the Arctic Strategies, 
governing and influencing how social practices happen, how ‘things are done’) are usually characteri-
zed by specific aspects of recontextualization (i.e. how elements of a social practice are relocated in the 
context of another). According to Fairclough, especially in the governance genre there are two general 
effects that are both present in the Arctic strategy papers with some relevant consequence. The first is 
the incidence the ‘promotional genre’ as a result of the ‘new capitalist’ order of discourse and of stra-
tegic action within an instrumental rationality22: the promotional genre ‘represents, advocates and anti-
cipates whatever it refers to’, hybridizing, mixing different generic features in order to reach and com-
municate to wider audiences and possibly obtain desired outcomes. The second is ‘globalization’ in-
tended here as ‘a change of the scale of relationship’: governance genres have thus the property of 
relating and sustain the coexistence of different scales (local, national, regional, global and general).23  
Recontextualization as representation of the different discourses then works as a filter, the inner logic 
that through mechanisms of ‘exclusion/inclusion/prominence” and ‘abstract/concrete representation’ 
shape the structure of the text. The principles of presence, abstraction, arrangement and addition will 
guide the analysis of the discourses, and particular attention will be spent on the means of nominaliza-
tion, i.e. the usage of a general noun in describing an action or process, a linguistic resource utilized for 
generalization that usually ‘erases or suppresses differences and obfuscate agency and responsibility of 
the actors’, reinforcing thus ideological predominance through implicit practices.24 
A certain degree of interaction between the Arctic strategies themselves, is to be expected since some 
extent of causal correlation is present, especially when most of the Arctic States had issued their own 
together with other states and international organizations (as the European Union). Also intertextuality, 
i.e. the presence of elements from other texts, will be partly taken under consideration. 
                                                            
21 Ibid, pp. 32-33. 
22 For Habermas’ strategic and communicative action see ibid, pp. 110-11. 
23 Ibid, pp. 33-34. 
24 Ibid, p. 139 and pp. 143-44. 
71 
 
4.2.2 The Cartographic Reasoning in textual form 
Although continuity, homogeneity and isotropy may be considered too abstract concepts to be other-
wise represented, I believe it is possible to be textually operationalized thanks also to the comprehen-
sion in the discipline of geography as well of ‘time and space’ as social conceptualization25. Here fol-
lows an initial categorization in textual terms, inferred specifically from Farinelli’s classifications26. 
Continuity, related to concept of contiguity and distance, in the state’s perspective can be seen in its 
most concrete form as a stressed importance of defined borders and territorial integrity. Moreover, 
analyzing policy papers involved in programmatic action there can be also a temporal continuity ex-
pressed in terms commitment to a precedent of future constant state’s policy, which can be more or less 
defined in a specific period of time. 
Homogeneity, referring to the equality in kind, can be defined accordingly in the steps of the previous 
original categorization in material and qualitative aspects (see 3.3.2): the material aspect of homogenei-
ty may allude to the standardization of infrastructure and bureaucratic practices; while in its qualitative 
aspect hints at the sense of nationhood and unity of the nation’s effort. This aspect is markedly present 
in the style and the semantic manner the state/nation is actually represented. 
Isotropy defined as ‘the equality of the parts as regard the direction’ (see 3.3.3) has been already equa-
ted with the specific pattern of the modern state’s organization, that is centralization, top-down actions. 
General references to sovereignty could be also a reaffirmation of the state’s centrality, especially when 
directly referring to specific state institutions legitimized for that specific action, though on a more 
theoretical level, I would better see the concept of sovereignty as a result of the three conditions altoge-
ther, and in its single attributes can be referred to continuity, as the extensions of borders over the seas 
is the result of land sovereignty, or to homogeneity, as sovereignty may be asserted as being exerted 
evenly.  
These characteristics are by hypothesis the cartographic expression of the modern nation-state. The 
main question is then to realize to what degree and how these features are reflected in the Arctic Stra-
tegies (e.g. is intergovernmental cooperation taken under consideration and to what extent; is territorial 
exclusivity an essential part of the state policy or are also soft-border initiatives considered; to what 
                                                            
25 See Harvey in Fairclough, 2003, pp. 152-53. Also Unwin, 1992, pp. 203-204 for the development of the interpretation of 
(time-)space in geography in the last decades of the 20th century. 
26 Farinelli, 2009, pp. 74-79; p. 86. 
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extent are minorities recognized and participate in the decision-making process; are similarly local ad-
ministrations and civil society?). Moreover, the aspects of temporality and ‘scale’ will be considered as 
they are indicative of the relation between past, present and future, or the local, national, regional and 
global level. In this sense, Fairclough underlines that the representations of time-space are not just the 
representation of time and space, but their interrelation with particular social relations and identities.27 
Keeping in mind the fact that this kind of analysis is most effective on short texts and interviews or 
parts of it, for the purpose of this investigation, it will be enough to point out the predominant temporal 
perspective and scale and their use (e.g. future-oriented? Expressed in a specific or general manner? 
Possible predominance of a specified time-space on the others), considering each strategy as a single 
act of communication in a wider dialogue between the other Arctic states and international actors. 
4.3 The extension of territoriality over space: the example of the contemporary Arctic 
The release of the Arctic Strategies that occurred in the last decade is then, also in linguistic terms, the 
“social event” that discloses a possible change in the social practices of the order of discourse of the 
territoriality of the modern nation-states, in particular its extension over the seas and the tensions bet-
ween national and global interests28. Moreover, the logic of the extension of sovereignty expressed in 
the United Nations Convention on the Law Of Seas (UNCLOS) supports the argument against Sch-
mitt’s land-appropriation principle in favor of effective sovereignty.  
Precisely after the 2nd World War, a new process of “institutionalization” and codification of the Inter-
national Law took place and brought to a progressive standardization of procedures and measurements 
regarding the many international territorial issues, without a supranational authority as such, but rather 
following the precedent principle of each state’s self-limitation. The so-called “land-appropriation” has 
been gradually replaced by customs and conventions regrouped into a recognized procedure which de-
fines all forms of territorial change (from occupation, to annexation, secession, merging etc.) with con-
sequent rights and duties. In these last decades the principle guiding the territorial legal reasoning has 
been clearly either stemming from a previous legal title or the one of “effective sovereignty” (see par. 
2.1.2). The former is utilized when determining sovereignty on land (see par. 2.3.2 with exception of 
                                                            
27 Fairclough, 2003, pp.152-54. My emphasis. He briefly proposes the analysis of management’s global space-time as an 
example of highly abstract construction, able to pervasively perform on any level of scale, from the workplace space-time 
to one of a European Union policy document. 
28 see Ruggie’s discontinuity, par.3.4; and also par. 4.2.1 note 11. 
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the Antarctica, nowadays regulated by the regime of the Antarctic Treaty29), while the latter works in 
the delineation of territoriality over the seas.  
4.3.1 The territorial order’s latest developments: Sovereignty over the sea 
The codification of the Law of the Sea has a critical importance when dealing with the Arctic, because 
most of the international concern on the political situation of the region revolves on the territorial 
claims and their recognition over its maritime extensions. Already from a brief analysis of the legal fra-
mework and customs, in the development of the last decade it is possible to notice the same cartogra-
phic reasoning working also on the legal level. Indeed, the concept of sovereignty over the sea develop-
ped in a peculiar way that shows clearly how the principle of effective sovereignty slowly extended 
over areas previously considered a free space. In the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS), the sea has indeed been divided in a range of different parts that present a legal 
status with a decreasing level of exclusive rights as the distance from the coast increases (i.e. territorial 
sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf). Without going too much into detail 
with the specific rights of each area30, they all share contiguity with the land territory and the principle 
of effective sovereignty, specifically in the scope of exploitation of natural resources31.  
A clear example is the notion of territorial sea, which developed from the original 3 nautical miles line, 
determined by the reach of the coastal artillery (see 2.2.4) and has been extended to 12 miles, because 
of the advance is in contemporary military technology.32 Here the state enjoys full sovereignty (except 
for the right of innocent passage) that extends to the seabed and airspace. Likewise, also the state’s ju-
risdiction over the ‘contiguous zone’ (up to 12 miles beyond the territorial sea) has the specific purpose 
of securing the ‘peaceful exercise of state functions’ (against smuggling, illegal immigration, or exter-
                                                            
29 Antarctica, the last continent to be explored on Earth, due to the extreme climatic conditions, has been ‘territorially 
neutralized’ with a multilateral treaty in 1959, the Antarctic Treaty, I.5778.  
As stated in its introduction, the guiding principles of the treaty are the ‘interest of mankind that Antarctica shall continue 
forever to be used exclusively to peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord. Art. 
2 moreover states the freedom of scientific investigation to be conducted in a spirit of cooperation.  
How these principles affect the territoriality in Antarctica are stated by Article 4, where ‘nothing contained in this present 
treaty shall be interpreted as’ a renunciation, diminution or constituting a prejudicial basis to any contracting party or pre-
viously asserted rights or claims on territorial sovereignty on Antarctica. None of these rights or claims can be modified in 
any form or new one asserted. Briefly, the situation has been frozen in the time of the redaction of the treaty, while all the 
activities in the continent, foremost scientific, have to be reported in advanced to the contracting parties. 
30 For more details see the Part II, IV and V of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS). 
31 For reference see the International Court of Justice Report on the North Sea Continental Shelf, quoted in Cassese, 2001, 
p. 60. The rights over the continental shelf are inherent and stem ‘by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an ex-
tension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources’. 
32 Ibid, p. 58. 
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nal interference). This gradual progression of territoriality is the result of a constant negotiation bet-
ween the traditional notion of free sea, whose rights and principles remain unaltered in the in the Open 
Sea, and the technological improvements that made the exercise of sovereignty possible over these spa-
tial extensions, in line with Elden’s approach on territory as a legal-technical instrument, and once 
again it is possible to spot the cartographic reasoning’s influence where continuity favors homogeniza-
tion, e.g. equivalence in sovereign rights of territory and territorial sea, and centralization, expressed in 
the exclusivity of the rights over these portions of the sea, but especially by the direction of the rights 
stemming and extending from the land. Nevertheless, this contemporary territorial tendency favored by 
the nation-states, that allows exclusive exploitation in the individualistic principle of free competition33, 
has been challenged by another concept that for its universal and undifferentiated resolutions has some 
global characteristic that might denote another shift in perspective in the dominant paradigm of territo-
rial sovereignty. 
4.3.2 The notion of Common Heritage of Humanity 
The concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind is a rather new legal notion advanced by the Maltese 
UN Ambassador Arvid Pardo in 1967. Its rationale is a more solidaristic and community-oriented inter-
national legal regime for the exploitation of natural resources specifically of the international seabed, 
but that could be extended as a new general standard for any new discovery of resources to ensure the 
exploitation for peaceful purposes and the benefit of Mankind as a whole. Its main guidelines are:  
1. the absence of the right of appropriation;  
2. the duty to exploit in the interest of Mankind, meaning benefitting all countries, also the deve-
loping ones that cannot afford the costs of such activities;  
3. the obligation to explore and exploit in peaceful means; 
4. special regard to scientific research; 
5. protect duly the environment.34 
Such principles were already expressed in different terms in the Antarctica Treaty (see note 3) and in 
the treaties codifying the exploration and use of Outer Space35, responding in two independent ways the 
                                                            
33 Ibid, p. 61. 
34 Ibid, particularly interesting is the introduction of the concept of protection of the environment, principle that will 
become more and more compelling especially in the Arctic due to the changing climatic conditions. 
35 Sovereignty over Outer Space has been regulated by the “Treaty on Principles governing the activities of the states in 
the exploration and use of Outer Space, including the moon and other celestial bodies”, multilateral treaty signed in 1967. 
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need of demilitarization and simultaneously foster the international cooperation for a prohibitive scien-
tific research to be conducted by an individual state.  
This new concept has been received and assimilated in the UNCLOS (articles 136, 137, 141-5), yet its 
original plan for the establishment of an International Seabed Authority, with the task of managing the 
exploitation of these natural resources, but has been obstructed by the industrialized countries until the 
revision of the Convention of the 1994, where this Authority had been finally subjected to markets for-
ces of efficiency and cost/effectiveness and minimal costs for the state members.36  
The ‘watering down’ of the concept of Common Heritage of Mankind for the sake entry into force of 
the UNCLOS shows clearly that the dominant reasoning of the convention is still one of exclusive so-
vereignty of the states. However, already Cassese pointed out that the principle of the Common Herita-
ge of Mankind it is not actually selfless, but advanced in the interest of the developing countries, and 
still driven by self-interest not exactly of Mankind’s. Yet, in my opinion, the Treaty on the Antarctica 
and the assimilation of the Heritage of Mankind in the UNCLOS were the first emergences of the im-
portance (or necessity) of international cooperation for the advance of scientific research and in the 
protection of the environment, two themes that appeared and merged also in the Arctic in the beginning 
of the 1990s with the Rovaniemi Declaration (Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy): a non-
binding multilateral agreement that started the Arctic cooperation and led to the institution of the Arctic 
Council37. The open question is here whether, despite the territorialization of larger and larger area of 
the Arctic Ocean, could be possible that the individual reception by the states of the notions of environ-
mental protection and scientific research as commons and the awareness of regional issues to be dealt 
cooperatively, empowering also local and indigenous communities (as the broader concept of a subna-
tional system of the ‘Europe of Regions’ would suggest38) would be assimilated and thus also reflected 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
The guiding principles stated in the introduction are the benefit of all people and cooperation among nations and people 
in the scientific and legal aspects of the exploration of the Outer Space in order to facilitate friendly relations. A clear sta-
tement defining the status of Outer Space is to be found in Article 1 where the Outer Space ‘shall be province of mankind 
and free for exploration and use by all states with no discrimination whatsoever. Article 2 then develops the statement 
declaring that ‘Outer Space is not subjected to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use, occupa-
tion or any other means’. “Treaty on Principles governing the activities of the states in the exploration and use of Outer 
Space, including the moon and other celestial bodies”, I.8843 27.Jan.1967. 
36 Ibid, p. 62. 
37 The Arctic Council is a high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination 
and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inha-
bitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the 
Arctic. Source: Arctic Council website.  
38 See Hörnström, 2010, pp. 13-15. The somehow abstract concept of the “Europe of Regions” does not entail that the sub-
national level of local administration would override the role of the nation-states, which still determine the general policy-
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in the Arctic Strategies, a sign of the discontinuity in the territorial approach of the modern nation-
states that Ruggie already hypothesized, capable of blending both the logic of national sovereignty and 
both the global and local concerns. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
making. However, through lobbying and networking they are demanding and often assuming a stronger influence also at 
the supra-national European level. Considering in principles some of the common patterns that occurred in the formation 
of the Arctic Council and the European Communities, such as the allocation of some state’s prerogatives (though in the 
case of the Arctic Council these priorities remain in the sphere of soft security, e.g. sustainable development and environ-
mental protection in the Arctic), it could be assumed that a similar empowerment of local authorities would happen also 
in Arctic thanks to the various cross-border initiatives and horizontal networking.  
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CHAPTER 5 – The Arctic States’ Arctic Strategies: the cases of Norway, Russia 
and Finland 
The publication of the Arctic States’ Arctic Strategies is a rather recent event that occurred in a relati-
vely short time-span: approximately 5 years, from the end of 2006 to the end of 20111. Some of the 
major causes for such a sudden renovated interest on the Arctic are to be found first in the ‘crashing’ of 
the myth of the Arctic as pristine and vigorous natural habitat provoked by the report ‘Impacts of a 
Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment’ in 20042, consequently the realization of the new 
opportunities regarding natural resources and shipping, and finally in the normalization of Arctic terri-
torial disputes’ resolution within the legal framework of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea3. 
Indeed, the ratification of the UNCLOS by most of the Arctic States in the same years and the follow-
ing commitment expressed by the Arctic coastal states4, implied the acceptance of the international pro-
cedures for the determination of jurisdiction for the legitimate exploitation of resources, and brought 
certainly an aspect of stability in governance of the Arctic.  
The Strategies are documents of various kind and form that nevertheless belong in different degrees to 
the same genre of policy documents, specifically a governance genre that reflects the states’ perception 
of territory. An exhaustive study of whether the Arctic States still present a modern, delimited, nation-
state centered conception of territory or a more networked, soft and diffused one, would have required 
the throughout analysis of all the eight Arctic States strategies, a work appropriate for a larger research 
                                                            
1 In chronological order respectively: Norway, December 2006 (and March 2009); Russian Federation, September 2008 
(though published in late March 2009); the United States, January 2009; Canada, March 2009; Finland, June 2010; Iceland, 
March 2011; Sweden, May 2011; Denmark, Aug 2011 (though a policy draft was published in Danish already in May 2008). 
2 ‘Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment’, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 2004. 
The report was the first scientific proof that the Arctic not only is actually affected by local and global human activities, but 
also that it was in such an intensive way that could not recover the balance and was gradually warming up. 
3 See paragraph 4.3.1 for the extension of sovereign rights over the seas.  
4 The Arctic States ratified the UNCLOS in the following dates: Iceland, 21 June 1985; Finland, 21 June 1996; Norway, 24 
June 1996; Sweden, 25 June 1996; Russian Federation, 12 March 1997; Canada, 7 November 2007; Denmark, 16 Novem-
ber 2004; the United States of America have yet not ratified the Convention.  
The date of ratification is relevant because it finalizes the entry into force for the member state and according to UNCLOS 
Annex II Art. 4 “Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with article 76, the outer limits of its continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific 
and technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that 
State.” My emphasis.  
See also the Iluissat Declaration, 28th May 2008. The Arctic coastal states, Canada, Denmark, Norway the Russian Federa-
tion and the United States, “remain committed to this legal framework [Law of the Sea] and to the orderly settlement of 
any possible overlapping claims. This framework provides a solid foundation for responsible management by the five coa-
stal States and other users of this Ocean through national implementation and application of relevant provisions. We the-
refore see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean”. 
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than this Master’s thesis. Yet, even the study limited to three of them, Norway’s, the Russian Federa-
tion’s and Finland’s Strategies, can bring forth important insights. Norway’s is important not only be-
cause it has been the first country to produce such documents, presenting thus the typical characteristics 
of the genres, but also because the two consecutive strategy papers of 2006 and 2009, show already de-
velopment of such approach in the short period. Russia’s Strategy is then temporally the second strate-
gy to be prepared (though published only six months after). Finally Finland’s is relevant because it is 
the first of the European Union member states to have published its definitive Arctic Strategy and the-
refore by hypothesis could present the possible ef-fects of European integration on the conception of 
territory (e.g. multilateral governance, subsidiarity, global awareness, typical of a post-modern perspec-
tive). Thus their initial analyses could be a start for a more extensive investigation on the cartographic 
expression of territory that, nevertheless, has to be the object of a successive work.  
5.1 Norway – The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategies, 2006-2009 
The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy, 2006 
Released in December 2006, by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Norwegian Govern-
ment’s High North Strategy’ (shortened hence as the ‘Strategy’) is a 75-pages long pamphlet in Norwe-
gian and in English, available also for downloading on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website.  
Author of the document is clearly the incumbent Norwegian cabinet (Stoltenberg II, 2005-2009) as it 
was prepared by an inter-ministerial committee aided by an external committee of experts and other lo-
cal and regional organizations, and eventually signed under the name of the Prime Minister, Jens Stol-
tenberg.5 Nevertheless, as the Government is ‘seeking to improve coordination and to maximize the 
effects of [their] effort’ often it will be replaced by ‘Norway’ and ‘Norwegian’, as it states ‘all this re-
quires us to give our best as a nation’6. 
The genre is definitely that of policy documents as the author states its priorities for achieving a speci-
fic goal, in this case the taking advantage of the opportunities of the High North, through lists and de-
clarations of intentions and commitments. However, this strategy paper is something more than just a 
list of priorities, goal and means for achievement, since it is “more than just foreign policy, and more 
than just domestic policy” where the Government is commited to act as prime mover and facilitator. 
The last sentence of the ‘Foreword’ “[t]herefore this strategy is also an invitation to everyone with an 
                                                            
5 The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy, p. 6. 
6 Ibid, p. 5-7. 
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interest in the Arctic” is a clear indication of the promotional aspect of the document. The presence of 
numerous pictures and also a map serve often the purpose of reaffirming on different level the themes 
proposed by the text7.  
Beyond the seven declared priorities, and therefore political goals of the strategy8,  the  threads  or  the  
main themes of the Strategy are expressed in the 9 parts of the document, respectively: 1) Norwegian 
foreign policy; 2) Knowledge generation and competence building; 3) Issues related to indigenous peo-
ple; 4) People-to-people cooperation in the north; 5) The environment; 6) The management and utiliza-
tion of maritime resources; 7) Petroleum activities; 8) Maritime transport; 9) Business development. 
Main focuses of action throughout the strategy are indeed, energy (and petroleum activities), the envi-
ronment and knowledge/know-how generation. This last aspect is described in length in part 2, the 
modality of the text is clearly in the field of necessity expressing both the lack and need of developing 
this capability, instrumental for the determination of jurisdiction, the management of resources and li-
velihood of the residents in the North, who are then the topic of the next parts (3 and 4).  
Elements of continuity in the Strategy are the particular emphasis is put on the consistency and predic-
tability of policy of the government and management procedures in line with Norway’s priorities, and 
the importance of the clear determination of jurisdiction and commitment to abide international law re-
garding the solution of border issues9. Nevertheless, there is an aspect of strategic partner-ship with 
Russia, where the rigidity of national borders is softened through the creation of specific borders zones 
able to foster industrial, economic and environmental cooperation (e.g. Finnmark and Murmansk Ob-
last), easing visa procedures and cooperation between local residents (Part 4). This is a clear effect of 
the priorities of the Strategy (see note 8): cooperation with Russia, people-to-people cooperation that 
creates almost a Norwegian-Russian axis, where the ‘exclusivity’ of territory is blurred through cross-
border cooperation on all level of society. 
Homogeneity is expressed then by the a clear shift in style, where in almost each paragraph all over the 
Strategy the main subject is ‘Norway’ or the collective “we” and the actual author, the Government, is 
                                                            
7 The map that introduces the thematic parts on page 12 of the Strategy and reproduced in figure 2 of the Appendix is 
particularly interesting. Its analysis together with the its counterpart of the following Norwegian strategy The New 
Building Blocks (figure 3 in the Appendix) relates almost ideally the textual and the graphic representation of the Arctic in 
particular and of the Earth in general. See par. 5.1.1. 
8 Stated in the introductory ‘Summary’, the priorities in the High North are: 1) credible, consistent and predictable exercise 
of Government’s authority; 2) Norway’s primacy in knowledge of the area; 3) stewardship of environment and natural 
resources; 4) sustainability of petroleum related activities; 5) safeguarding of indigenous people’s culture and livelihoods; 
6) Fostering of people-to-people cooperation; 7) Cooperation with Russia. Ibid, pp. 7-10. 
9 Ibid, pp. 16-18. 
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seldom mentioned. This choice refers to the scope of mobilizing ‘the nation as a whole’, as stated in the 
Strategy’s Foreword. Also when relating to the indigenous people in Part 3, the safeguarding of their li-
velihood, culture and competences are functional for their full participation in the ‘general development 
of society’10. Homogeneity of procedure in the management and monitoring of resources is also stress-
sed11 together with the emphasis on new electric and transport infrastructure (Part 9), as they are lack-
ing and essential for the balanced growth and well-being of the country. 
Isotropy, or centralization is conveyed by the reassertion of sovereignty and authority through the pre-
sence of state authorities, military forced included12, and the monitoring of resources (p.60). Yet, the 
main aspect is the declared direct intervention of the Government through financial investments, espe-
cially in education and infrastructure13 in a clear top-down pattern. Simultaneously the recognition of 
people-to-people cooperation on the grass roots level (Part 3, 4 and 9) could soften Norway’s centra-
lism and empower local authorities, and the commitment on the activities regional intergovernmental 
forums, which presuppose a horizontal and cooperative relation, with the other member states. 
Completely in line with the declaratory nature of the genre, the Strategy presents a marked future-
oriented temporality, with a continuous use of future tenses. The concept of sustainability is also an 
evident where the use of resources (fish in particular) for present and future generations presupposes a 
long-term perspective. Connecting the assumptions and declarations, future temporality is here the sign 
of empowering, especially the local level. The present is instead the time either of the ‘imposing’ of 
global processes (e.g. climate change, pollution)14 or the language/modality of necessity and lacking as 
shows its predominance in Part 2. The past is then usually the temporality of historical consequence 
and legitimization (e.g. the ‘historical development of the Norwegian energy policy northwards’; histo-
ric responsibility to continue [sustainable fishing]; clarification on the Spitzbergen Treaty). 
The co-presence of different ‘scales’ (i.e. considering variable levels of geographical areas as the local, 
regional and global) is already a feature of policy genres as pointed out above by Fairclough (see par. 
4.3.1 ‘Recontextualization, genre mixing and intertextuality’). Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice 
that often the local and global level intertwined when discussing environmental and social issues, un-
derlying the global impact of environmental threats on one side and the importance of regional and in-
                                                            
10 Ibid, p. 38. 
11 Ibid, p. 55; but also implied in Norway’s commitment to the predictability of its policy. 
12 Ibid, p. 13 and p. 17. 
13 Ibid, pp. 26; 32; 34; 63. 
14 See paragraph 4.3.3. 
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ternational net-working both in the people-to-people cooperation and the safe-guarding of indigenous 
cultures in the Arctic. A marked ‘local’ scale, marked by the denomination “North Norway”, is yet to 
be found in those parts where a incisive territorial action is required as the development of knowledge 
generation and know-how generation (Part 2) the infrastructures for petroleum activities (Part 6), mari-
ne transport (Part 8), of labor market and business (Part 9). 
The New Building Block in the North, 2009 
No later than two year after the first document, in March 2009, the Norwegian Government released 
another policy paper: ‘New Building Block in the North. The next Step in the Government’s High North 
Strategy15 (hence the Building Blocks). Admittedly an update of the 2006 Strategy, the Building Blocks 
is perfectly in accordance with the genre of the previous policy document: a 94-pages long pamphlet, 
published in English and Norwegian, and available for downloading from the same website16. Reasons 
for a new release have been, beside the metaphor of the ‘changing world’, on one hand the increased 
international interest and publications of Arctic Strategies by other States and international organiza-
tions (as the European Union), and on the other the practical learning in the undertaking of the ‘diver-
sity of challenges’ and solutions required17.  
Following these lines the structure of the document is slightly different from the previous. Divided in 
two main parts, the first one develops the themes that were recognized lacking in the Strategy, which 
reordered as found in the Building Blocks namely are: 1) Developing knowledge about Climate and the 
Environment in the High North; 2) Monitoring, Emergency Response and Maritime Safety Systems; 3) 
Sustainable Use of Offshore Petroleum and Renewable Marine Resources; 4) Promoting Onshore Busi-
ness Development in the North; 5) Developing Infrastructure in the North; 6) ‘Continuous exercise of 
Sovereignty and Strengthening of Cross-Border cooperation; 7) Safeguard of Indigenous Peoples’ Cul-
tures and Livelihood. These are the ‘new building blocks’ on which the Government wishes to pursue a 
‘dynamic policy for the High North’, within a definite time-span of 10-15 years, which is nevertheless 
not considered as a strict deadline. The second part is definitely more promotional, and clearly defined 
as the “backdrop”18 of the first, displaying therefore the conditions where the priorities take place, and 
supposedly are the rationales leading the goals: 1) Cooperation; 2) Opportunities 3) Wealth from Oil 
and Gas; 4) Environment, Livelihoods and Fisheries; 5) Knowledge basis forward. 
                                                            
15 New Building Blocks in the North, 2009 
16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Object of the analysis will be the English version. 
17 Ibid, Foreword, p. 5. 
18 Ibid, p. 3. 
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The style of the first part is dramatically different from the predominant one of the Strategy. The em-
phasis on the ‘nation as a whole’ is not as present anymore: while the term ‘Norway’ is still used when 
referring to the ‘nation’ especially in relations with other countries or the international environment 
(with clear moral assumptions coming from its international status, or when referring to “new identi-
ties”, e.g. ‘Norway as a coastal/shipping state/nation’19), the active subject of the document is definitely 
the Norwegian Government often explicitly mentioned as ‘the Government’, together or implied by the 
specific Ministries in their area of competence. This all is a clear sign of increased centralization, as 
top-down initiatives often budgeted and declared. The local level, ‘Northern Norway’ (NN), is equally 
mentioned, but almost exclusively as a place of action “in NN”, or as the passive agent of an action 
“NN is now being given the opportunity” or even in an apparently active form as “the challenges NN is 
facing”, which nevertheless means a ‘being opposite to something unavoidable’20. Society and civil 
society are addressed as their ability “to restructure, innovate and adapt is essential to a future know-
ledge-based and competitive economy”, expressed in a generic and neo-liberal point of view. The inten-
tion of supporting and empowering local authorities, especially municipalities, could convey an interest 
in decentralizing, though it is an aspect of Scandinavian “redistributive regionalism” that will be 
discussed in more depth in the following conclusions (par 5.4). 
Homogeneity in its qualitative aspect is not as present as in the Strategy in terms of nationhood, though 
there are some other features that connect the state/Government’s action with the principle of equality 
and freedom of settlement, expressed especially in part 4: “The Government’s aim is that everyone 
should be free to settle where they wish, and to utilize the potential for value creation in all the parts of 
the country”.21 Similarly, conditions for a competitive society are also desirable ‘in all the parts of the 
country’ and the links with other regional and rural national policies, defines the High North policy as 
corresponding stage in a larger national development plan. Measures for an innovative and sustainable 
Norway are to be developed and the same are relevant also in Northern Norway22. In order to realize 
such qualitative conditions, the building of a functional infrastructure is to be created and this is defini-
tely the common thread of the first part of the document where educational, maritime, offshore and on-
shore infrastructures are consequently addressed. In line with the previous ‘Strategy’ and the predomi-
nant neo-liberal economic-functional view of the ‘Building Blocks’, indigenous people are again fun-
ctional for the whole Norwegian society as their knowledge “[specialized ways of a living under mar-
                                                            
19 Ibid, pp. 13 and 15. 
20 All of these forms can be present in the same page with no apparent contradiction (e.g. Ibid, p. 28). 
21 Ibid, p. 26.  
22 Ibid, p. 26. 
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ginal conditions in a subarctic area] must be preserved and further developed in order to meet future 
challenges related to ecological, economic, geopolitical and other forms of social change.”23  
Continuity, is then again physically reasserted through the territorial contiguity of land and sea/seabed, 
and the consequent emphasis on sea and borders control and the tension in maintaining regulated and 
lawful flows of good and people. Temporally, evident is the continuity between the two High North 
Strategy papers, though, even if stated also in Building Blocks, the importance of predictability and 
constancy of policy is not as stated as in the ‘Strategy’. Also the emphasis on the ‘Norwegian-Russian 
axis’ is to some degree diminished. 
Also the general temporality of the text has shifted from a marked pull toward the future to an almost 
ubiquitous present. Both past and future dimensions are still present but mostly reduced to time spans 
no longer than a decade, almost certainly a result of the new centralized programmatic perspective for 
North Norway and High North. The ‘scales’ are also adjusted with an actual focus on Northern Norway 
and the High North as the priorities are, like in the Strategy, clearly located on the national territory. 
The co-presence of different scale is also present, especially in the second part of Building Blocks, 
where the local level of Northern Norway is ‘positioned’ both nationally and internationally, and the 
whole policy is not restricted to the Norwegian territory alone24, so to reframe both in causal and teleo-
logical terms (why the state action is required and why exactly in that direction, reinforcing once again 
Fair-clough’s insight governance genre of the policy documents as discursively connecting and recon-
textualizing events through the lenses and means of state’s action. See 4.3.1). Priorities and roles also 
extend the range of action, where for example the role of Norway as ‘steward of indigenous culture and 
liveli-hoods’ underlines the assertive statements concerning also the North Eastern parts of Russia. 
5.1.1 The High North Strategies – Between the globe and the map 
Being the forerunner of the whole specific genre of “Arctic strategies”, the Norwegian Strategies pre-
sent many common aspects and some innovation. The promotional aspect of the specific genre, i.e. a 
pamphlet published in an internationally understood language, has been utilized also by almost all other 
Arctic countries (Finland, Denmark, Sweden) as a typical way of ‘Public Diplomacy’ to inform and 
influence both the domestic and international audiences about the intentions of the state on specific 
issues. This kind of unilateral declarations have the overt purpose of clarifying good intentions in order 
                                                            
23 Ibid, p. 42. 
24 Ibid, p. 67 and p. 7. 
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to create the conditions for trustful and stable relations, an objective generally favored by all the Arctic 
states. 
The first relevant difference could be the absence of the word ‘Arctic’ substituted here by the ‘High 
North’, which is stated as a quite circumscribed area, which initially coincides with the Norwegian ter-
ritorial range, but then overlaps with the circumpolar North25, mixing again the scales of local/national/ 
regional. This is a clear result of the dialogue between a national strategy and the regional or global 
range required by environmental or socio-economic challenges, that Norway has to cope as a ‘nation’, 
though such emphasis was stronger in the Strategy than in the Building Blocks, where the ‘homogenei-
ty as a nation’ has shifted towards a more marked centralization expressed by the explicit presence of 
the Government and its Ministries. 
To this extent, the cartographic reasoning, it is still evidently underlying also the logic of state action, 
even if some important step towards a joined monitoring and management of resources is favored 
throughout the ‘Norwegian-Russian cooperation axis’, in such a way that traditionally sensible territo-
rial issues, such as movements across the borders and cross-border networking at grass-roots level, atte-
nuate the exclusivity of national territory. Similarly does also the intention for empowering local com-
munities and civil society. The Strategy would therefore represent a state that is confident enough in its 
position to let go of some of its territorial prerogatives both domestically, promoting a more decentrali-
zed administrative structure26, and internationally, cooperating in bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
initiatives, while building up at the same time a new identity as a general expert and expertise provider. 
This open and cooperative attitude is then almost set aside in the Building Blocks and expressed mainly 
in the second part of the document, while most of the emphasis is posed in the strengthening of the po-
sition of Northern Norway in the High North.  
Such a shift is interestingly reflected in the two cartographic representations of the documents, two 
maps that in my opinion display figuratively the same change almost in a semiotic Freudian slip. In the 
Strategy, the map reproduced just before the thematic parts shows Norway with its land borders is loca-
                                                            
25 A  “broad concept both geographically and politically”. Geographically it covers ‘sea and land, islands included’ north-
wards from Nordland county comprehended between Greenland and the Barents and Pechora Sea. Politically, mainly the 
administrative entities part of the Barents cooperation (Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia) overlapping with US, Canada 
and EU relations, through cooperation initiative and regional forums (Arctic Council); ibid, p. 13. See also Grindheim, 2009, 
pp. 11-12, for the development of the term in Norwegian political papers and the final correspondence with the Arctic: “In 
international terms, the High North is in many ways synonymous with the Arctic”. New Building Blocks in the North, 2009; 
p. 50. 
26 Though this decentralizing trend will be reversed in few years, see Hörnström, 2010, especially chap. 4.3 “Norway – 
regionalization with constraints”, pp. 50-55 and chap. 8.2 for the notion of ‘redistributive regionalism’, pp. 155-60. 
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ted centrally over a physical map curved as a globe, with the North untraditionally on the lower part of 
the image. It is a powerful image that reaffirms the centrality and pivotal of Norway and its sea, with an 
increased relevance of the northern seas (identified here as Norwegian, Greenland and Barents seas), 
but at the same the physic-natural, globular and global aspect of the World are clearly depicted as an at-
tempt of conciliating the state in the awareness of the rest of the World, one and whole in its environ-
mental aspects, represented in the geophysical features of land and seas. This is a typical post-modern 
awareness, that comes from the realization of the finitude and wholeness of the planet we live on (a fact 
usually distorted and hidden by the plane infinity of the cartographic map27), that initially made me ex-
pect a less state-centered and more networking approach of Norway, and was to some extent reflected 
in the style and the discourses of the Strategy.  
The ‘Building Blocks’ inverted this apparent tendency, with the same map repeated as cover of the 
pamphlet and before the second ‘backdrop’ part: in this case the map is a zenithal perspective over the 
North Pole, seas are dark blue, while land light blue, and Norway stands white in its landmass and 
islands. Sphericity could be inferred by the halo around the pole, but nevertheless I think it is more re-
levant the return to the graphic representation on a flat surface and the homogenization of colors: a 
clear sign that the nation-state reasserts again its existence with the usual cartographic terms. Norway 
stands therefore in-between the initial, more post-modern approach organized of a boundless finite 
globe and the modern defined exclusiveness of state territory. 
5.2 Russia – The Foundations of the Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 
and Beyond 
‘The Foundations of the Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond’ (hence the 
‘Foundations’) was approved by President Medvedev the 18th of September 2008 and released for the 
public only in late March 2009, and it is available for downloading from the website of the Security 
Council of Russia and of the Rossiyskaya Gazeta28.  
The approximately 9-pages long policy document has been written and published in Russian. Both the 
style and the circumstances of the public release imply the fact that it was most certainly intended for 
internal administrative purposes, and only after the further publication of other Arctic Strategies29 it 
                                                            
27 See Farinelli, in paragraph 3.2.2. 
28 Original  title  “ʽ̨̭̦̼̏ ̨̨̭̱̬̭̯̖̦̦̜̐̔̌̏ ̨̡̛̛̛̪̣̯ ˀ̨̡̨̛̭̭̜̭̜ ˇ̶̛̛̖̖̬̔̌ ̏ ʤ̡̡̛̬̯̖ ̦̌ ̨̛̪̖̬̔ ̨̔ 2020  ̨̐̔̌ ̛ 
̣̦̖̜̹̱̔̌̽̀̡̛̪̖̬̭̪̖̯̱̏”. See the Bibliography for references to the document and possible translations in English.  
29 Namely, the Danish draft of 2008, the United States of January 2009 and the Norwegian New Building Blocks.  
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was eventually made public. Yet the original addressees remain supposedly the Russian Federation’s 
administrative bodies. 
The date of approval makes Russia’s strategy the second in time and follows shortly the Iluissat Decla-
ration of 28 May 2008. Differently from the other strategies there is no indication of the material 
author(s) (though it has evidently prepared by the Security Council, consultative body of the execute-
ve, composed by officers of the Russian Government’s Ministries30), except the signature of the Presi-
dent, supreme executive authority of the Federation. The extremely schematic structure of the text, 
typical of official resolutions, reflecting thus its programmatic and administrative character, is divided 
in six parts, further developed in articles and lists: 1) General Provisions; 2) National Interests; 3) Main 
Goals and Strategic Priorities; 4) Main Challenges and Means for Implementation; 5) Main Mecha-
nisms for Implementation; 6) Implementation.  
The main interests, and therefore the themes directing the Foundations are stated as: a) the utilization 
of the Russian Arctic Zone as a resource base for national growth; b) the preservation of the Arctic as a 
zone of peace and cooperation; c) the protection of the Arctic’s unique ecosystem; d) the use of the 
North Sea Passage as a unified transport link31. Despite these evident themes of socio-economic deve-
lopment, through all over the document there is a general concern on security from ‘potential threats’, 
of natural or technical character and under various ‘military and political circumstances’32, an interest 
stated in the very first article of the document under the ‘General Provisions’.  
If homogeneity of ‘the nation as a whole’ was the main emphasis of the Norwegian strategies, in the 
Foundations this qualitative aspect is almost neglected, or better taken for granted. No specific agent is 
ever stated, but all facts are presented impersonally. ‘Material’ homogeneity is expressed by enhancing 
and integrating infrastructure and administrations. Continuity is instead constantly asserted, almost on-
ce for each list of goals, priority, challenge or means, in terms of definition and integrity of the national 
borders33. Isotropy, or the state’s centralized structure is represented in many parts of the documents, 
                                                            
30 See also Zysk, 2010, p. 104. 
31 The Foundations of the Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond. II. National Interests of the Rus-
sian Federation in the Arctic. Art. 4. 
32 Ibid. III. Main Goals and Strategic Priorities. Art. 8, a) and b). 
33 E.g.  Ibid,  “protection and defense of the national boundaries of the Russian Federation”, III. Main Goals and Strategic 
Priorities, Art. 6 b); ‘active interaction in delineating maritime boundaries’ Art. 7 a) & f); “delineation of the outer border of 
the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation” IV Main Challenges and Means, Art. 8 a) socio-economic challenges; “military 
defense and protection of the Russian border”,  “border units”,  “optimized border control” Art. 8 b) security challenges; 
“[...] research for the purpose of preparing material for delineating the border of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federa-
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in particular both as background and implementation in the ‘strict accordance with the legislation of the 
Russian Federation and its international contracts’34, but also in the double direction of raw resources/ 
investments35 displaying a clear top-down pattern, e.g. the implementation mechanism described in ar-
ticle 10. A pattern that reflects also in the general order of each thematic list of the Foundations: the as-
sertion of continuity is followed by the establishment ‘material homogeneity’, and isotropy is implied 
in the final as role of Russia as “the leading Arctic Power [...] strengthen her position in the Arctic, 
consolidate international security, and promote peace and stability in the Arctic region.”36 
International cooperation is mentioned, yet it remains functional to integrated maritime security or 
socio-economic development and, more importantly, at the state-level through “bilateral or multilate-
ral [...] on the basis of international treaties and agreements to which the Russian Federation is a sign-
atory"37 and in the last implementation part it is only generically stated as to be expanded, “partially 
for the effective utilization of natural resources [...]”38 Indigenous people, their cultures and livelihoods 
are addressed though only in the last points of the strategic priorities and means for socio-economic 
development39, and they somehow seem completely unrelated with the challenges to such development 
just listed above, as if this local dimension were only added in a second moment. 
The promotional aspect of the Russian Federation policy is mentioned, but only planned through other 
media and not connected with the promotion of the policy document itself40. The temporality of the text 
has been a ubiquitously present and the scales, in this particular case, are limited to the local, i.e. ‘the 
Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation’, while national and regional aspects are supposed and never 
localized; the global is completely absent. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
tion",  “delineation of the internationally recognized exterior border of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation [...]” VI 
Implementation, Art. 11 a) & b). 
34 Ibid. II National Interests, Art. 5. See also, V Main Mechanisms for implementation, Art. 10 a). 
35 This first direction periphery > center is well expressed in the national interests where the resources are functional to 
the national growth, ibid, Art. 4 a). But also a center > periphery is present with the direct intervention of the state in the 
development of the Arctic zone, e.g “improvement in the state management of the socio-economic development of the 
Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” III Goals and Priorities, Art. 7 g), (my emphasis); “... partially by launching state pro-
grams for investigating and integrating the continental shelf” and “government’s support for industrial subjects active in 
the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, specifically in the areas of hydrocarbon and other natural resources.”Art. 8 a). 
36 Ibid, VI Implementation, Art. 11 c). 
37 See especially, ibid, III Main Goals and Priorities, Art. 6 e) but also Art. 7 b), c) and e) where in the last point there is an 
opening to public organization and not state organizations alone, but generally Civil society is seldom addressed. 
38 Ibid, Art. 11 a). 
39 Ibid, Art 7 h) and Art. 8 a). 
40 Ibid, Art. 10 d). 
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5.2.1 The ‘Foundations’ – The exemplar ‘textual map’ 
Russia’s perception of the Arctic has been evolving in the last decade. According to Zysk, there has 
been a development from a previous Arctic policy document of June 2001, where the rhetoric was 
markedly more focused on hard security issues, and the Foundations is an at-tempt to fill the lack of a 
coherent strategy in the Arctic41. Despite the emphasis on military issues, the commitment on stability 
of the area and the legal determination of maritime borders has been confirmed by the bilateral agree-
ment with Norway signed and ratified in 2010.  
In line with the cartographic characteristics, the ‘Foundations’ is an exemplar textual map of the ‘Arctic 
Zone of the Russian Federation’. Its timeless present and limitedness to a single scale, the national one, 
with a clear top-down perspective and direction, the impersonality of the style and the continuous 
emphasis on the definition and integrity of the borders (according to the framework of international 
law) are all features that make of the Foundation a model of the traditionally ‘modern’ conception of 
territory. Hints of global, cross-border or heterogeneous social elements, global demand for resources, 
environmental threats, international cooperation and minorities, are nevertheless present, though still 
re-strained in a state-centered approach. Apparently, the same style and features are to be confirmed 
also in the following years as they are reproduced in the new strategy paper, published in the Russian 
Government website on February 201342, as a follow-up for the changed presidency and the realization 
of the second stage of the implementation process43. Briefly, in its 7 parts and 39 articles, it follows the 
same structure and style of the ‘Foundations’, localizing even more the area of state’s intervention in 
the ‘Arctic zone’, and the concept of security is linked more to human security factors than just military 
ones.44 
                                                            
41 Zysk, 2010, p. 104. Referred to as simply the “ʽ̨̭̦̼̏̨̨̭̱̬̭̯̖̦̦̜̐̔̌̏̨̡̛̛̛̪̣̯ˀ̨̡̨̛̭̭̜̭̜ˇ̶̛̛̖̖̬̔̌̏ʤ̡̡̛̬̯̖”, 
14 June 2001. I was not able to retrieve it in any form. 
42 ˁ˃ˀʤ˃ʫʧʰ˔ ̛̛̬̯̌̏́̚ʤ̸̡̡̨̛̬̯̖̭̜ ̨̦̼̚ ˀ̨̡̨̛̭̭̜̭̜ˇ̶̛̛̖̖̬̔̌ ̛̸̨̛̖̭̪̖̖̦̍́ ̶̨̨̛̦̦̣̦̜̌̌̽̨̨̛̖̪̭̦̭̯̍̌̚̦̌  
̨̛̪̖̬̔̨̔ 2020 ̨̐̔̌. “Strategy of the development of the Arctic Zone of Russian Federation and of the national security 
until 2020”, published in Russian the 20th February 2013. 
43 Vladimir Putin has been re-elected President of the Russian Federation in the election of May 2012. The second 
implementation stage of the “Foundations” was expected to take place in the period 2011-2015. Art. 11 b). 
44 See Strategy of the development ...”, Part 3, Art. 7, where ‘the offer of military security’ is the last priority after 
respectively socio-economic, scientific, infrastructural development, environmental security and international 
cooperation;  and Part  6 “The main characteristics of the socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian 
Federation and national security”. 
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5.3 Finland – Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 
Released in July 2010, by the Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region’ (shor-
tened hence as ‘Finland’s Strategy’) is a 94 pages long pamphlet published in Finnish and in English, 
available also for downloading on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website. 
Beside the fact of being the first Arctic strategy paper to be officially published by a EU member 
state45, Finland’s strategy is a particularly interesting document because it presents some special cha-
racters that differentiate it from the other strategies, and could be considered as a further development 
in territorial perception and perspective. The difference is reflected in the mixed genre: it is not only a 
policy document, thus with a predominant declaratory modality, but also a report, and was prepared by 
a working group appointed by the Prime Minister’s Office with representatives from all the Govern-
ment’s Ministries.46  
Having considered this, Finland’s strategy presents indeed quite a peculiar structure: it is divided in 9 
chapters, including an introductory and conclusive chapter (1 and 8). The core of the strategy is forms 
by Finland’s objectives and interests (chap. 2 to 5; environmental frailty of the Arctic, economic active-
ties and know-how, transport and infrastructure, indigenous people) and its means of action (chap. 6 
and 7; Arctic policy tools, the EU and the Arctic Region), aided by an extensive chapter 9 with 16 ap-
pendices. Each chapter begins with a line resuming the main points, a declaration and a list of Finland’s 
objectives concerning each area of action. The familiarity ends there, as the chapters usually continue 
with a broad presentation of the theme that often assumes the style of scientific or expert publications. 
There are constant changes in scale, from global, to regional and local level, with a changing emphasis 
in line with the subject. Each chapter concludes with remarks or proposals, which can also be generally 
addressed, except in chapter 8 ‘proposals for action’ where Finnish governmental institutions are speci-
fically referred to. Thus, while the declared list of objectives is typical of the policy papers, the more 
descriptive and informative nature of the expository part of the chapters, often enriched by abstracts in 
smaller tables, the continuous references to the appendices, including official documents, maps and 
accounts for extensive discussion on various topic, and the final proposals are more typical of the genre 
of reports. 
                                                            
45 Denmark’s draft paper is not counted here, and the Danish complete strategy was released only in August 2011. More-
over, Denmark’s biggest Arctic Territory, Greenland has undertaken the process of self-determination, leading to a poten-
tial independence in the next years, and it has opted out from the European Communities already in 1985. 
46  See the introductory abstract, Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region, p. 3; and also in the introduction, p. 7.”[it] will be 
submitted as a report to the Parliament”. The generic characteristic of the report-genre will be described shortly above. 
See the Finland’s Strategy’s appendices 1a and 1b for the appointments of the working group members. 
90 
 
This mixed generic character of Finland’s Strategy made it more difficult to spot the traditional analy-
tical Euclidean classifications by which the previous policy papers had been overviewed. In case of 
Finland’s Strategy they are never clearly asserted as in Norway’s or Russia’s strategies and they often 
combined47 (e.g. an enhanced open-border policy, would not only ‘soften’ the boundary, but also, fos-
tering cooperation on the public and private level on both sides, blurs the national centralized homoge-
neity). Physical continuity (i.e. borders) on the one hand is not of major concern for Finland, since it 
has “no territorial claims in the Arctic”, yet it recognizes the indirect effect of the coastal states claims 
and reiterates the abiding of all the Arctic states to international law and its interest in “maintaining sta-
bility and continue cooperation in the region and to keep the security situation predictable”, displaying 
thus some sort of temporal continuity48. However, on the other hand, the active participation in the re-
gional cooperation organization as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), Northern Dimension ini-
tiative and EU cross-border cooperation programs blurs the borders with the common objective to Fin-
land and the EU of the “creation of security, stability and well-being in the EU’s external borders”49. 
Moreover, there is no mentioning for an improved border control derived from the Schengen Treaty’s 
criteria as in the case of Norway. 
Qualitative homogeneity is frequently represented by some degree of personification, with Finland 
‘wishing, supporting, striving’ for what it considers important and of its interest, yet, not as often as in 
the case of Norway or Russia; certainly when affirming Finnish objectives at the beginning of each 
chapter, but not in almost each paragraph as the Norwegian ones, and mostly in a passive or positioning 
manner (e.g. Finland’s interests, in Finland). The chapters where Finland has a predominant active mo-
dality are not only in economic or infrastructural issues, but especially regarding the indigenous people 
and the Sámi in particular, sole cases where the Government is directly cited as interlocutor and gua-
rantor of their constitutional rights (ironically a direct effect of the recognition of their constitutional 
status of minority). In several occasions, Finland is asserted as ‘an Arctic country’ or as an ‘Arctic 
member state of the EU’50 and promotes its expertise in shipping and Arctic related knowledge. As ma-
terial homogeneity the development of infrastructural network is highlighted as in all other strategies, 
yet with a slightly different approach, i.e. infrastructure to connect, as it needs and lacks good connec-
tions with the Barents area in order to benefit of foreign trade trends developing on the Northern shores 
                                                            
47 As too the Euclidean characteristics are not one the effect of the other, but they simultaneously condition each other, 
see par. 4.3.4. 
48 Ibid, pp. 10-11. Reiteration also in the ‘Means for Action’, chap. 6.1, p. 35, and 6.2, p. 37. 
49 Ibid, chap. 7 The EU and the Arctic Region, p. 51. 
50 Ibid, p. 8 and p. 44. 
91 
 
of the Arctic  seas  but  also as  ‘[t]he European Arctic Region should be treated comprehensively and 
Arctic viewpoints must be taken into account in the EU policies”51. A sentence that hangs between dif-
ferent roles and points of views Finland acts in (see below 5.3.1) 
Isotropy, or centralization, is not clearly stated, except in few occasions, as in chapter 8 ‘Conclusions: 
objectives and proposals for action’, where to each priority is assigned a specific Ministry in charge of 
the implementation52, and could be loosely inferred by the same fact that all the cooperative means of 
action imply bilateral or multilateral mechanisms, thus state-coordinated action, with the only excep-
tion of the Barents Region, where also local regional authorities are direct participants (in the Barents 
Regional Council) together with the intergovernmental level (Barents Euro-Arctic Council). Another 
aspect is the funding (chap 6.4) where Finland’s Arctic cooperation is funded by resources budgeted to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Ministries, but the major part is ‘based on joint funding by 
various actors (national, both public and private, and international)’53. Local businesses and associa-
tions are scarcely mentioned, yet in a different way from the Norwegian strategies where the state inter-
venes directly to support them, while Finland recognizes their existence and vitality and point to the 
possibilities of networking54. 
The predominant temporality is again the present, with several general indication ‘in the future’ in the 
chapters 3 and 4 describing economic activities and infrastructure pointing to a necessary action. Other-
wise, even the potential climatic change in the environment, which have a clear future time-span of 
decades are described in the present, in the style typical of scientific reports. 
5.3.1 Finland’s Strategy – Variable styles and perspectives 
It is exactly this variety in styles that makes ‘Finland’s Strategy’ peculiar and could approximate to 
Ruggie’s post-modern multi-perspectival polity (see par. 3.4). The first difference with the previous 
Arctic Strategies is the origins of the Finnish one. As explained in the appointment decision (appendix 
1a), it has been requested by the Finnish Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (not from an executi-
ve body) in order to chart ‘Finland’s policy for the Arctic Region’, implying thus that national policies 
were already taking place. Its importance is stressed by the increasing relevance in politico-economic 
                                                            
51 Ibid, p. 24. Quotation from p. 47. 
52 Ibid, pp. 52-55. 
53 Ibid, p. 42. Beside the fact that the following note remarks ”Actions are implemented within the boundaries of the natio-
nal economy based on separate decisions made according to appropriate procedures in each concrete case”, the involve-
ment of private and international actors is a sign of decentralization and openness. 
54 Ibid, p. 18 and p. 53. 
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terms, and even though the aim is ‘to focus mainly on the aspect of external relations in Arctic policy’ 
(emphasis visible in the continuous reference to external factors leading to the changes in environment 
of trade flows and the international cooperation means to coordinate), there is also an unambiguous in-
ternal/national approach when dealing with the economic or infrastructural issues. Finland’s Strategy’s 
main purpose is then stated in the very first paragraph of the introduction: “to define objectives for Fin-
land’s Arctic policy for advancing [them] nationally and in various international and regional forums, 
within the European Union, in Nordic cooperation and in bilateral relations.”55  
At a single glance, regarding only external relations, Finland’s approach could bluntly be assessed in 
such a way that it is a only mere attempt to stay at the Arctic table of negotiation after the territorial 
closure of the Arctic coastal states (the Ilulissat Declaration of May 2008). Yet, the current state of in-
ternational affairs is acknowledged56, and also internal, local development issues (and therefore neatly 
territorial) are managed, realizing that exactly the complexity of the threats and challenges requires a 
mixed approach much similar to the one of the European Union, where internal and external are level 
are still separated, though inevitably linked in a functional sense (i.e. the socio-economic well-being of 
the Union depends on the ‘security, stability and well-being also on the EU’s external borders’), show-
ing thus also signs of what Vollaard described as the possible ‘functional’ discontinuity in the political 
territorial logic57. A possible counter-argument could be that the same informative style of the report is 
a hint to the fact that no real awareness or common Finnish national policy on the Arctic, but this very 
sentence is an evaluative implies a stronger intervention of the state. Suspending any judgment on the 
efficiency of Finland’s Arctic policy so far, it was present in a diffused form, enhanced by the various 
regional initiatives and organizations (Northern Dimension and Barents Euro-Arctic Council in particu-
lar), designed on the intergovernmental level but actuated on the regional one.  
A definite informative scope of Finland’s Strategy is reflected in the composition itself of the working 
group appointed for the preparation of the report: beside the ministerial provenance of members, spe-
cialists could be consulted, and though never mentioned their more or less indirect influence is evident 
in the style of each chapter58. As style is the discoursal aspect of being (see 4.3.1), they are a sign of 
different roles that the state is assuming. Some could argue that these changes in styles could be shaped 
                                                            
55 Ibid, p. 7. 
56 Ibid, pp. 10-11, p. 36 and appendix 5. 
57 Vollaard, 2009, p. 705. 
58 For example, chapter 2 of the Strategy is evidently influenced by the scientific reports on the matter, as the reference to 
the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment of 2004, in the table at page 10. Companies and national business organization as 
Finpro may have helped in the definition of “promotion of Arctic Exports” in the table at page 22. 
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by specific institutional cultures59, yet the focus of the analysis is on the particular perspective issues 
are (re)presented. In the case of Finland’s Strategy the point of view of Finland is clear in the initial ob-
jectives, but also other perspectives are simultaneously present and taken under consideration, scientific 
(chap. 2), business (chap. 3), logistics (chap. 4), Sámi people (chap.5), international and regional orga-
nizations (chap. 6), European Union (chap. 7), that should help not only in literally expanding the pic-
ture, but also in showing and indicating the networks and means where to act most effectively. Thus, 
bearing in mind the different roles Finland assumes in each situation (i.e. Member state of the United 
Nations; Arctic state affected by the environment and part of regional organizations; expert state in 
Arctic issues and technologies; guarantor of minorities/indigenous people; Arctic member state of the 
European Union), its Strategy is a charting of the complexity of each topic from points of view that 
tries to include all stakeholders. These different style are interestingly represented also cartographically 
in the various maps of the appendices, showing in different scales the diverse topics under conside-
ration60.  
5.4. Findings and Reflections: the State still on the Map. 
The analysis of the Arctic Strategies of Norway, Russia and Finland through the textual approach of 
Critical Discourse Analysis reveals that, considering them as both the territorial perceptions and the 
performative projections of state territory, they still display in different degrees the three cartographic 
Euclidean characteristics of continuity, homogeneity and isotropy, unsurprisingly confirming that the 
nation-state has still a predominant modern approach (i.e. bounded, uniform and centralized exercise of 
Power), though some discontinuity in one or more of these aspects can be separately discerned.  
Such finding is not completely surprising as it was the initial hypothesis of the thesis to assume the 
state “as a person” as the main agent in the international scene (Chap. 1) in any forms61. The real ques-
tion here would be whether nowadays the states can co-exist in other forms than just the one of indivi-
dual modern nation-states, and such possible development could be Two possible ways in Arctic could 
have been either an international legal regime, as in the case of the Antarctica, or a reinforcing intergo-
vernmental cooperation towards some kind of supranational governance, in the line of the European 
                                                            
59 Specifically in Finland it could be argument of debate the apparent hegemony of the “asiantuntijat”, of the experts, in 
most of social life. 
60 Ibid, pp. 61-63; 70-71; 73-75; 88-91. They varies from the circumpolar maps showing population density, melting of the 
sea ice and forecasts, regional  issues [territorial claims], sea routes and potential resources deposits, to regional ones on 
nuclear safety in the Barents region and cross-border and regional cooperation programs.  
61 I believe any pluralist objection of the governments actually speaking and declaring the Strategies priorities to be here 
inaccurate. The national governments here are acting as the material ‘authors’ of the documents.   
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Communities of the second half of the 20th century. However in a time were even the epitome of the 
supranational way, the European Union, is facing a bitter identity crisis, the Arctic States are only as-
serting their territorial rights, in accordance with the current International Legal System.  
Such assertion has its most evident manifestation in the so-called Ilulissat Declaration (2008): the final 
document of the international Arctic Ocean Conference organized by Denmark in Ilulissat, Greenland, 
by the five Arctic Coastal States: Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation and the United 
States of America62. The need of such high level meeting was indeed to discuss ‘climate change and the 
melting of the ice having a potential impact on vulnerable ecosystems, the livelihoods of local inhabi-
tants and indigenous communities and the potential exploration of natural resources’, in line with the 
traditional narratives on the Arctic of the 1990s and 2000s, and reassure the peaceful determination of 
territorial disputes after some extraordinary “flag issues”63. What is new is the stated awareness of the 
‘important rights and obligations’64 provided by the law of the sea to the coastal states, and the commit-
ment to the legal framework of the UNCLOS provisions and dispute-solving procedures, which make 
redundant the ‘development of a new comprehensive international legal regime for the Arctic’. Such a 
resolute stance and the exclusion of any representative from Finland, Iceland and Sweden could seem 
thus a regression from the cooperative and inclusive attitude promoted by the Arctic Council toward an 
individualist, competitive and exclusively national geopolitical approach. However, despite the diplo-
matic impoliteness, there is still the recognition of the importance of the Council and other international 
for a and organizations such as the International Maritime Organization and the multilateral meeting 
and declaration indeed support the current International Legal System and the its territorial order of 
discourse (par. 2.3.2 and 4.3). Such development is reflected in the Norwegian strategies, where the 
‘Building Blocks’ seems marking a trend towards a “re-cartographicization” of territory65. All the other 
Arctic strategies come after the declaration (beside the one of the United States that have not ratified 
the Convention yet, but are traditionally committed to the law of the sea and the principle of freedom of 
                                                            
62 The Ilulissat Declaration, 28 May 2008. All following indirect references are from the 2-pages long document. 
63 One is the territorial dispute between Canada and Denmark on Hans Island and the other is the evocative posting of the 
Russian flag on the North Pole on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean in August 2007. 
64 Among these are clearly mentioned the issues of the determination of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the pro-
tection of marine environment, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research and other uses of the sea, all subjects to 
the territorial rights endowed by the UNCLOS.  
65 The connection is echoed in the identification of Norway as a coastal and shipping nation/country, endowed with 
particular obligations. Building Blocks, 2009, pp. 12 and 15.  
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navigation) and even an excluded Arctic State, as Finland, recognizes and commits itself to the 
UNCLOS66.  
Another treaty that boosted fears of slicing of the Arctic into ‘areas of influence’ was the Agreement on 
Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, the first binding interna-
tional agreement signed during the Nuuk ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council in May 2011. The 
same arguments pointed above are more clearly stated in this document whose objective is to “is to 
strengthen aeronautical and maritime search and rescue cooperation and coordination in the Arctic” 
and “The delimitation of search and rescue regions is not related to and shall not prejudice the delimit-
tation of any boundary between States or their sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction”67, reinfor-
cing thus the general concept that, beside the apparent exclusiveness of the sovereign territorial rights 
extended also to the sea, the pragmatism of an effective response to challenging threats, as maritime or 
environmental security, requires also to the Arctic States some level of cooperative and networked ac-
tion. This simultaneous occurrence of territorial assertion of the state over space and its binding into 
forms of multilateral cooperation is, in my opinion, paradoxical only in principle, as it is a signal of a 
necessity that however does not weaken the use of territory as legal-political tool both on the internatio-
nal and the domestic policy level. 
Regarding the reinforcement of intergovernmental cooperation towards some kind of supranational go-
vernance, major steps have been taken in cross-border cooperation and a timid empowerment of regio-
nal and indigenous communities, which however remains confined in those more densely populated 
areas of the Arctic: the Nordic countries and the Barents region68. Being all the countries taken under 
consideration part of the Barents cooperation, its importance is naturally stressed, though in the Russian 
strategy is assumed under the general label of “bilateral and multilateral cooperation”. Some functional 
aspects of the new regionalist approach are present in the Nordic countries’ strategies, such as the defi-
nition of the regions and the cooperation between them in functional terms (health care, education and 
culture), the realization of local solutions and potentials for the regional development and innovative 
                                                            
66 See par. 5.3.1 note 57, for Finland; and The Foundations of the Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and 
Beyond, III. Main Goals and Strategic Priorities of Russian State Policy in the Arctic, Art. 7 a), b) and c) for the commitment 
to the law of the sea and international cooperation with Arctic States. 
67 See Art. 2 and 3.2, Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, 2011. 
68 Areas that nevertheless suffer of negative demographic figures; the long distances and sparse population do not favor 
economy of scale, typical of the more economically developed regions of Central Europe that initiated the new 
regionalism concept. 
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networking also on the international level thanks to “para-diplomacy”69. However, the Nordic regiona-
lism, though heavily influenced by the European model and funding projects (which eventually follows 
mostly the same vertical logic of the traditional national regional policy, only on a larger scale70), has 
the national state in a central role as the guarantor of equal conditions all over the country, without con-
tradiction of having strong regions within the unitary state71. Thus, intergovernmental integration seems 
to be the only development actually taking place in the Arctic, under the encompassing name of Arctic 
governance. However, the focus and initiative remain to the states, as also the proposal by the Standing 
Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region in the Arctic Governance in an evolving Arctic Re-
gion recommends a strengthening of the Arctic Council towards a full-fledged international organiza-
tion and binding agreements, especially in the areas of research, education and tourism72. 
This reassertion is also reflected in the Arctic Strategies in the use of different ‘scales’, the continuous 
shift from local, to national, to global perspective and vice versa. According to Fairclough the change 
in perspective was one of the aspects of globalization (par. 4.3.1). However, when dealing with scales 
one is still reasoning in cartographic terms of projection, selection and space (par. 3.2.3), exactly be-
cause it is to the scale that it has been given the nexus between local and global, “the relentless agent of 
space production, the general standardization, the immediate equivalence that permits the exchange 
between the concrete and the abstract, at the core of the cartographic ethos and the cartographic root 
of modern territory”73, and therefore is one of the most important instruments by which the state tries 
to redefine its relation and action with territory.  
In the light of this understanding, it is possible to grasp more of the Arctic states’ approach towards 
their territory in the Arctic. While Russia’s is mostly based on a national scale, caused apparently by 
the fact that its presence is not yet satisfactory (constant reference to continuity and homogeneity, i.e. 
delimitation of borders and establishment of infrastructure) and the perception of the Arctic as mainly a 
national strategic resource area, Norway and Finland shift from the local/regional to the global scale, 
understanding that an efficient management of the territory in all its political, economic and social as-
                                                            
69 Hörnström, 2010, pp. 22-24. This aspect is most evident in the Norwegian Strategies: see High North, Part 4, “people-to-
people cooperation”, and especially Building Blocks, Part II, “1. Cooperation in the High North”, “2. The Region of 
opportunity”, “3. Wealth Creation from Oil and Gas”.  
70 Ibid, p. 25. 
71 See Hörnström, 2010, Redistributive Regionalism – Characteristics of the Nordic Periphery, pp. 155-60. 
72 Arctic Governance in an evolving Arctic Region. A Proposal by the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic 
Region (SCPAR). Presented in Akureyri, at the 1st session of the 10th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, 
5-7 September 2012. 
73 Farinelli, 2009, pp. 172-73. With ethos Farinelli implies ‘the complex of mental models and consequent behaviors’; ibid, 
p. 164. 
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pects requires a comprehensive approach. Cooperation and networking are present and reaffirmed 
throughout all the strategies taken under investigation, though their effects are not that evident and they 
still are dependent on states’ support and facilitation. Cross-border cooperation is the activity that most 
of any other smears borders and compels neighboring states to combine forces if not to share previous 
exclusive priorities. A good example is Finland’s strategy that even changing the perspective from a 
state centered one, the state is still present though on the background, and all the information is never-
theless directed to Finland’s priorities74. The borders blur but the boundary remains, and each state still 
persists firmly on the map. Such shifts in scale and content remind me of interactive maps, very useful 
instrument for managing huge amount of information from different point of views. The material sup-
port remains, nevertheless, the Map, with all the cognitive implications underlined previously (see par. 
3.2.3) never leaving the two-dimensional table for the globe.  
                                                            
74 Fact reflected also graphically in all Finland’s Strategy’s maps of the appendices: all political maps that, in different 
scales, relate the changing content to the states still delineated on the map.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The strong feelings that territory creates in public discussions are already a sign of the complexity of 
such concept in international politics. Traditionally seen as one of the most material manifestations of 
political power, it has actually never been problematized, but always taken for granted as the concrete 
body of the nation especially in modern times. The first question of this research was therefore to en-
quire the social nature of this concept, avoiding any naturalist or organicist approach, which could 
bring to simplistic and unquestioned dynamics. The first step was the reasoned adoption of Wendt’s 
social constructivist theory and specifically the standpoint of the state “as-a-person” that permitted the 
argumentation of considering it as a process, a complex system where various material and aspects 
(Wendt’s essential state and corporate agency. See 1.2) are the preconditions for the emergence of the 
state’s personhood and intentional agency, essential properties for the ensuing analysis. 
The state “as-a-person” is a concept that developed also in the formation of the international law in the 
last centuries, which, for its constitutive and behavioral effects, can be also held as the International 
Culture where the states act as the main actors. It is thus no wonder that the first academic investigation 
of territory and its distribution over the Earth was made by a legal scholar, Carl Schmitt. He had some 
crucial insight, such as the original purpose of management and redistribution of the Earth’s fruits, but 
afterward focused mainly on its exclusive aspects, theorizing a rather violent and pessimistic world-
view. Instead of land-appropriation as the founding principle of the global geographic order, the deve-
lopment of the current jurisprudence regarding territory leans toward the principle of effectivity, return-
ing thus to the functional aspects of territorial division. For these reasons, Stuart Elden’s analytical ap-
proach (see 2.4) is the most appropriate manner to tackle ‘territory’ in International Relations:  as a 
‘political technology’, a tool for management expressed mostly in legal and cartographic terms. The 
legal aspects are immediately evident when studying the international law, as they have been lately co-
dified in various international conventions. There is, however, a subtler logic that operates on the repre-
sentational and cognitive level, with unexpected consequences. As explained by Franco Farinelli, terri-
tory has a great symbolic value that connects the individuality of places with the totality of the World 
through matrix of uniform space (3.1.2). This process is exemplified by the cartographic representation 
itself, which, through selection, projection and geometrical, pretends to represent factually the World 
on the map. The formal equivalence between object and representation, the World and the Map, modi-
fies the relation into a bidirectional one: the map is not anymore a copy of the World, but it modifies it 
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on its cartographic terms (3.2). These conditions are the three characteristics of Euclidean space, conti-
nuity, homogeneity and isotropy, (3.3) that are also the three features and patterns that distinguish and 
structure the modern nation-state. 
The categorization into these three typical attributes provided the analytical terms by which it is possi-
ble to investigate also in textual terms, whether John Ruggies’s post-modern forms of political space 
are present in the contemporary Arctic, as the narratives on environmental issues and integrated coope-
rative regimes would let suspect. Critical Discourse Analysis was used as the most apt methodology for 
the dynamic analysis of the probable discrepancies in state’s discourses on territory, and therefore if 
change were happening in the social practices of the order of discourse of the territoriality of the mo-
dern nation-states, in particular over the Arctic. Though understanding that there are innumerable ways 
through which language, texts and their relations can be investigated, specifically the analysis of the 
Arctic Strategies seemed the most appropriate for the purpose of analyzing the territorial approaches of 
the states for their synthetic and comprehensive content. Although a similar throughout examination on 
all the Arctic States Strategies could uncover many interesting aspects both on the linguistic (e.g. the 
relations between format, genres and styles, whether there is a regularity among the Arctic States and 
what does this represent), and the individual territorial approach of the Arctic States (e.g. variable de-
gree of modernity of the approach through the cartographic characteristics), already the Norwegian, 
Russian and Finnish cases showed three completely different degrees of representation and confirmed 
at the same time the assumption of the persistence of the modern territorial perspective, visible in all 
the strategies in textual and surprisingly also in cartographic terms. There are hints of discontinuity in 
the absolute exclusivity of the sovereign modern state, where exactly the functional principle of effect-
tivity compels the Arctic States to cooperate in those areas where the state cannot cope with alone, but 
these processes are still mainly state-driven and no mixed sort of multilevel networked governance is to 
be observed. Moreover the states still find a cartographic expression for managing the effects of global 
phenomena: through the systematic shifts of scale and content, that resemble the functionality of inter-
active maps (5.4). In the light of these findings, a possible direction for further research could be the 
how technological and graphic development could influence future territorial representations and 
would these be able to depict networks and globality, thus revealing the taking place of another spatial 
revolution. Nonetheless, at this moment, also in areas of the World where narratives would state other-
wise, the state is definitely still on the map, determines and uses territory in an integrated way that par-
tially softens its exclusivity, but keeps it fundamental for any domestic or international policy.    
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Figure 2. Map of the High North in “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy”. 
Source: The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy, 2006; p.12. 
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Figure 3. Map of the High North in “The New Building Blocks in the North”. 
Source: New Building Blocks in the North, 2009; cover background. 
102 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources  
THE ARCTIC STRATEGIES 
NORWAY 
The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy. (Regjeringens nordområdestrategi). 
Available in English, from website of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/strategien.pdf (Last retrieved 9.4.2013) 
New Building Block in the North. The next Step in the Government’s High North Strategy.  
(Nye byggesteiner i nord. Neste trinn i regjeringens nordområdestrategi) 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Nordomr%C3%A5dene/new_building_blocks_in_the_
north.pdf (Last retrieved 9.4.2013) 
RUSSIA 
ɈɫɧɨɜɵɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɣɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɢɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɜȺɪɤɬɢɤɟɧɚɩɟɪɢɨɞɞɨ 2020 ɝɨɞɚɢ 
ɞɚɥɶɧɟɣɲɭɸɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɭ. – The Foundations of the Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 
2020 and Beyond.  
Available in Russian from the Security Council of Russia website, 
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html (Last retrieved 9.4.2013) 
ɋɌɊȺɌȿȽɂəɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɹȺɪɤɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɣɡɨɧɵɊɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣɎɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢɢɨɛɟɫɩɟɱɟɧɢɹɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɣ 
ɛɟɡɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɢɧɚɩɟɪɢɨɞɞɨ 2020 ɝɨɞɚ.  – “STRATEGY of the development of the Arctic Zone of 
Russian Federation and of the national security until 2020” 
Available in Russian from the Russian Government’s website 
http://government.ru/docs/22846/ (Last retrieved 9.4.2013) 
FINLAND 
Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region (Suomen arktinen strategia) 
Available in English, from website of the Prime Minister’s Office 
http://vnk.fi/julkaisukansio/2010/j07-suomen-arktinen-08-finlands-strategy/pdf/en.pdf  
(Last retrieved 9.4.2013) 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, TREATIES, DECLARATIONS, SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 
AND PROPOSALS 
Arctic Governance in an evolving Arctic Region. A Proposal by the Standing Committee of 
Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR). (2012) 
Available at: http://www.arcticparl.org/files/arctic-governance-in-an-evolving-arctic-region.pdf  
103 
 
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic. (2011) 
Available at: http://library.arcticportal.org/1474/ 
Antarctic Treaty (1959). 
Available at: http://treaties.un.org/untc//Pages//doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20402/volume-402-I-
5778-English.pdf  
Case Concerning the frontier dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), International Court of Justice 
Judgment of 22 December 1986. 
Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/69/6449.pdf  
Charter of the United Nations (1945) 
Available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/  
Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council 1996 - Ottawa Declaration. 
Available at: http://library.arcticportal.org/1270/  
Ilulissat Declaration. (2008) 
Available at: http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf (Last retrieved 
23.5.2013) 
‘Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment’ (2004), Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme, Cambridge University Press.  
Available also at http://amap.no/acia/  
Island of Palmas case (Netherlands, USA), 4 April 1928. Reports of International Arbitral Awards. 
Vol. II pp. 829-871. Available at: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_ii/829-871.pdf  
The Covenant of the League of Nations (1918, 1924) 
Available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp  
Treaty on Principles governing the activities of the states in the exploration and use of Outer Space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies. (1967) 
Available at: http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20610/volume-610-I-8843-
English.pdf  
United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Seas (1982) 
Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm  
Secondary Sources 
Agazzi, Evandro and Montecucco, Luisa (2002), Complexity and Emergence: Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting of the International Academy of the Philosophy of Science. River Edge, NJ: World 
Scientific. 
104 
 
Agnew, John (2003), Geopolitics: re-visioning world politics. 2nd ed. London : Routledge, 2003. 
Berridge, G. R. (2002), Diplomacy: theory and practice, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Campbell David (2007), “Poststructuralism” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith (ed.) 
International Relation Theories – Discipline and Diversity. pp. 203-226, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Cassese, Antonio (2001), International Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 
Cordell D. K. Yee (1998a), “Reinterpreting Traditional Chinese Geographical Maps” in Harley, J. B. 
and and Woodward, David (ed.), The history of cartography. Vol. 2, book 2, Cartography in the 
traditional East and Southeast Asian societies, pp.35-70. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Cordell D. K. Yee (1998b), “Traditional Chinese Cartography and the Myth of Westernization” in Har-
ley, J. B. and and Woodward, David (ed.), The history of cartography. Vol. 2, book 2, Cartography in 
the traditional East and Southeast Asian societies, pp.170-120. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Elden, Stuart (2010) “Land, Terrain, Territory” in Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 34, No. 6, 
pp. 799–817. 
Duara, Prasenjit (reviewed by), “Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation by Thongchai 
Winichakul” in The American Historical Review, Vol. 100, No. 2, April 1995, pp. 477-79. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Fairclough, Norman (1995), Critical Discourse Analysis. The Critical Study of Language. London: 
Longman.  
Fairclough, Norman (2003), Analysing Discourse. Textual analysis for social research. London: 
Routledge. 
Farinelli, Franco (1997), “L’Immagine dell’Italia” in Pasquale Coppola (ed.) Geografia Politica delle 
Regioni italiane. pp. 33-59. Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore. 
Farinelli, Franco (2003), Geografia. Un’introduzione ai modelli del mondo. Torino: Giulio Einaudi 
Editore. 
Farinelli, Franco (2009), La crisi della ragione cartografica. Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore. 
Fierke, K. M. (2007), “Constructivism” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith (ed.) International 
Relation Theories – Discipline and Diversity. pp. 166-184, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Franke, Ulrich and Roos, Ulrich (2004), “Actor, structure process: transcending the state personhood 
debate by means of a pragmatist ontological model for International Relations theory” in Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 1057-1077. 
Gee, James Paul (1999), An introduction to discourse analysis: theory and method, London: Routledge. 
105 
 
Gethin, Rupert (1998), The Foundations of Buddhism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Grindheim, Astrid (2009), The Scramble for the Arctic? A Discourse Analysis of Norway and the EU’s 
Strategies Towards the European Arctic. FNI Report 9/2009: Fridtjof Nansen Institute. 
Heininen, Lassi and Heather, Nicol N. (2007), “Geopolitics of the Circumpolar North” in Geopolitics, 
Vol. 12/1, pp.133-165, London: Routledge. 
Heininen, Lassi and Southcott Chris (2010), Globalization and the Circumpolar North. Fairbanks: 
University of Alaska Press. 
Hensel, Paul R.; Michael E. Allison and Ahmed Khanani (2006). Territorial Integrity Treaties, Uti 
Possidetis, and Armed Conflict over Territory. Paper presented at the Shambaugh Conference "Buil-
ding Synergies: Institutions and Cooperation in World Politics," University of Iowa, 13 October 2006. 
Hörnström, Lisa (2010), Redistributive regionalism. Narratives on regionalization in the Nordic 
periphery. Umeå: Umeå University.  
Kagan, Richard L. and Schmidt, Benjamin (2007), “Maps and the Early Modern State: Official 
Cartography”, in Woodward, David (ed.), The history of cartography. Vol. 3, part 1, Cartography in 
the European Renaissance, pp. 661-679. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Kegley, Charles W., Jr.(2002), Exorcising the ghost of Westphalia: building world order in the new 
millennium. Upper Saddle River (N.J.): Prentice Hall. 
Keskitalo, E. Carina H. (2002), Constructing the Arctic. Discourses of international regional-building. 
Rovaniemi: Lapin yliopisto. 
Keskitalo, E. Carina H. (2004), Negotiation of the Arctic. The construction of an international region. 
New York: Routledge.  
Klotz, Audie and Lynch, Cecilia (2007), Strategies for research in constructivist international 
relations. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 
Lowe, Vaughan (2007), International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Loughlin, Martin (2000), Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship between Law and 
Politics. Oxford & Portland: Hart Publishing. 
Mearsheimer, John J., “Structural Realism” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith (ed.) 
International Relation Theories – Discipline and Diversity. pp. 71-86, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Martin, Lisa L. (2007), “Neo-Liberalism” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith (ed.) 
International Relation Theories – Discipline and Diversity. pp. 109-124, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
106 
 
Noë, Alva (2006), ”Experience without the head” in Perceptual Experience, Szabó, Tamar and 
Hawthorne, John (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Ojakangas, Mika (2004), A Philosophy of Concrete Life: Carl Schmitt and the political thought of late 
modernity. Jyväskylä: Minerva. 
Ruggie, John G. (1993), “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations” in International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1. (Winter, 1993), pp. 139-174. 
Rupert, Mark (2007), “Marxism and Critical Theory” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith (ed.) 
International Relation Theories – Discipline and Diversity. pp. 148-164, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Neumann, Iver B. (2008), “Discourse Analysis” in Qualitative Methods in International Relations – A 
pluralist guide, pp. 61-77, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Painter, Joe (2010), “Rethinking Territory” in Antipode Vol. 42, No. 5, pp. 1090–1118, Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Scheuerman, William E. (2007), “Chapter Three. Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau: Realism and 
Beyond” in Michael C. Williams (ed.) Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in 
International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press 
Schmitt, Carl (2002) The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum. 
New York: Telos Press Ltd. 
Simons, Penelope (2003), “The Emergence of the Idea of the Individualized State in the International 
Legal System”, Journal of the History of International Law, No 5, pp.293-336. 
Sullivan, Robert E. (2011), Geography speaks: performative aspects of geography, Farnham: Ashgate.  
Teschke, Benno Gerard (2011) “Fatal attraction: a critique of Carl Schmitt’s international political and 
legal theory”, in International Theory, Vol. 2, Issue 3, pp. 179–227. Cambridge University Press. 
Torfing, Jakob (2005), “Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges” in David 
Howarth & Jacob Torfing Discourse Theory in European Politics – Identity, Policy and Governance, 
pp. 1-32, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Unwin, Tim (1992), The Place of Geography, Burnt Mill: Longman Scientific & Technical.  
Vollaard, Hans (2009), “The Logic of Territoriality” in Geopolitics, Vol. 14 pp. 687-706. London: 
Routledge. 
Wachman, Alan M. (2005), “Stamped Out!: Carto-Philatelic Evidence of the PRC’s Constructed 
Notion of China’s Territorial Integrity” in East Asia: An International Quarterly, Summer 2005, Vol. 
22, No. 2, pp. 31–55. Springer. 
107 
 
Wendt, Alexander (1999), Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Wendt, Alexander (2004), “The state as a person in international theory” in Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 289-316.  
Wendt, Alexander (2006), “Social Science as Cartesian Science: an auto-critique from a quantum 
perspective” in Guzzini and Leander (ed.), Constructivism and international relations: Alexander 
Wendt and his critics. London: Routledge.  
Wight, Colin (2004), “State Agency: social action without human activity?” in Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 269-280. 
Wight, Colin (2006), Agents, structures and international relations: politics as ontology. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1966), Tractatus logico-philosophicus: the German text of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung / with a new translation by D. F. Pears & B. F. 
McGuinness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Woodward, David and Lewis, G. Malcolm (1998), “Introduction”, in Harley, J. B. and and Woodward, 
David (ed.), The history of cartography. Vol. 2, book 2, Cartography in the traditional East and 
Southeast Asian societies, pp.. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Woodwar, David (2007), “Cartography and the Renaissance: Continuity and Change” in Woodward, 
David (ed.), The history of cartography. Vol. 3, part 1, Cartography in the European Renaissance, pp. 
3-24. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Zysk, Katarzyna (2010), Russia's Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints, Joint Force Quarterly, 
NDU Press, 57/2010. 
Available also online at http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-57/zysk.pdf  
DICTIONARIES AND ENCYCLOPEDIAS  
Encyclopedia of social and cultural anthropology (1996), Alan Barnard and Jonathan Spencer (ed.), 
London: Routledge. 
Encyclopedia of social theory (2005), Ritzer, George (ed.), Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Greek-English Lexicon (1958), Liddel, Henry G. and Scott, Robert (ed.), Oxford: Calendon Press. 
Online Etymological Dictionary. 
http://etymonline.com  
Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. 
http://oald8.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com  
108 
 
The Cambridge dictionary of sociology (2006), Turner, Bryan S. (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 
http://plato.stanford.edu  
Vocabolario Etimologico della Lingua Italiana, Ottorino Pianigiani (ed.). 
http://www.etimo.it  
INTERNET AND RADIO BROADCASTS, WEBSITES 
Franco Farinelli “L’invenzione della Terra”, directed by Giancarlo Simoncelli. Radio broadcast series 
“Alle 8 della Sera”, 20 Dec. 2004 - 14 Jan. 2005, Rai Radio 2, 
http://www.radio.rai.it/radio2/alleotto/invenzioneterra/  
Arctic Council website, http://www.arctic-council.org  
Malcolm Shaw, “The International Legal Principles Relating to Territorial Disputes: The Acquisition 
of Title to Territory”, accessed on 24.10.2012 from the website of the United Nations Audiovisual 
Library of International Law, http://www.un.org/law/avl 
Geopolitics in the High North website, http://www.geopoliticsnorth.org/  
